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Abstract
End-to-end trust is regarded as a game changer for the assurance of distributed
and heterogeneous computing environments. It refers to the collection of tech-
nologies, user behaviours, implementations and infrastructures that can enable a
predictable level of trust in the computing environment. In order to establish end-
to-end trust, we first need to identify trust properties that reflects the make up of
a trusted system. This is followed by the development of this trusted system that
spans hardware, software, people and data.
The first part of the thesis reports our work on identifying trust properties. We
first describe a study that looks at how computer users perceive trust notions and
the relationship between these perceptions and the stake involved in practical In-
formation Technology scenarios. This work provides an up-to-date understanding
of trust notions. Then, to address the challenge of describing the make up of a
trusted system, we offer a novel causality-based model. This model represents in-
formation about the dependencies between trust notions, capabilities, computing
mechanisms and their configurations. We also introduce a new approach to at-
testation which is founded on the use of provenance data. A complete design of
this attestation technique is given. This is followed by building key mechanisms to
explore implementation approaches to provenance-based attestation.
The second part of the thesis looks at the challenges of developing trusted sys-
tems which contain the building blocks of trust properties. We develop an ontol-
ogy that describes the capabilities of a computing device secured with the Trusted
Platform Module (TPM) 2.0. The aim is to enable experts to share a common un-
derstanding of such technologies with developers using a standard vocabulary. We
then develop a use scenario of TPM 2.0 and investigate the use of threat modelling
on this scenario. Finally, we look at using TPM 2.0, as a building block of trust prop-
erties, in a modern system and propose a framework for para-virtualizing TPM 2.0.
i
Acknowledgment
I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr. Allan Tomlinson, for his support and guid-
ance throughout my PhD program. It was a great challenge for me to go back to
school after working in the public sector for 8 years. He helped me with the tran-
sition by identifying potential research ideas and giving continuous feedback on
my work. He has also introduced me to numerous researchers in Trusted Comput-
ing, enabling me to tap on their knowledge. It has been a privilege doing research
under his supervision as without him, this thesis would not have been possible. I
would also like to thank my advisor, Dr. Stephen D. Wolthusen, who accompanied
my development via the annual reviews.
During my stay at Royal Holloway, I was honored to have met many good peo-
ple. I would like to thank them all and wish them well in their life and careers.
Particularly, I would like to thank fellow students from the Information Security
Group and Mathematics Department who have brightened up the study environ-
ment. In the course of my research work, I was glad to be introduced to David
Grawrock of Intel and Dr. Liqun Chen and Dr. Graeme Proudler of HP Labs. I am
grateful to them for sharing their knowledge of Trusted Computing. And many
thanks to my examiners Assoc. Prof. Andrew Simpson of University of Oxford
and Prof. Kenny Paterson of Royal Holloway University of London for their in-
sightful comments on my thesis and making my viva an interesting experience.
Back home, I would like to thank my sponsor for its financial support over the
years. From my previous work place, I would like to thank my managers and
directors who backed my decision to enroll in this PhD program. I would like to
express my deepest gratitude to my colleagues who had to take up my work when
I left.
My heartfelt thanks to all my family members for their unconditional love and
encouragement. Most importantly, I have to thank my wife for persuading me to
take up a PhD program. She has also provided immeasurable care for our boy and
me during our stay in the United Kingdom. I simply can’t thank her enough.
ii
Contents
Listings viii
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Key Findings and Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.4 Thesis Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
I Identifying Trust Properties 8
2 A Socio-Technical Study on User-Centered Trust Notions and Their Cor-
relation to Stake in Practical Information Technology Scenarios 9
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3 Research Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.4 Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.5 The Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.6 Analyzing the Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.7 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.8 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3 A Causality-based Model for Describing the Trustworthiness of a Com-
puting Device 30
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.2 A Causality-based Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.3 Basic Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.4 Graph Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.5 Praxis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.6 Trust Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.7 Related Works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.8 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
4 Provenance-based Attestation for Trustworthy Computing 49
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.2 Provenance Data as Trust Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.3 Design Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.4 A Design for Provenance-based Attestation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.5 Collecting and Representing Provenance Records . . . . . . . . . . . 53
iii
Contents
4.6 Trust Assessment of Provenance Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.7 Proof of Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4.8 Threat Modelling of Our Design for Provenance-based Attestation . 63
4.9 A Protocol for Provenance-based Attestation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.10 Related Works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.11 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
II Developing Trusted Systems 67
5 An Ontology of a Computing Device Secured with Trusted Platform
Module 2.0 68
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
5.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
5.3 An Ontological Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
5.4 Querying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
5.5 Related Works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
5.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
6 Threat Model of a Scenario based on Trusted Platform Module 2.0 Spec-
ification 80
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
6.2 Threat Modelling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
6.3 Description of Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
6.4 Threat Identification and Mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
6.5 Related Works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
6.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
7 Para-Virtualizing the Trusted Platform Module: An Enterprise Frame-
work Based on Version 2.0 Specification 87
7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
7.2 More About TPM 2.0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
7.3 State of the Art for Para-Virtualizing the TPM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
7.4 Examining TPM 2.0 Suitability for Para-Virtualizing . . . . . . . . . . 92
7.5 Requirements for Para-Virtualizing TPM 2.0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
7.6 An Enterprise Framework for Para-Virtualizing TPM 2.0 . . . . . . . 95
7.7 Requirements Revisited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
7.8 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
8 Conclusion and Future Work 101
8.1 Thesis Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
8.2 Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
8.3 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
A Appendix A 105
B Appendix B 108
C Appendix C 147
iv
Contents
D Appendix D 175
Bibliography 184
v
List of Figures
1.1 Dependencies among chapters of this thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1 Technology acceptance model from [17] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2 The simplified user centered trust model from [32] . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3 Relationship between trust, stake and risk drawn after [82] . . . . . . . . 16
2.4 Relationship between trust and trustworthiness drawn after [82] . . . . . 17
2.5 Willingness to share different types of personal information in scenario
one. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.6 Willingness to share different types of personal information in scenario
two. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.1 Definition of causality-based model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.2 Defining the causal graph. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.3 Pictorial representation of the vertices and edges in the causal graph
model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.4 Pictorial representation of a sample causal graph. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.5 Example of a trust policy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.1 A design of provenance-based attestation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.2 A graph describing the PROV data model redrawn from [54]. . . . . . . 54
4.3 Flowchart for upgrading iptables using rpm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.4 Provenance graph of upgrading iptables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.5 A screen shot of System Tap running a monitoring script. . . . . . . . . . 61
5.1 Graphical representation of the ontology based description. . . . . . . . 72
5.2 SPARQL query for the Confidentiality class. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.3 SPARQL query for the AccessControl class. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
5.4 SPARQL query for the Attestation class. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
6.1 STRIDE-per-element matrix from [34]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
6.2 To encrypt symmetric key for group share. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
6.3 To recover symmetric key for group share. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
6.4 DFD for encrypting symmetric key (left) and for recovering symmetric
key (right). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
7.1 Architecture for para-virtualizing TPM sharing from [21]. . . . . . . . . . 91
7.2 Layout of the multi-context TPM from [85]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
7.3 TPM control structure from [85]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
7.4 TPM 2.0 key distribution for multiple VM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
7.5 Enterprise framework for para-virtualizing TPM 2.0. . . . . . . . . . . . 96
vi
List of Tables
2.1 Subjective trust notions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2 Objective trust notions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3 Demographics of the two samples. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.4 Ranking of subjective notions in scenario one. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.5 Ranking of objective notions in scenario one. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.6 Ranking of subjective notions in scenario two. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.7 Ranking of objective notions in scenario two. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4.1 Threats and mitigations to provenance-based attestation. . . . . . . . . . 64
5.1 Result for SPARQL query on the Confidentiality class. . . . . . . . . . . . 75
5.2 Result for SPARQL query on the AccessControl class. . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
6.1 Threats and mitigations to use scenario. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
vii
Listings
3.1 XML schema of causal graph data model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.2 XML representation of the sample causal graph. . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.3 Specification of the basic assessment rule. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.4 XQuery command to check for a specific mechanisms that ”DiskLocker”
calls on. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4.1 XML based provenance record for patching iptables. . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.2 Rule specification grammar for trustworthy evaluation of provenance
record. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.3 A set of dependency and attribute rules. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.4 Dependency rule expressed as XQuery. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.5 Attribute rule expressed as XQuery. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.6 Using TPM to generate digital signature of a provenance record. . . . 65
4.7 Using TPM to verify digital signature of a provenance record. . . . . 65
5.1 Description of the Confidentiality class in RDF/XML format. . . . . . 75
5.2 Description of the AccessControl class in RDF/XML format. . . . . . . 76
5.3 Description of the Attestation class in RDF/XML format. . . . . . . . 77
viii
List of Abbreviations
CCE Common Configuration Enumeration
CPE Common Platform Enumeration
DFD Data Flow Diagram
DNF Disjunctive Normal Form
I/O Input and Output
IT Information Technology
IV Initialization Vector
MAP Metadata Access Point
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NV Non Volatile
OPM Open Provenance Model
OS Operating System
OWL Web Ontology Language
PCR Plaform Configuration Register
RDF Resource Description Framework
RNG Random Number Generator
TAM Technology Acceptance Model
TCB Trusted Computing Base
TCG Trusted Computing Group
TLS Transport Layer Security
TNC Trusted Network Connect
TPM Trusted Platform Module
Turtle Terse RDF Triple Language
URI Uniform Resource Identifier
URL Uniform Resource Locator
VM Virtual Machine
VMM Virtual Machine Monitor
W3C World Wide Web Consortium
XACML eXtensible Access Control Markup Language
XML eXtensible Markup Language
ix
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Modern computing devices are diverse and interconnected by dynamic and hetero-
geneous networks. In the 2009 National Cyber Leap Year Summit, the participat-
ing researchers reported that end-to-end trust will be a game changing technology
when deployed in this type of computing environment [14]. They defined end-
to-end trust as a collection of technologies, behaviours, implementations and in-
frastructure that can enable a predictable level of trustworthiness in the computing
environment.
The identification of trust properties can be used to determine the trustworthi-
ness of a system. This ability is considered as a key to the establishment of end-
to-end trust. The benefit of this is that any other computing device can select its
mode of participation in a computer network according to the level of trustworthi-
ness offered by the corresponding computing devices. In the same vein, Grawrock
et al. explained that there is a need for computing devices to communicate their
trustworthiness so that the involved parties can understand and manage security
risks [94]. Grawrock articulated on this issue again at the 2013 European Trusted
Infrastructure and Systems School 1. He lectured specifically on the need for a trust
language that could describe the trustworthiness of a computing device. He noted
that the level of trust is not the same for different tasks. On the other hand, the
make up of a computing device determines its level of trustworthiness and conse-
quently the tasks it is trusted to perform. The trust language should have grammar
to support the descriptive property, and rules are necessary as free form makes
parsing difficult.
Meanwhile, property-based attestation was proposed by Sadeghi and Stuble [74].
The main concept is that attestation should verify if a computer possesses proper-
ties to fulfill certain requirements of the party who asks for attestation. The authors
define that the trust property of a computing device describes an aspect of the be-
haviour of that computing device regarding certain requirements, such as confiden-
tiality. However, this approach is challenged by the fuzzy definition of property. In
addition, the authors did not discuss how this property can be evaluated to ascer-
tain the trustworthiness of the computing device.
In addition, a literature review was carried out by Nagarajan et al. [55] on prop-
erty based attestation. In that paper, the authors analyzed the various works and
summarized that the main challenge was to define what is meant to be a prop-
erty. The authors also wrote that a property can be described at different level of
granularity. For example, data confidentiality in a card payment machine is pro-
1http://www.iaik.tugraz.at/content/about iaik/events/ETISS INTRUST 2013/
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vided by an encryption function which employs a certain cryptographic algorithm.
Moreover, the definition of a property is closely bound to the application that the
property is defined for. The property can change as the state of the computer sys-
tem changes. There is also the consideration that there are dependencies among
properties. Hence, during attestation, the list of dependent properties has to be
evaluated too. As the paper is a literature review, the authors did not go into de-
scribing how these properties make up a trusted system. Nevertheless, the paper
provides a very useful analysis on trust properties.
Thus, some questions on identifying trust properties arise: What is the under-
standing of trust by computer users? How can we describe the trustworthiness of a
computing device? Can this description be evaluated? What evidence can be pro-
vided to convey assurance in the trustworthiness of a computing device? Can we
evaluate this evidence? In the first part of this thesis, we study and address these
questions.
The second part of this thesis looks at the development of trusted systems which
contain the building blocks of trust properties. The participating researchers of the
2009 National Cyber Leap Year Summit stated that hardware can be the root of
trust in a computing environment. Thus, a system that has components which
are developed and configured to leverage trusted hardware can be considered as a
trusted system [66]. Moreover, such trusted hardware is also regarded as a building
block for trust properties.
On the research front, considerable effort was directed towards building a trusted
system based on the Trusted Platform Module (TPM). The TPM is a device that is
specified by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG). The TPM is designed to im-
prove the trust in computing devices by offering certain functionalities such as
cryptographic engine, secure storage, digital certification and trusted reporting of
the identity and state of its host computing device. TPM 2.0 is the latest specifica-
tion from TCG [92].
One such project which aimed to build trusted systems was carried out by
Kuhlmann et al. [42]. In this project, prototypes of trusted systems were devel-
oped. For example, in the demonstration for home banking, a specialized virtual
machine was launched to host the home banking client. This virtual machine will
be attested by the bank to prevent impersonation. Although the TPM provides
unique capabilities which can benefit computer users, a panel of industry experts
at the Trusted Computing Conference 2013 pointed out that its uptake was mainly
limited to high end computing devices such as those designed for the commercial
environment [2]. One reason given was that there was a lack of consumer use sce-
narios.
Consequently, some problems on the development of trusted systems emerge:
How to share information on trusted hardware so that developers can use it? What
method can be used to identify threats to use scenarios of trusted hardware? What
applications can benefit from using trusted hardware? In the second part of this
thesis, we investigate and propose solutions to these problems.
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1.2 Key Findings and Contributions
This thesis uses several approaches to develop solutions for the questions raised in
Section 1.1. In so doing, the thesis makes the following findings and contributions.
• We uncovered how computer users perceive subjective and objective trust no-
tions in various scenarios. We also detected correlations between the stake in-
volved in a scenario and the importance of these trust notions. Consequently,
we contributed an updated understanding of trust.
• To describe the properties that make up a trusted system, we showed how
this trust language can be based on the concept of causality. The description
includes information about the dependencies between trust notions, capabil-
ities, computing mechanisms and their configurations. To support practical
application, we transformed this causality-based description to a graph and
demonstrated its implementation. This work brings together two separate
domains of research in trust: abstract trust notions and technical trust primi-
tives. As a result, we contributed a causality-based model for describing the
properties of a trusted system and the specification of rules used for its eval-
uation
• We argued for the use of provenance data as trust evidence. To advance this
idea, we developed a design that uses provenance data of software compo-
nents in the attestation of a trustworthy computing device. This design in-
cludes the specification of rules used for evaluating provenance data. There-
fore, we contributed an attestation technique based on provenance data of
computer software components.
• We found that the ontological approach is suitable for producing a standard
vocabulary for experts to share with developers the common understanding
of a particular class of trusted system. Subsequently, we contributed an on-
tology of a computing device secured with TPM 2.0
• To use TPM 2.0 as a building block of a trusted system, we found that threat
modelling can be used as a tool to analyse use scenarios of TPM 2.0. Mean-
while, we also found that TPM 2.0 can be para-virtualised. On this point, we
contributed a para-virtualisation framework for TPM 2.0.
1.3 Publications
The contributions in this thesis are described in the following publications.
• Jiun Yi Yap and Allan Tomlinson. Socio-Technical Study on User-Centered
Trust Notions and Their Correlation to Stake in Practical Information Tech-
nology Scenarios. In Proceedings of the 6th ASE International Conference on
Privacy, Security and Trust, 14-16 December 2014.
• Jiun Yi Yap and Allan Tomlinson. A Causality-based Model for Describing
the Trustworthiness of a Computing Device. In Proceedings of the 7th Inter-
national Conference on Trusted Systems, 7-8 December 2015.
3
1.4 Thesis Structure
• Jiun Yi Yap and Allan Tomlinson. Provenance-based Attestation for Trustwor-
thy Computing. In Proceedings of the 14th IEEE International Conference on
Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications, 20-22 Au-
gust 2015.
• Jiun Yi Yap and Allan Tomlinson. An Ontology of a Computing Device Se-
cured with Trusted Platform Module 2.0. RHUL-ISG-2016-2 (Information Se-
curity Group, Royal Holloway, University of London, 2016).
• Jiun Yi Yap and Allan Tomlinson. Threat Model of a Scenario Based on Trusted
Platform Module 2.0 Specification. In Workshop on Web Applications and Se-
cure Hardware, 20 June 2013.
• Jiun Yi Yap and Allan Tomlinson. Para-Virtualizing the Trusted Platform
Module: An Enterprise Framework Based on Version 2.0 Specification. In
Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Trusted Systems, 4-5 De-
cember 2013.
1.4 Thesis Structure
This thesis is organised into two parts. Part I contains Chapters 2, 3 and 4, which
focus on the identification of trust properties. In Chapter 2, to establish the under-
standing of trust notions in this thesis, we describe a socio-technical study on user-
centered trust notions. Addressing the challenge of describing the trustworthiness
of a computing device, we present, in Chapter 3, a novel causality-based model to
represent information about the dependencies between trust notions, capabilities,
computing mechanism and configurations. This is followed by Chapter 4 where
we address the question of the assurance in the trustworthiness of a computing de-
vice by introducing a new approach to attestation using the provenance data of the
computer components.
Part II consists of Chapters 5, 6 and 7, and they deal with the development
of a trusted system which uses the TPM 2.0 as a building block. In Chapter 5,
we present an ontology that describes the capabilities of a computing device se-
cured with TPM 2.0. The aim is to have a standard vocabulary for experts to share
information on such technologies with developers of trusted systems. This is fol-
lowed by Chapter 6 where we develop a use scenario based on TPM 2.0 and study
about the use of threat modelling. In Chapter 7, we offer a framework for para-
virtualizing as a potential application of TPM 2.0.
As this thesis spans multiple research projects, the background material rele-
vant for their understanding and the literature reviews are woven into their re-
spective individual chapters. The following paragraphs provide more details about
these chapters.
Chapter 2. To establish the understanding of trust notions in this thesis, we con-
ducted a socio-technical study on user-centered trust notions and their correlations
to stake in practical information technology scenarios. From literature reviews, the
study captured a list of subjective and objective trust notions and looked at a con-
ceptual relationship between trust, stake and risk. We then proposed an approach
4
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to investigate the importance of these trust notions and their correlation with stake.
For the purpose of the study, an online survey was commissioned and it provided
the respondents with scenarios based on a mass market laptop computer and In-
ternet of Things devices. It asked questions on the type of information for sharing
online to establish the stake and the importance ranking of the subjective and ob-
jective trust notions. The results were analyzed and hypothesis tests were carried
out using statistical methods. We uncovered how the respondents rank the im-
portance of various trust notions in different scenarios and detected correlations
between stake and the perceived importance of the subjective and objective trust
notions. This work was partly funded by the University of London Postgraduate
Research Study Cost Scheme. This chapter is based on our publication ”Socio-
Technical Study on User-Centered Trust Notions and Their Correlation to Stake in
Practical Information Technology Scenarios”.
Chapter 3. With the understanding of trust notions from Chapter 2, we present
in this chapter a novel causality-based model for describing the trustworthiness of
a computing device. The description includes information about the dependencies
between trust notions, capabilities, computing mechanisms and their configura-
tions. We will show in this chapter what could be the grammar of Grawrock’s trust
language described in Section 1.1 and we explain the structure of this trust lan-
guage. In this work, the concept of causality within the model was defined first.
This involved detailing the semantic meaning of the terms used in the model. A
pictorial representation was then developed to show the causal dependencies as a
graph. This step specified the vertices and edges used in the causal graph. To im-
plement the causality-based model, the causal graph was translated into an eXten-
sible Markup Language schema and added to the Metadata Access Point database
server of the Trusted Network Connect open architecture. Finally, the trust as-
sessment of the causal graph was explained. The work presented in this chapter
appears in our publication ”A Causality-based Model for Describing the Trustwor-
thiness of a Computing Device”.
Chapter 4. Having developed a description for trustworthiness of a computing
device, the next step is to attest to the components identified in the description.
We present a new approach to attestation that is founded on provenance data of
its key components. The prevailing method of attestation relies on comparing in-
tegrity measurements of the key components of a computer against a reference
database of trustworthy integrity measurements. An integrity measurement is ob-
tained by passing the binary of a component through a hash function but this value
carries little information unless there is a reference database. On the other hand,
the semantics of provenance contain more details: There is expressive information
such as the component’s history and its causal dependencies with other elements
of a computer. Hence, we argue that provenance data can be used as evidence of
trustworthiness during attestation. We begin by describing a complete design for
provenance-based attestation. The design development was guided by goals and it
covers all the phases of this approach. We discuss collecting provenance data and
using the PROV data model [54] to represent provenance data. This is a new ap-
plication of the PROV data model which is typically used in the semantic web. To
evaluate the provenance data for trustworthiness of the component it represents,
we developed a rule specification grammar and provided a discourse on using the
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rules. We then built the key mechanisms of this form of attestation by exploring
approaches to capture provenance data and looking at transforming the trust eval-
uation rules to XQuery language before running the rules against an XML based
record of provenance data. Finally, the design was analyzed using threat mod-
elling. This chapter is based on our publication ”Provenance-based Attestation for
Trustworthy Computing”.
Chapter 5. The second part of this thesis looks at the development of trusted
systems which contain the building blocks of trust properties. We first work on
using an ontology as a standard vocabulary for experts to share a common un-
derstanding of trusted systems with developers. To this end, we contribute an
ontology for describing a class of computing device secured with Trusted Platform
Module (TPM) version 2.0. This ontology represents information about the capa-
bility of the computing device, TPM 2.0, and notions of trust we have obtained
from Chapter 2. They are characterized at different abstract levels. The ontology is
based on the Web Ontology Language (OWL) and recorded in Resource Descrip-
tion Framework (RDF) / eXtensible Markup Language (XML) format. A developer
can review the ontology-based description by asking competency questions. Fi-
nally, we demonstrate how to translate the competency questions into SPARQL
queries. The work presented in this chapter appears in our technical report ”An
Ontology of a Computing Device Secured with Trusted Platform Module 2.0”.
Chapter 6. In this chapter, we produce a use scenario that describes the use of
TPM 2.0 cryptographic functions to share data. This is followed by the use of Mi-
crosoft’s security development lifecycle threat modelling tool to construct a threat
model of this use scenario. The threats to each element in the model are analysed
and the appropriate mitigations are worked out. Our publication ”Threat Model of
a Scenario Based on Trusted Platform Module 2.0 Specification” forms the basis of
this chapter.
Chapter 7. We now consider how TPM 2.0, as a building block for trust prop-
erties, can be used in a modern system. Virtualization is a fundamental technology
that is widely used in Enterprise IT infrastructures. Users of virtualization tech-
nology need some level of assurance about the expected behavior of a virtual ma-
chine (VM) and its ability to protect confidential information from unauthorized
disclosure. The TPM offers security properties that can be leveraged by the users
of virtualization technology to increase the protection of the system and data from
cyber security threats [77]. In this chapter, we contribute a framework for para-
virtualizing the TPM 2.0. The framework covers the design of a para-virtualized
TPM 2.0 and the considerations when deploying it for use in an Enterprise Infor-
mation Technology infrastructure. To develop this framework, a quick study of
the TPM 2.0 specification was undertaken and a survey of para-virtualizing TPM
techniques was carried out. The study found that TPM 2.0 core functions are suit-
able for para-virtualization. A set of requirements was then developed to guide
the design of this framework. The framework includes components to support the
para-virtualized TPM. The framework also covers external components that are
essential for the proper functioning of the para-virtualized TPM in an Enterprise
IT environment. The work presented in this chapter appears in our publication
”Para-Virtualizing the Trusted Platform Module: An Enterprise Framework Based
on Version 2.0 Specification”. It was given the best paper award by the conference
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Figure 1.1: Dependencies among chapters of this thesis
organisers.
Chapter 8. We conclude this thesis by providing final remarks and discussing
the plethora of research still to be undertaken in the course of these works.
Although Chapters 2 to 7 present individual works, they are not entirely inde-
pendent and do exhibit associations. For example, the threat modelling process in
Chapter 6 is used to analyse the provenance-based attestation in Chapter 4. The
objective trust notions from Chapter 2 are used to guide the development of the
causality-based model in Chapter 3 and the ontology in Chapter 5. The ontology in
Chapter 5 is in turn referenced when developing the materials for Chapter 6 and 7.
Lastly, Chapter 4 describes an attestation technique that can be used to vouch for
the trust description of Chapter 5. These relations are depicted in Figure 1.1.
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Identifying Trust Properties
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Chapter 2
A Socio-Technical Study on User-Centered
Trust Notions and Their Correlation to Stake in
Practical Information Technology Scenarios
2.1 Introduction
In the context of human and computer interaction, it is often the case that the hu-
man computer user has to trust a computing device to carry out a specific task in-
volving certain stake. A key factor that affects this behavior is the properties of the
computing device that satisfy the human computer user’s requirement for trust-
worthiness. This in turn relates to how a human computer user understands trust.
In this thesis, we use the term ”trust notion” to refer to the properties of a comput-
ing device that a human computer user considers when he is deciding whether to
trust it to carry out a given task. Another key factor is the stake involved in this
task. Stake will refer to the value of information revealed when a task is carried
out by a computing device. The computer user can decide what stake is acceptable
with respect to the properties of the computing device and the scenario.
The user-centered point of view of the trust in a computing device is more subtle
than ”a computer user should not use that computing device if he cannot trust it”
[39]. Trust is not a purely technical property but rather a socio-technical quality that
includes computer users’ behavior with regards to technology and the underlining
cognitive and psychological factors [15]. Moreover, the stake involve in the task
can influence a computer user’s attitude to the properties offered by the computing
device [82]. This is an important consideration in Trust Management. For example,
if the task involves information that is considered as high value, then a computer
user is likely to require the computing device to possess a configuration that gives
a high level of protection.
We would like to obtain an up-to-date understanding of how computer users
view the social and technical aspects of trust in practical scenarios. We would
also like to gain an insight into the connection between stake and computer users’
perceptions of trust notions. This knowledge will provide direction when inves-
tigating trust concepts and the use of trustworthy computing technologies. Thus,
a socio-technical study was carried out to examine how computer users perceive
these trust notions and the association of trust notions to the stake involved in prac-
tical scenarios. The social aspect of the study examined how these mental and ex-
periential attributes influence a computer user’s behavior in trusting a computing
device. The technical aspect of the study looked at how a computer user perceives
certain technical properties such as those related to information security, trusted
computing and security standards.
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Section 2.2 reviews related work. It captures the trust notions that are covered in
this socio-technical study and examines the conceptual relationship between trust,
stake and risk. This section also describes the approach taken to study these con-
cepts in practice. Section 2.3 sets out the research questions and Section 2.4 de-
scribes the scenarios that portray the stakes involved. Section 2.5 describes the
development of an online survey to collect data for this study. Section 2.6 examines
the data collected from the online survey using statistical analysis and hypothesis
testing. Section 2.7 discusses how the survey data helps to answer the research
questions. The summary of this chapter is in Section 2.8. In addition, secondary
analyses of how different demographic groups perceive the subjective and objec-
tive trust notions in the two scenarios are given in Appendix A.
2.2 Literature Review
The concept of trust is so diverse in different domains and contexts that it is not
meaningful to articulate it without a focus. In this socio-technical study, trust is
examined in the context of human and computer interaction which is typical in the
domain of Information Technology. A number of user-centered trust models have
been proposed. Corritor et al. propose a model for online trust [16]. Their trust
model is based on research from human-computer interaction and it defines two
categories of factors that give rise to trust. In the category of perceived factors, the
authors describe how credibility, ease of use and risk can impact a computer user’s
degree of trust in a website. On the other hand, in the category of external factors,
the authors describe the influence on trust by physical and psychological causes.
Meanwhile, Wang and Emurian suggest a framework for online trust [95]. The
framework presents the four considerations of graphic design, structure design,
content design and social-cue design. The authors explain that these considera-
tions are aimed to gain a high level of trust from the computer users. However,
[16] and [95] focus on the social aspect of trust and they do not address the techni-
cal aspect of trust. Thus, to examine both the social and technical aspect of trust,
we turn to the user-centered trust model proposed by Hasan et al. [32] which sug-
gests that trusting beliefs form attitudes that lead to trusting behavior. Thereafter,
we look at the conceptual relationship of trust, stake and risk by Solhauf et al. [82].
Their literature reviews are summarised in Section 2.2.1 and 2.2.2. As defined ear-
lier, the social aspect of the study examines how mental and experiential attributes
influence a computer user’s behavior of trusting a computing device and we use
the term ”subjective trust notion” to refer to these attributes. On the other hand,
the technical aspects of the study looked at how a computer user perceives certain
technical properties such as those related to information security, trusted comput-
ing and security standards, and the term ”objective trust notion” is used in this
chapter to refer to those properties.
2.2.1 User Centered Trust Model
The framing of this study is based on the conceptual user centered trust model
proposed by Hasan et al. [32]. In their paper, the authors described how the Tech-
nology Acceptance Model (TAM) [17] can be integrated with various trust concepts
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Figure 2.1: Technology acceptance model from [17]
they gathered from literature reviews. The main idea of the TAM is that system use
is a response that can be explained or predicted by user motivation. This in turn is
directly affected by external variables, which could be the user’s education level,
gender, mindset towards adopting new technology and stake and risk involved in a
transaction. We will look at the external variables of stake and risk in Section 2.2.2.
User motivation consists of the following factors: beliefs, attitude toward using
and behavioral intention. The TAM explains that the components of beliefs include
the perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use. Perceived ease of use is the
degree to which an individual believes that using a particular system would be
free of physical and mental effort while perceived usefulness refers to the degree
to which an individual believes that using a particular system would enhance his
work performance. The attitude of the user is a major determinant of whether the
user will actually use or reject the system and behavioral intention is a measure of
one’s intention to perform a behavior. Figure 2.1 shows the TAM.
The TAM can be explained by the Theory of Reasoned Action [23], which sug-
gests that behavior is driven by intentions and intentions are a function of an in-
dividual’s attitude. In turn, these attitudes are derived from beliefs. With this
understanding in mind, Hasan et al. then carried out literature reviews and high-
lighted the work of Benamati et al. [7] and McKnight et al. [51]. The authors deduce
from the literature reviews that beliefs can be categorized into ”trusting beliefs in
technology” and ”trusting beliefs in vendors”. The trusting beliefs in technology
refers to the technical properties that a computer user thinks will enable a comput-
ing device to accomplish the given task. The trusting beliefs in vendors refers to
the conduct that people in the organization, that produce the computing device,
display in order to impress the computer user, who is a consumer of the computing
device. Based on their analysis, the authors proposed a hypothetical user centered
trust model and the simplified illustration of this model is shown in Figure 2.2. Es-
sentially, this user-centered trust model proposes that beliefs, which consist of the
TAM beliefs, trusting beliefs in technology and trusting beliefs in vendor, and in
accordance to the Theory of Reasoned Action, give rise to attitudes that lead the
computer user to form the intention to trust a computing device and eventually re-
sult in a behavior that manifests as using the computing device to carry out a given
task.
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Figure 2.2: The simplified user centered trust model from [32]
2.2.2 Subjective Trust Notions
We argue that notions associated with TAM beliefs and trusting beliefs in vendors
can differ from one person to another and are subjective. For example, each com-
puter user has his belief about how a computing device can enhance his job perfor-
mance. Another example is that one individual’s experience with the vendor can
be different from another’s. On the other hand, notions related to trusting beliefs
in technology are based on technical attributes and hence objective. Therefore, we
can broadly classify these trust notions from the user-centered trust model as either
subjective or objective. The subjective trust notions to be examined in this study are
proposed to consist of those shown in Table 2.1. These notions are derived from the
notions described by Hasan et al. for TAM beliefs and trusting beliefs in vendors.
2.2.3 Objective Trust Notions
For the purpose of a more encompassing socio-technical study on user centered
trust notions, we propose that the trusting beliefs in technology cover notions re-
lated to the attributes of information security and trusted computing. This is be-
cause trust, as discussed in the foregoing, and security are not orthogonal. Trusted
components are used to build secure systems. On the other hand, security proper-
ties are often evaluated as part of the process of establishing trust in a computing
system. This association of trust and security is articulated in the Trusted Com-
puter System Evaluation Criteria (Orange Book) of the United States of America
Department of Defense in 1985 [71]. Therefore, our study includes notions related
to attributes of information security such as confidentiality, integrity and availabil-
ity. These notions are described in the ISO 27001 standard [37]. In addition, the
study looks at what computer users think of the importance of security standards
that prescribe guidelines for the secure development and configuration of comput-
ing devices.
One central piece of Information Security technology is the Trusted Platform
Module (TPM) specified by the Trusted Computing Group [92]. The TPM is a de-
vice which is typically bound to another computing device to provide trusted com-
puting functionality. One aspect of this functionality is the integrity measurement
of components involved in the booting of the computing device. When the in-
tegrity measurements match predefined trustworthy values, it can be said that the
computing device will behave in a trustworthy manner. This functionality conveys
the notion of expected behavior and authenticity.
Furthermore, the TPM has a unique key that can be used to identify itself to
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Table 2.1: Subjective trust notions.
S/N Notion Description
1 The computing device is easy
to use.
The degree to which a computer user be-
lieves that using the computing device
will be free from physical and mental ef-
fort. This notion is related to TAM.
2 The computing device is use-
ful for this scenario.
The degree to which a computer user be-
lieves that the computing device will en-
hance his job performance. This notion
is related to TAM.
3 The aesthetics of the comput-
ing device suit this scenario.
The emotional attitude that a beautiful
or attractive casing or interface gives a
positive impression. Hassan et al. cited
the work by Lindgaard et al. [46] who
suggested that visual appeal dominates
first impression judgment of trustwor-
thiness.
4 Vendor’s technical compe-
tence at solving your prob-
lem.
The degree to which a computer user
perceives that the vendor is in posses-
sion of the necessary knowledge and
skills to resolve a technical problem.
This notion is part of the trusting belief
in technology and the authors attributed
this to the work by Mayer et al. [50] and
Li et al. [45].
5 Vendor’s interest in your
wellbeing when you en-
counter a difficulty.
The belief that the vendor is interested
in the wellbeing of the user without ul-
terior motive. This notion is part of
the trusting belief in technology and the
authors attributed this to the work by
Mayer et al. [50] and Li et al. [45].
6 Vendor’s ability to tell you
the truth and act ethically
when a new issue is discov-
ered.
The belief that the vendor tells the truth
and acts ethically. This notion is part of
the trusting belief in technology and the
authors attributed this to the work by
Mayer et al. [50] and Li et al. [45].
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a requestor. Identity is an important factor affecting trust. During remote attes-
tation, the TPM can provide the requestor this identification together with the in-
tegrity measurements as a proof of its identity and state of trustworthiness. In
addition, the latest specification of TPM has a cryptographic engine that is able to
carry out cryptographic operations using widely used symmetric and asymmetric
algorithms.
Although the TPM provides unique capabilities which can benefit computer
users, its uptake is mainly limited to high end computing devices such as those de-
signed for the commercial environment. A panel of industry experts discussed this
at the Trusted Computing Conference 2013 [2] and pointed out that there is a lack
of consumer use cases which may hamper the uptake of the TPM. Therefore, the
outcome of our study into TPM related notions such as expected behavior, identity
and authenticity can also aid the development of TPM based consumer use cases.
A new trustworthy computing research area is the use of provenance-based
models for reasoning about a system’s ability to satisfy trust properties of interest
[56]. The main concept behind the provenance-based model is the provision of
origin and change history of hardware or software components to assist with trust
evaluation. It is interesting to examine what computer users think of this property
of provenance as an objective trust notion.
Consequently, the objective trust notions to be examined in this study are pro-
posed to consist of those described in Table 2.2 which relate to properties of the
device.
We now have captured a list of subjective and objective trust notions for exam-
ination in this study. As explained by the user-centered trust model of Hasan et al.,
these notions are the beliefs that give rise to attitudes which lead the computer user
to form the intention to trust a computing device and subsequently the act of using
it to carry out a task. In our socio-technical study, we will focus on investigating
the degree of importance of each of these trust notions to the computer users when
they have to trust a computing device to carry out a task in a particular scenario.
2.2.4 Relationship between trust, stake and risk
From Section 2.2.1, we understand that stake and risk are considered as external
variables in the TAM. In this sub-section, we will review the conceptual model from
Solhauf et al. [82] that relates the various facets of trust, stake and risk. We will
then propose an approach to investigate this concept by linking the definition of
trust and trustworthiness in this model to the subjective and objective trust notions
explained in the previous sub-section on the user-centered trust model.
Solhauf et al. explain that trust is a relationship between a trustor and a trustee
where the former places trust in the latter. They define ”trust” as the subjective
probability by which the trustor expects the trustee to perform a given action on
which their welfare depends. The important property of ”trust” in this model is
the aspect of belief, i.e. the trustor’s subjective probability estimation. This level
of ”trust” is a probability that ranges from 0 (complete distrust) to 1 (complete
trust). To extend this definition to the user centered trust model of Hassan et al., we
propose that this understanding of ”trust” can be extrapolated to include subjective
trust.
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Table 2.2: Objective trust notions.
S/N Notion Description
1 Always work in the same
way as before (expected be-
haviour)
This is supported by TPM’s boot up in-
tegrity measurement .
2 Provides identity and au-
thenticity of the computing
device.
This is supported by TPM’s unique key
and integrity measurement.
3 Ensure confidentiality of
data.
This is an attribute of information secu-
rity.
4 Ensure integrity of data. This is an attribute of information secu-
rity.
5 Provides the origin and
change history of its hard-
ware and software compo-
nents.
This is a new research topic that aims
to use provenance data of trustworthy
components.
6 Required function or data is
always available.
This is an attribute of information secu-
rity and is related to the notion of func-
tionality and reliability described under
the trusting beliefs in technology of the
user centered trust model.
7 Is certified to meet certain se-
curity standard, for example,
Common Criteria.
Security standards prescribe guides for
implementing information security.
8 Provides identity and au-
thenticity of the correspond-
ing party.
This is supported by TPM’s unique key
and integrity measurement.
Solhauf et al. argue that the level of risk is balanced against the stake involved
and the trust in the trustee. Stake refers to the value involved in the transaction, at
a certain level of risk, between the trustor and trustee. This relationship between
trust, stake and risk is illustrated in Figure 2.3.
As an example of using Figure 2.3, a trustor is assumed to only accept low
risk in a specific context. If the value in the transaction is s2, the trustor must
trust the trustee with a value of ”trust” ≥ t2. Symmetrically, if the ”trust” value is
determined to be t2, the trustor will proceed with transactions in which the stake is
≤ s2. If the trustor does not accept high risk, then all transactions in which ”trust”
value is t1 and the stake value is ≥ s1 are unacceptable. In the same way, if the
stake is s1, all transactions in which the ”trust” value is ≤ t1 are unacceptable.
Further to this conceptual relationship of trust, stake and risk, the authors then
define that ”trustworthiness” is the objective probability by which the trustee per-
forms a given action on which the welfare of the trustor depends. They explain that
well-founded trust is the case in which the ”trust” perceived by the trustor equals
the ”trustworthiness” of the trustee. This means that the trustee possess properties
that supports its ”trustworthiness” value and hence will not disappoint the trustor
when executing the transaction. As ”trustworthiness” is defined as an objective
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Figure 2.3: Relationship between trust, stake and risk drawn after [82]
variable, we propose that this definition of ”trustworthiness” be inferred as objec-
tive trust which was described in the previous section on the user-centered trust
model of Hasan et al. This relationship between ”trust” and ”trustworthiness” can
be illustrated using the graph in Figure 2.4.
To extend this conceptual relationship to practical application in Information
Technology, the parameters for measuring ”trust” (subjective probability that the
trustee performs the given task) and the parameters for measuring ”trustworthi-
ness” (objective probability that the trustee performs the given task) have to be
defined. However, such measurable parameters are extremely difficult to define
[38]. Hence, we limit our investigation to only the high level understanding of this
conceptual relationship. Our objective is to find out if there is a connection between
different amounts of stake and the level of ”trust” and ”trustworthiness” and not
to obtain data to plot the graphs in Figures 2.3 and 2.4. As proposed earlier, ”trust”
will be treated as subjective trust while ”trustworthiness” will mean objective trust.
Thus, to study this conceptual relationship in Information Technology, the degree
of subjective trust will correspond to what the computer users think of the impor-
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Figure 2.4: Relationship between trust and trustworthiness drawn after [82]
tance of subjective trust notions. This interpretation is extended for objective trust
as well. The lists of subjective and objective trust notions have already been cap-
tured in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 and we will use these notions in our investigation. We
also propose that stake can be interpreted in this study as the value of the infor-
mation involved in a transaction between the trustor and the trustee in a specific
context. The stake can be decided by the trustor, depending on the properties of
the computing device and the scenario. Meanwhile, in this study, the risk level is
assumed to be fixed. This assumption is inconsequential as the relationship is such
that the degree of trust and amount of stake increase in tandem regardless of the
risk level.
To summarise Section 2.2, we have reviewed the user-centered trust model of
Hasan et al. and captured a list of subjective and objective trust notions. These
notions could give rise to attitudes that cause a computer user to form an intention
to trust a computing device and eventually carry out the act of using it to perform
a specific task. We also reviewed the conceptual relationship from Solhauf et al. of
trust, stake and risk where we proposed to associate ”trust” with subjective trust
and ”trustworthiness” with objective trust. Stake refers to the value involved when
the computer user trusts a computing device to perform a specific task in a certain
context. Hence, as explained by the conceptual relationship of Solhauf et al., if risk
is fixed, there is a correlation between stake and subjective trust as seen in Figure
2.3 and a correlation between subjective trust and objective trust as seen in Figure
2.4. With this background, we can proceed to form the research questions.
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2.3 Research Questions
It is an uphill task to check the practical application of conceptual models because
such models are often made with the assumption of ideal conditions. The real
world contains many variables and they obfuscate the expected behavior of these
models. The task can be made more surmountable by limiting the examination
to certain aspects of the concept under selected conditions. Hence, with the un-
derstanding of the background to this socio-technical study, the following research
questions are proposed.
Question One
What is the degree of importance of the various captured subjective and objective trust
notions in influencing the attitude of computer users to the computing device that they use
to carry out a given task in a particular scenario?
We understand from [32] and Figure 2.2 that behavior is driven by intentions
and intentions are a function of attitudes that are derived from beliefs. We state
that, in this study, behavior refers to trusting the computing device. Hence, this
research question aims to uncover how computer users think of the importance
of the various subjective and objective trust notions when they are forming the
attitude that leads to the behavior intention of trusting a computing device to carry
out a task in a particular scenario. The idea of studying the degree of importance of
the various notions is to gain insight into how these notions influence the attitude
of computer users which lead to the behavior of trusting a computing device. The
intention is not to prioritize certain technical design requirements.
Question Two
Is there a relationship between stake and the degree of importance given to subjective trust
notions, and consequently objective trust notions, when a computer user is considering
whether to trust a computing device to carry out a given task in a particular scenario?
Due to the limitation of time and financial resource, we decide to conduct a
quick investigation into the practical application, in an Information Technology do-
main, of one aspect of the conceptual stake, trust and trustworthiness relationship
proposed by Solhauf et al.. We interpret in this study that stake is associated with
subjective trust and subjective trust is associated with objective trust. Therefore, the
question first aims to find out what is the stake that different computer users can
accept when using a specific computing device. The result from this inquiry is then
linked to how computer users think of the importance of the various subjective and
objective trust notions. If the concept is applicable, then the results from the study
should indicate a connection between willingness to share information of different
value and the degree of importance given to the trust notions. For example, private
information may be considered more valuable than public information. Therefore,
the notion of data confidentiality may be more important when sharing private
information rather than when sharing information already in the public domain.
2.4 Scenarios
To answer the research questions, we developed two scenarios that describe the
computer user using some computing devices to carry out the task of information
sharing. The objective is for the scenarios to set the context so that we can obtain
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data about the acceptable stake for different computer users and how they think of
the importance of the subjective and objective trust notions. For the purpose of un-
covering the acceptable stake, the scenarios present to the computer users various
types of information of different value. The intention is that when computer users
select the type(s) of information for sharing, the selection will give an indication
of the stake involved. Since this study focuses on user-centered trust notions, we
have to assume that any corresponding party is considered trustworthy and the
user does not have to take this point into consideration.
2.4.1 Scenario One
The first scenario tells the computer user that he is using a mass market laptop
computer to share various types of personal information. The question to ask the
computer users and the types of information are listed below. This is an everyday
scenario and the majority of computer users will be familiar with it. The types
of information listed range from that which can be found in public, such as the
information in a telephone directory, to that which is not published online, such
as the national identity number. These types of information are considered to be
of different value to the computer user due to privacy concerns and the kind of
damage that can be done if a malicious actor has access to that information. In
other words, they reflect various levels of stake.
Question for Scenario One
Imagine that you are conducting an online information sharing activity using a mass mar-
ket laptop computer. Please put a tick beside these pieces of information you are willing to
share before you decide to find out more about this laptop computer and the sharing proto-
col, for example, authenticity of digital certificates and cryptographic parameters.
Type of Information for Scenario One
• Information that can be found in the public telephone directory, for example,
name, contact number and address.
• Information that can be found on your company’s website, for example, work-
place address, occupation, designation, email address, work and education
history and photo identification.
• Information that can be found on social media, for example, Facebook profile,
social activities, list of friends, interest, school attended and personal opin-
ions.
• Information that is unlikely to be published online, for example, national
identity number, passport number and bank account number.
2.4.2 Scenario Two
The second scenario is based on the increasingly popular Internet of Things [96]. It
narrates that the computer user has several of these embedded computing devices
and that they can share a variety of information. The question to ask the computer
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users and the types of information are listed below. The types of information range
from life style and health data to travel and home environment data. Similar to
scenario one, these types of information are considered to be of different value to
the computer user. The intention of this scenario is to uncover how a computer
user values the different types of information and the importance of the numerous
trust notions for Internet of Things.
Question for Scenario Two
Imagine that many embedded computing devices that you use daily are able to communicate
with a third party for the purpose of enhancing your quality of life. An example of an em-
bedded computing device is the Smart Refrigerator that can keep track of the amount of food
it is storing and order new supplies when the stock runs low. Please put a tick beside these
pieces of information that you are comfortable in sharing before you decide to find out more
about the embedded computing device and the sharing protocol, for example, authenticity
of digital certificates and cryptographic parameters.
Type of Information for Scenario Two
• Information that is related to your life style, for example, diet, movie prefer-
ence and exercise routine.
• Information that is related to your health, for example, sleeping pattern, pulse
rate, blood pressure, body temperature.
• Information that is related to your travel pattern, for example, route, mode of
transport, time and meeting schedule.
• Information that is related to your home environment, for example, utilities’
consumption and thermostat readings.
2.5 The Survey
A survey was planned as part of the study to examine how a population of com-
puter users views the social and technical aspects of trust in the scenarios described
in Section 2.4. We anticipate that the analysis of the survey responses could provide
answers to the research questions posed in Section 2.3. The method of an online
survey was chosen due to its low cost, convenience and wide reach. A series of test
runs were conducted from January to May of 2014. These test runs were conducted
in Singapore, United Kingdom and United States of America. The purpose of the
test runs was to evaluate the comprehension of the survey questions and identify
issues that may affect the quality of the data collected. As a result, the composi-
tions of the survey questions were sharpened to make them easier to understand.
In addition, it was found that the survey became difficult to complete if it covered
the two scenarios in one go. Hence, the survey was subsequently carried out in two
separate and shorter projects, with each project covering one scenario.
The first project covered the scenario of sharing personal information. There
were a total of 4 survey questions. The first question asked about the type of infor-
mation the respondent would be willing to share using a mass market computer
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laptop. The question and the list of information are described in Section 2.4.1. The
respondent had to choose at least one type of information to share. There were
no limit to what the respondent could choose. This was followed by the questions
asking the respondent to rank the importance of the subjective and objective trust
notions from Tables 2.1 and 2.2. The ordering of the notions in the survey questions
was randomized to help improve the quality of the responses. The ranking scale
was defined such that a smaller rank value was linked to greater importance of that
particular trust notion. The same rank could not be assigned more than one time
and all notions had to be ranked. This was to avoid the situation where the respon-
dents banded certain notions together as this could dilute the differentiation of the
importance and make analysis difficult. Finally, the survey asked the respondent if
they were an early adopter of information technology or only minimally acquired
information technology to meet certain needs. The second project covered scenario
two and was structured in the same way as the first project. The data obtained from
the second project will serve as a comparison to the first project.
The live run of the online survey was conducted on 30 and 31 May 2014. Survey-
Monkey 1 was used to deliver the survey questionnaires and collect the responses.
The respondents were recruited by SurveyMonkey and their identities were kept
anonymous. The target criteria were employed people residing in the United States
of America. The collected responses were exported to a spreadsheet and statistical
analyses were done using spreadsheet software. The collected responses were ana-
lyzed using basic descriptive statistics, followed by hypothesis testing using t-tests
in order to assess the correlation between stake, subjective and objective trust no-
tions. The t-test assesses whether the means of two groups are statistically different
from each other.
2.6 Analyzing the Results
The respondents were chosen randomly and a total of 156 valid responses were
collected for scenario one and a total of 155 valid responses were collected for sce-
nario two. As shown in Table 2.3, the samples are rather balanced with regards
to gender. The respondents mostly possess bachelor degrees or higher education
qualifications (68.9% and 67.9%) and are well informed about information technol-
ogy (55.5% and 49.0% are early adopters). Meanwhile, we assume that the collected
data is normally distributed.
2.6.1 Scenario One
Figure 2.5 displays the type of information in scenario one and the corresponding
percentage of respondents that are willing to share it. The respondents are more
willing to share information that can be found in the public domain (62.2% for that
which can be found in the public telephone directory) and are less willing to share
private and sensitive information (12.2% for that which is unlikely to be published
online, for example, national identity number, passport number or bank account
number). This result indicates that most of the respondents have a common per-
ception of the value of different types of information and understand the risk of
1https://www.surveymonkey.com/
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Table 2.3: Demographics of the two samples.
Demographics Scenario One
(n=156)
Scenario Two
(n=155)
Female 44.4% 47.8%
Male 55.6% 52.2%
Bachelor Degree and higher 68.9% 67.9%
Associate Degree and High School 31.1% 32.1%
Early adopter 55.5% 49.0%
Minimalist 38.7% 46.5%
Not comfortable with computer
technology
5.8% 4.5%
Figure 2.5: Willingness to share different types of personal information in scenario
one.
sharing the information online without the computing device meeting certain trust
requirements.
Table 2.4 shows the mean (average) rank given by the respondents to the sub-
jective trust notions in scenario one. The result reveals that the respondents place
greater value on the vendor’s ability to tell the truth and act ethically (mean rank of
2.62). This is followed by the notion that the vendor has the technical competence to
solve a problem (mean rank of 3.04). The notion that the vendor is interested in the
wellbeing of the respondents has a mean rank of 3.63. Referring back to the user-
centered trust model by Hasan et al., this result shows that the notions for trusting
beliefs in the vendor plays a more critical role in shaping the respondents’ trust
in a computing device compared to the notions for the TAM beliefs. The results
also validated, in this scenario of human to computer interaction, the application
of Mayer et al. [50] and Li et al. [45] proposition that vendor’s competence, ability
to act ethically and interest in the computer user’s wellbeing play a significant role.
However, the results suggest that the influence of aesthetics (mean rank 4.99) as
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Table 2.4: Ranking of subjective notions in scenario one.
Order Notion Mean Rank
1 Vendor’s ability to tell you the truth and act
ethically when a new issue is discovered.
2.62
2 Vendor’s technical competence at solving
your problem.
3.04
3 The computing device is useful for this sce-
nario.
3.33
4 The computing device is easy to use. 3.38
5 Vendor’s interest in your wellbeing when
you encounter a difficulty.
3.63
6 The aesthetics of the computing device suit
this scenario.
4.99
proposed by Lindgaard et al. [46] is of less significance compared to other subjec-
tive trust notions in this scenario of human to computer interaction. It is noted that
the notions of usefulness (mean rank of 3.33) and ease of use (mean rank of 3.38)
are ranked closely together and this suggests that the respondents consider them
to be equally important.
The ranking of objective trust notions in scenario one is shown in Table 2.5.
The result uncovers that the respondents consider information security related no-
tions of confidentiality (mean rank of 2.67) and integrity (mean rank of 3.40) to be
very important. Recent high profile news about mass surveillance has heightened
the need for privacy [48] and this could have contributed to the observation. The
result also shows that notions associated with trusted computing are of lesser im-
portance comparatively. The notion of identity and authenticity of the computing
device scores a mean rank of 4.66 while the notion of identity and authenticity of
the corresponding party scores a mean rank of 4.76. On the other hand, the notion
of expected behavior comes in second last with a mean rank of 5.15. This suggests
that the awareness of the benefits of trusted computing such as expected behavior
and strong identity could be lacking. It is also noted that the notion of the avail-
ability of required function or data (mean rank 5.14) is ranked closely to the notion
of expected behavior. This suggests that the respondents do not differentiate be-
tween the two in terms of importance. In fact, there is a difference in the benefits
brought about by these two notions and an explanation for this finding is that the
users lack awareness of the subtleties of these notions. The result also points out
that the notion of security standards (mean rank of 4.53) is relatively central to the
respondents’ trust in the computing device. This observation is not surprising as
many vendors have put guides in place to assure the security level of their products
and these efforts are included in their marketing material [36]. The notion of origin
and change history comes in last with a mean rank of 5.69. This could be because
the concept of provenance for trustworthy computing is a new research area and
the respondents are not well informed about it. Lastly, it is noted that the notion of
identity and authenticity of the mass market laptop computer (mean rank 4.66) and
identity and authenticity of the corresponding party (mean rank 4.76) are ranked
closely together. This could be that the respondents place equal importance on the
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Table 2.5: Ranking of objective notions in scenario one.
Order Notion Mean Rank
1 Ensure confidentiality of data. 2.67
2 Ensure integrity of data. 3.40
3 Is certified to meet certain security standard,
for example, Common Criteria.
4.53
4 Provides identity and authenticity of the
mass market laptop computer.
4.66
5 Provides identity and authenticity of the cor-
responding party.
4.76
6 Required function or data is always avail-
able.
5.14
7 Always work in the same way as before (ex-
pected behavior).
5.15
8 Provides the origin and change history of its
hardware and software components.
5.69
identity and authenticity of all the parties involved.
A hypothesis test using two tailed independent sample t-test at 5% significance
level was carried out to seek an answer to research question two by examining if
there is any relationship between stake and subjective and objective trust notions.
The 5% significance level is widely used in social science [72].
Hypothesis test 1
H0 : The mean rank of each of the subjective and objective trust notions is equal
for the respondents that are willing to share only information found in the public
telephone directory and those that are willing to share information found in the
public telephone directory, company website and social media.
H1 : The mean rank of each of the subjective and objective trust notions is not equal
for the respondents that are willing to share only information found in the public
telephone directory and those that are willing to share information found in the
public telephone directory, company website and social media.
Analysis. This hypothesis seeks to test if the mean rank of the various notions
changes when the stakes are different. There were 47 respondents who are willing
to share only information found in the public telephone directory and 24 respon-
dents who are willing to share information found in the public telephone directory,
company website and social media. The hypothesis test was carried out for each of
the six subjective trust notions and each of the eight objective trust notions. H0 is
rejected for the subjective notion of device aesthetics and vendor’s technical com-
petency. Specifically, the respondents that are willing to share only information in
the public telephone directory are less concerned about aesthetics (mean rank of
5.09 against 4.71) and more concerned about vendor technical competence (mean
rank of 2.70 against 3.12). H0 is also rejected for the objective notion of expected
behavior. The respondents that are willing to share only information in the public
telephone directory place less importance on this notion (mean rank of 5.66 against
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Figure 2.6: Willingness to share different types of personal information in scenario
two.
4.79). Further discussion on how this hypothesis testing answers research question
two is given in Section 2.7.
2.6.2 Scenario Two
Moving to scenario two, Figure 2.6 presents the type of information and the per-
centage of respondents that are willing to share this information. It is observed
that the respondents are more willing to share information about their home envi-
ronment (74.8%) and lifestyle (51.6%) for the purpose of improving their quality of
life. This result may correspond to the current trend of installing home automation
sensors [80] and the popularity of exercise tracking software applications [24]. The
finding that 43.2% of the respondents are willing to share information about their
health could indicate that more people are ready to embrace the advancements in
tele-medicine. On the other hand, the respondents are less willing to share their
travel pattern (25.8%). This result suggests that the respondents are uncomfortable
with sharing their geo-location data and calendar although these functions are al-
ready widely available in computing devices such as the smart phone. Researchers
and vendors of Internet of Things computing devices will benefit from this col-
lected data as it provides a view of how the respondents value the different types
of information that could be shared by this means.
The ranking of subjective trust notions is shown in Table 2.6. Although the no-
tion of vendor telling the truth and acting ethically (mean rank 2.62) is still the most
important to the respondents, the notion that the computing device is easy to use
is now ranked second with a mean rank of 3.01. This suggests that the respondents
place significant emphasis on the ease of use of these Internet of Things devices.
The ranking for the remaining notions is not dissimilar to that in scenario one.
The ranking of objective trust notions is shown in Table 2.7. The rank of the no-
tions is largely similar to those in scenario one. This implies that the requirement
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Table 2.6: Ranking of subjective notions in scenario two.
Order Notion Mean Rank
1 Vendor’s ability to tell you the truth and act
ethically when a new issue is discovered.
2.62
2 The computing device is easy to use. 3.01
3 Vendor’s technical competence at solving
your problem.
3.25
4 The computing device is useful for this sce-
nario.
3.30
5 Vendor’s interest in your wellbeing when
you encounter a difficulty.
3.83
6 The aesthetics of the computing device suit
this scenario.
5.00
Table 2.7: Ranking of objective notions in scenario two.
Order Notion Mean Rank
1 Ensure confidentiality of data. 2.06
2 Ensure integrity of data. 3.63
3 Is certified to meet certain security standard,
for example, Common Criteria.
4.33
4 Provides identity and authenticity of the cor-
responding party.
4.65
5 Provides identity and authenticity of em-
bedded computing device.
4.69
6 Always work in the same way as before (ex-
pected behavior).
5.12
7 Required function or data is always avail-
able.
5.25
8 Provides the origin and change history of its
hardware and software components.
6.27
for trust in embedded computing devices is the same as those for a mass market
laptop computer which has a more complex build, diverse functionality and han-
dles more types of information. Once again, it is observed that the ranking for
the notion of identity and authenticity of the embedded computing device (mean
rank 4.69) and identity and authenticity of the corresponding party (mean rank
4.65) are ranked closely together. This finding confirms that the respondents do not
differentiate between these two notions and they place equal importance on the
identity and authenticity of all the parties involved. Close ranking is also repeated
for the notion of expected behavior (mean rank 5.12) and the notion of availability
of required function or data (mean rank 5.25). This confirms the earlier inference
that more awareness may be required for the core concept of expected behavior in
trusted computing.
Hypothesis testing using two tailed independent sample t-test at 5% signifi-
cance level was carried out to seek an answer to research question two by exam-
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ining if there is any relationship between stake and subjective and objective trust
notions.
Hypothesis test 2
H0 : The mean rank of each of the subjective and objective trust notions is equal
for the respondents that are willing to share only information related to home envi-
ronment and those that are willing to share information related to lifestyle, health,
travel pattern and home environment.
H1 : The mean rank of each of the subjective and objective trust notions is not equal
for the respondents that are willing to share only information related to home envi-
ronment and those that are willing to share information related to lifestyle, health,
travel pattern and home environment.
Analysis. This hypothesis seeks to test if the mean rank of the various notions
changes when the stakes are different. There were 36 respondents who are will-
ing to share only information related to home environment and 21 respondents
who are willing to share information related to lifestyle, health, travel pattern and
home environment. Similar to hypothesis test 1, this test was carried out for each
of the six subjective trust notions and eight objective trust notions. H0 is rejected
for the subjective notion of device usefulness, vendor’s interest in respondent’s
wellbeing, vendor’s ability to tell the truth and act ethically and vendor’s technical
competency. Specifically, the respondents that are willing to only share informa-
tion related to home environment are less concerned about vendor’s interest in
the respondent’s wellbeing (mean rank of 4.14 against 3.62) and vendor’s ability
to tell the truth and act ethically (mean rank of 2.94 against 2.26) and more con-
cerned about the vendor’s technical competence (mean rank of 3.00 against 3.76).
H0 is also rejected for the objective notion of expected behavior and confidential-
ity of data. The respondents who are willing to share only information related to
home environment place more importance on expected behavior (mean rank of
4.81 against 5.57) and less importance on data confidentiality. Further discussion
on how this hypothesis testing answers research question two is given in Section
2.7.
2.7 Discussion
The data collected from the responses to the online survey has answered the re-
search question of which subjective and objective trust notions are considered to be
important to influencing computer users’ attitudes towards trusting a computing
device to carry out a given task in a particular scenario. The ranking of the various
subjective and objective trust notions in the two scenarios are shown in Tables 2.4,
2.5, 2.6 and 2.7. The results uncover that the trusting beliefs in vendors described
in the conceptual user centered trust model play an important role because this
notion is always ranked higher. The implication of this finding is that computer
users are likely to trust computing devices from vendors who are reputed to have
good technical competence and have an excellent record of acting truthfully and
ethically. However, these findings may have an ominous application if a malicious
entity who wishes to compromise the computer user makes use of these findings
to improve its social engineering tactics. For example, a computer user may be
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tricked into trusting a malicious application which appears to be originating from
a reputable vendor.
On the topic of objective trust notions, the results show that the information se-
curity attributes of confidentiality and integrity are ranked highly. The results also
show that technical attributes associated with trusted computing technology such
as the TPM are of lesser importance compared to information security attributes.
Nevertheless, the survey provides information for the development of TPM-based
consumer use cases. For example, as the responses indicated that information se-
curity attributes are important, consumer use cases could focus on using the TPM’s
cryptographic engine to provide confidentiality and integrity protection for data.
Meanwhile, TPM vendors could build an image that portrays ethical behavior and
technical competence so as to positively influence the beliefs of computer users and
consequently their attitudes towards this technology.
On the research question of whether there is a relationship between stake and
degree of importance of subjective trust and objective trust, the survey found that
computer users consider the importance of the various subjective and objective
trust notions differently when the stakes are not the same. It is seen from hypothesis
test 1 that the respondents who are willing to share only information in the public
telephone directory are less concerned about aesthetics and more concerned with
the vendor’s technical competence. It could be that this group of respondents is
acutely aware of the risk of online information sharing and to mitigate this risk,
they require the vendor of the mass market laptop computer to have competent
technical knowledge. H0 of hypothesis test 1 is also rejected for the objective notion
of expected behavior. The respondents that are willing to share only information
in the public telephone directory place less importance on this notion. This could
indicate a shift in the ranking of other objective trust notions but the change is not
detected by the statistical test.
We can see a trend forming when we look at hypothesis test 2. Respondents
who are only willing to share information related to home environment place more
importance on vendor’s technical competence. This is similar to the observation
in hypothesis test 1 for respondents who are only willing to share information in
the public telephone directory. We also noted that the statistical difference is more
marked in scenario two as hypothesis test 2 uncovers changes in importance to
the subjective trust notions of device usefulness, vendor’s interest in respondent’s
wellbeing and vendor’s ability to tell the trust and act ethically. Meanwhile, H0 is
rejected for the objective notions of expected behavior and confidentiality of data
in hypothesis test 2. We see that respondents who only share information related to
home environment place more importance on expected behavior and less impor-
tance on data confidentiality. However, compared to scenario one, this observation
is not aligned. For example, respondents who only share information found in the
public telephone directory in scenario one place less importance on expected be-
havior and this is the opposite for respondents who only share information related
to home environment in scenario two as they place more importance on the same
notion. This observation indicates that the correlation between subjective trust and
objective trust as shown in Figure 2.4 is not detected across different scenarios al-
though there is a shift in the ranking of objective trust notions within a scenario
when the stake changes.
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Overall, when we cross reference the results from hypothesis tests 1 and 2 to the
conceptual relationship of trust, stake and risk proposed by Solhauf et al. [82], we
can see that as the stake increases from sharing less information to sharing more
information, there are changes to the importance of the various subjective and ob-
jective trust notions within each scenario but only the subjective trust notion of
vendor’s technical competence shows a consistent pattern across scenarios.
2.8 Summary
In this chapter, a socio-technical study on user centered trust notions and their as-
sociation to stake for practical Information Technology scenarios is presented. This
socio-technical study made use of an online survey to investigate how computer
users perceive subjective and objective trust notions and their association to the
value of information involved in the transaction. The online survey provided data
on how the respondents rank the importance of the subjective and objective trust
notions in the two scenarios. This data helped to answer the research question on
the degree of importance of the subjective and objective trust notions in influenc-
ing the attitude of the computer users towards a computing device that they use to
carry out a task in a particular scenario.
The study also attempted a quick investigation into the practical application
of the conceptual relationship between stake, subjective trust and objective trust.
Hypothesis testing on the survey data was carried out to examine how one group
of respondents who are willing to share more information rank the various trust
notions compared to another group of respondents who are less willing to share
information. Within each scenario, we detected changes to the perceived impor-
tance of certain subjective and objective trust notions when the stake changed but
there was no consistent pattern other than that the subjective trust notion of the
vendor’s technical competence was ranked consistently higher when the stake was
higher in both scenarios.
Thus, this study contributes towards the current understanding of how com-
puter users view the social and technical aspect of trust in practical scenarios. The
cross disciplinary research also provides an insight into the connection between
stake and computer users’ perceptions of trust notions. Most importantly, this
study establishes the understanding of trust notions for this thesis.
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Chapter 3
A Causality-based Model for Describing the
Trustworthiness of a Computing Device
3.1 Introduction
We understand from Chapter 1 that a key component to building end-to-end trust
is the ability to describe the trustworthiness of a computing device. There are two
facets to this ability. First of all, it is the description of the capabilities of a com-
puting device that could give rise to its trustworthiness. This requires marking up
this description with metadata in a well understood and consistent manner. Such
annotation will enable the description of the capabilities to be processed by a com-
puter [41]. In this chapter, we take the first step towards describing the capabilities
of a computing device. Meanwhile, the second facet refers to evidence that conveys
assurance in certain capabilities of the computing device. A prevailing technique
is the use of attestation which vouches for the identity and state of a computing
device’s software stack. In Chapter 4, we propose to use provenance as evidence
during attestation .
This novel causality-based model for describing the capabilities of a comput-
ing device that give rise to its trustworthiness contributes to Grawrock’s research
agenda on a trust language that could describe the trustworthiness of a computing
device1. As far as we know, this is the first attempt at this challenge. The main
feature of this approach is that the description captures the causal dependencies
between trust notions, capabilities, mechanisms and configurations, and this infor-
mation is useful for intelligent processing. Moreover, it uses a graph to describe a
computing device at various levels of abstraction in a way that is easily compre-
hended. Lastly, the causal graph can be made machine-readable by translating it
into a format that uses markup language, such as the eXtensible Markup Language
(XML).
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 gives the background
to the causality-based approach. Section 3.3 defines the concept of causality for
this model and makes clear the semantics of the terms used. Section 3.4 defines
the graph and illustrates how it is used to show the dependencies between trust
notions, capabilities, computing mechanisms and their configuration. This is fol-
lowed by Section 3.5, which describes how the graph can be implemented as an
XML schema and we discuss how this schema was applied to the Metadata Access
Point (MAP) database server of the Trusted Network Connect (TNC) open archi-
tecture. Section 3.6 explains how we can carry out trust assessment. Section 3.7
1http://www.iaik.tugraz.at/content/about iaik/events/ETISS INTRUST 2013/ETISS/
slides/DavidGrawrock.pdf
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reviews related works. The summary to this chapter is in Section 3.8.
3.2 A Causality-based Approach
The design of the model aims to meet the following requirements:
• To describe the capabilities of a computing device that could give rise to its
trustworthiness.
• To define the model in a clear and easy to understand manner.
• To support the digital representation of this model by translating it into a
machine-readable format.
The intention of these requirements is to guide the development of the model
and make sure that it can be implemented in practice. We do not intend to specify
how the descriptions are created and updated but we can assume that such descrip-
tions are created by the designer of the computing device and the descriptions are
updated by agents installed on that computing device. While we refer to the ob-
jective trust notions described in Chapter 2 as we develop this model, we exclude
subjective trust notions because their perception can differ from person to person.
To describe the capabilities of a computing device that give rise to its trust-
worthiness, we refer to the technical models described in the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-33 [84]. These models
encompass information at several levels. They range from high level security no-
tions to low level specific technical details. For example, the low level technical
mechanism of cryptographic key management is described as enabling the capa-
bility of access control enforcement which in turn supports the security notion of
confidentiality. The NIST publication is intended to describe the technical founda-
tions that underlie security capabilities. Since our intentions are broadly aligned,
we will frame our description of the capabilities of a computing device using the
structure of the technical models described in the NIST publication. The descrip-
tion will cover the trust notions, capabilities, mechanisms and configurations of a
computing device. We also note that if any of the technical foundations are miss-
ing, the resulting high level capability and notion will not exist. We interpret this
observation as causality.
A general causal model consists of a set of equations of the form
xi = fi(pai, ui), i = 1,...,n,
where pai stands for the set of variables that directly determine the value of xi
and where ui represents errors or disturbances due to omitted factors [63]. This
functional relationship can be thought of as Laplace’s quasi-deterministic concept
of causality. Bayesian networks are usually used to represent this general causal
model and, for example, ui can be used to indicate the probability of a causal de-
pendency when affected by factors such as an attack on the computing device.
However, this approach is sophisticated and at this stage, it is beyond our design
requirements. Hence, we decided to set ui to zero (i.e. no errors) in our causality-
based model. By setting ui to zero, the causal model loses the ability to deal with the
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probability of a causal dependency. As our primary concern is to introduce a model
to describe the causal dependencies between trust notions, capabilities, computing
mechanisms and their configuration and to make sure that this model works in
practice, omitting the above ability does not affect the description. Nevertheless,
we will discuss more about setting ui to non-zero in Chapter 8.
With this understanding of a causal model, we can say that: A cause is defined to
be an object followed by another, where, if the first object had not been, the second would
never had existed [44]. This concept of causality has important applications in com-
puter science, such as intelligent planning and processing [30]. Whenever we seek
to explain a set of computations that unfold in a specific scenario, the explanation
produced must address the cause and effect of these computations. The genera-
tion of such explanations requires the analysis of the concept of causality and the
development of a data model to characterise the account.
On the other hand, the practical application of causality requires it to transform
into a graph that is founded on mathematics and logic [63]. A directed graph con-
sists of a set V of vertices and a set E of edges. The vertices in this graph represent
the variables and the edges denote a certain causal relationship holds between pairs
of variables. As a causal explanation describes how a variable is caused by another
variable, this description of dependency path can be written as a triplet (v1, e, v2)
where v1, v2 ∈ V and e ∈ E. In other words, a source variable v1 is related to desti-
nation variable v2 through the causal dependency e. Consequently, this can also be
expressed as a graph where e is an edge from source vertex v1 to destination vertex
v2. Hence, we can conjecture that a causal graph composes of multiple triplets and
they form a larger graph with numerous vertices that are connected by edges.
With this background knowledge, we can envisage that this graph will have a
data structure that depicts the causal dependences between the low level technical
mechanisms and high level capabilities and notions. Although it can be argued
that such information can be obtained from various sources, the main advantage
of this model is that the information about technical mechanisms, configuration,
capabilities and trust notions are linked together meaningfully by their causal de-
pendencies. As a result, another party can carry out intelligent processing on this
information and decide how it will interact with this computing device.
3.3 Basic Definitions
In this section, we define the semantic meaning of the terms used in this causality-
based model. As the causality-based model has to be transformed into a graph for
practical application, Definitions 2 to 5 refer to the kind of vertices in the graph.
Definition 1 (Causality) We refer to the definition of causality in the previous
section and define causality in this model to be the use of a configured mechanism,
or a set of configured mechanisms, and if one of the configured mechanisms is not
used, the capability and the resulting trust notion that arise out of the use of the
configured mechanisms will not exist. For example, the trust notion of confiden-
tiality relies on the capability of disk encryption which in turn is derived from the
usage of a symmetric cryptographic mechanism.
We then produce the following definitions for the key terms in definition 1.
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Definition 2 (Mechanism) It is a computation process that has at least one in-
put and at least one output. Although how the computation works is defined by
computer code, the quality of the output can be influenced by the applied config-
uration. For example, a symmetric encryption mechanism is configured to use a
symmetric key of certain size, then takes in data and produces the encrypted form
of that data.
Definition 3 (Configuration) A set of parameters that affect the output of a
mechanism. For example, the key size of an AES symmetric encryption mechanism
needs to be specified as different applications require different key sizes.
Definition 4 (Trust Notion) A notion reflects a specific behavior of a computing
system. We understand that there is a large body of research on trust notions. Thus,
to focus our research effort, we scoped this work to the trust notions described in
Chapter 2. These trust notions are confidentiality, integrity, identity, authenticity,
availability and expected behaviour. These are objective notions that are related to
technical properties of a computing device.
Definition 5 (Capability) A capability can be considered as a high level descrip-
tion of a mechanism or a set of cooperating mechanisms. It refers to the ability to
perform certain tasks. A capability of one computing system is the same as another
system if this capability is derived from the same set of mechanisms and configu-
rations.
Various notions of causal dependencies were considered for the causality-based
model. A strong notion of causal dependency would provide a detailed explana-
tion of how an effect is caused. However, such a strong notion of causal depen-
dency was not practical as one could argue that additional factors may have in-
fluenced the outcome. For example, if the computation has been occurring on a
hardware that is operating within its allowed temperature range. Therefore, we
decided that weaker notions which describe only the core meaning of the causal
dependencies would be more suitable. This decision is supported by two consider-
ations:
• Usability. We expect that the description of the capabilities could be produced
without a detailed knowledge of how the mechanisms interact and how the
configuration affects the behaviour of the mechanisms. Thus, weaker notions
allow the causality-based model to be used in practice by non experts.
• Composability. We desire that multiple causal graphs can be combined to re-
flect more complex capabilities. This is true in practical applications whereby
a complex capability can be composed of various mechanisms spread across
diverse computing systems. Hence, weaker notions allow a more flexible in-
terpretation of the causal dependencies and avoid complications due to con-
trasting explanation used by different computing systems.
Nevertheless, stronger notions of causality for specific applications, can be de-
veloped as subclasses to the dependencies defined in our model. While the above
definitions refer to the kind of vertices in a causal graph, the edges between the
nodes will represent their causal dependencies. On this point, we propose the fol-
lowing causal dependencies for this model:
Definition 6 (Mechanism CallsOn Mechanism) A mechanism can call on an-
other mechanism during its computation process. This relation can be one to one,
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one to many, many to one or many to many. However, this causal dependency
is affected by the configuration of the mechanism. A mechanism with the same
configuration can be called on multiple times by other mechanisms. If this mech-
anism has another configuration, then it must be represented again on the causal
graph. A calling mechanism can only complete its computation process when the
mechanism that it called on has completed its computation process. For example,
a software application calls on a key generator and a symmetric encryption mech-
anism when it is performing disk encryption.
Definition 7 (CapabilityDerivesFromMechanism) A capability is derived from
a mechanism or a set of cooperating mechanisms. If a capability is derived from a
set of cooperating mechanisms, all these mechanisms must have begun and com-
pleted their computation processes before the capability can exist. The same con-
straint applies to the situation when a capability is derived from one mechanism.
The quality of a capability will be affected if a mechanism or a configuration is
not from a specified set. For example, the capability of disk encryption is derived
from a software application that encrypts data using symmetric cryptography and
manages the key used in the encryption process.
Definition 8 (Trust Notion ReliesOn Capability) The existence of a trust notion
relies on a capability or a set of capabilities. The mechanisms that the capability
depends on must have completed their computation process before the trust notion
can exist. A trust notion can rely on more than one capability. For example, the
trust notion of confidentiality relies on the capability of disk encryption. The same
trust notion of confidentiality can also rely on the capability of network encryption
which uses a different set of mechanisms from the capability of disk encryption.
Definition 9 (Mechanism Uses Configuration) Each mechanism has a maxi-
mum of one configuration for each account of causality. In other words, it is a one
to one relation. If the same mechanism uses more than one configuration, then the
mechanism shall be represented again with another configuration.
We have introduced the definition of the terms used in the causality-based
model. However, there may be ambiguity in the definition and hence we introduce
set-theoretic definitions in Figure 3.1 to further clarify the causality-based model.
In Figure 3.1, lines 1 to 4 define the term mechanism, configuration, trust notion
and capability as sets. These terms correspond to vertices when transformed to a
graph. Line 5 further defines that C is a subset of CAPABILITY and element c only
belongs to C if and only if c has a property P. P refers to the property that elements
of C work together to give rise to a trust notion. Line 6 defines that M is a subset of
MECHANISM and element m only belongs to M if and only if m has a property Q.
Q refers to the property that elements of M work together to give rise to a capability.
Line 7 says that CF is a subset of CONFIGURATION and that element cf belongs
to CF if and only if cf has a property S. S refers to the property that elements of CF
are applicable to a particular set of mechanisms that give rise to a capability.
Lines 8 and 9 are the interpretation of the definition of causality in this model.
It says that there is a function f such that it maps elements of the TRUSTNOTION
to the set CAPABILITY. Then there is a complex function g such that g(C) produces
a set that contains the mappings of M to CF. Lines 10 to 13 refer to the edges that
link the vertices. CallsOn, ReliesOn and DerivesFrom refers to a one to one or one
to many mapping. For Uses, we use the symbol for an partial injective function
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1. [MECHANISM] the set of all possible mechanisms in computing systems.
2. [CONFIGURATION] the set of all possible configurations in computing sys-
tems.
3. [TRUSTNOTION] the set of all possible trust notions enabled by computing
systems.
4. [CAPABILITY] the set of all possible capabilities provided by computing
systems.
5. C is a subset of CAPABILITY such that the elements of C are capabilities that
work together to give rise to a trust notion. Therefore,
C == { c:CAPABILITY | P(c) }
6. M is a subset of MECHANISM such that the elements of M are mechanisms
that work together to give rise to a capability. Therefore,
M == {m:MECHANISM | Q(m) }
7. CF is a subset of CONFIGURATION and elements of CF are configurations
for a particular set of mechanisms. Therefore,
CF == { cf:CONFIGURATION | S(cf) }
Following definition 1, we have:
8. f : TRUSTNOTION→ CAPABILITY
9. g : C→ (M 7 CF)
10. CallsOn : MECHANISM→MECHANISM
11. ReliesOn : TRUSTNOTION→ CAPABILITY
12. Uses : MECHANISM 7 CONFIGURATION
13. DerivesFrom : CAPABILITY→MECHANISM
14. V: TRUSTNOTION→MECHANISM
W: TRUSTNOTION→ CONFIGURATION
X: CAPABILITY→ CONFIGURATION
15. ∀ tn:TRUSTNOTION, m:MECHANISM, (tn,m) ∈ V | @ v:V • tn V m
16. ∀ tn:TRUSTNOTION, cf:CONFIGURATION, (tn,cf) ∈W | @ w:W • tn W cf
17. ∀ cp:CAPABILITY, cf:CONFIGURATION, (cp,cf) ∈ X | @ x:X • cp X cf
Figure 3.1: Definition of causality-based model.
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to say that each mechanism has only one configuration at a time and there may
exist a mechanism that does not need any configuration. These edges shall be di-
rected and the direction is from the range to the domain of the functions CallsOn,
ReliesOn, DerivesFrom and Uses. The way these edges are directed reflects our re-
quirement to describe the causal dependencies between trust notions, capabilities,
mechanisms and configurations. This is a mapping from abstract concepts to low
level technical primitives. Meanwhile, the directed edge ReliesOn is the manifesta-
tion of function f in line 8 while the directed edge DerivesFrom is the manifestation
of function g in line 9. Finally, lines 14 to 17 clarify that composition is not allowed.
Particularly, it addresses the constraint that neither trust notion nor capability can
arise only out of configuration. The other reason is that we want to capture all the
causal dependencies.
3.4 Graph Definition
This section defines the graph that is required for the practical application of the
causality-based model. We name this as the causal graph. The following defines
this causal graph.
1. Vertices of the causal graph are the elements of MECHANISM, CONFIGU-
RATION, CAPABILITY and TRUSTNOTION and they are given unique iden-
tifiers. Two elements from the same set are equivalent if they have the same
identifiers.
2. Elements of MECHANISM, CONFIGURATION and CAPABILITY can be as-
signed to a computing system. It means that these elements are hosted by
a particular computing system. This supports composability; i.e a capability
can be derived from mechanisms held in more than one computing system.
This also supports the situation where multiple capabilities from different
systems give rise to a trust notion.
3. Edges of the causal graph are identified by the vertices they connect. Ver-
tices are elements of the sets MECHANISM, CONFIGURATION, CAPABIL-
ITY and TRUSTNOTION and they have unique identifiers.
4. A causal graph is a set of vertices and edges as specified in this chapter.
5. A proper causal graph contains a ReliesOn and a DerivesFrom edge. In other
words, it explains the existence of a trust notion and capability. This ensures
that a causal graph captures a valid causal dependency between the high level
trust notion or capability and a low level technical mechanism. A proper
causal graph is also acyclic due to the direction of the edges. It is possible that
with the additional definition of edges, a causal graph can be made cyclic but
this will not be discussed in this chapter.
Figure 2 provides a set-theoretic definition of the causal graph. Lines 1 to 5
declare the sets of identifiers. Lines 6 to 8 say that the vertices Mechanism, Config-
uration and Capability have unique identifiers and are associated with at least one
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1. MechanismId : primitive set
2. ConfigurationId : primitive set
3. TrustNotionId : primitive set
4. CapabilityId : primitive set
5. System : primitive set
6. Mechanism : MechanismId→ P(System)
7. Configuration : ConfigurationId→ P(System)
8. Capability : CapabilityId→ P(System)
9. TrustNotion : TrustNotionId
10. CallsOn ⊆Mechanism ×Mechanism
11. ReliesOn ⊆ TrustNotion × Capability
12. Uses ⊆Mechanism × Configuration
13. DerivesFrom ⊆ Capability ×Mechanism
14. CausalGraph ⊆ P(CallsOn) × P(ReliesOn) × P(Uses) × P(DerivesFrom)
15. ∀m1,m2 ∈Mechanism, cf1, cf2 ∈ Configuration, s1, s2 ∈ System.
∃ u1, u2 ∈ Uses | u1 = ((m1,s1),(cf1, s1)), u2 = ((m2, s2), (cf2, s2)) • u1 = u2⇔
(m1 = m2) ∧ (cf1 = cf2) ∧ ((s1 = s1) ∨ (s1 6= s2))
16. ∀ m1,m2, m3, m4 ∈ Mechanism, u1, u2, u3, u4 ∈ Uses, cf1, cf2, cf3, cf4 ∈
Configuration, s1, s2 ∈ System.
∃ co1,co2 ∈ CallsOn | co1 = ((m1,s1),(m2,s1)), co2 = ((m3,s2), (m4, s2)), u1 =
((m1, s1),(cf1, s1)), u2 = ((m2, s1), (cf2, s1)), u3 = ((m3, s2),(cf3, s2)), u4 = ((m4,
s2), (cf4, s2)) • co1 = co2⇔ (m1 = m3) ∧ (m2 = m4) ∧ (cf1 = cf3) ∧ (cf2 = cf4) ∧
((s1 = s1) ∨ (s1 6= s2))
17. ∀ DF1, DF2 ⊆ DerivesFrom, M10, M11, M20, M21 ⊆ Mechanism, CO1, CO2
⊆ CallsOn, U10, U11, U20, U21 ⊆ Uses, CF10, CF11, CF20, CF21 ⊆ Configu-
ration.
∃ cp1, cp2 ∈ Capability | DF1 = (cp1, M10), DF2 = (cp2, M20), CO1 = (M10,
M11), CO2 = (M20, M21), U10 = (M10, CF10), U20 = (M20, CF20), U11 = (M11,
CF11), U21 = (M21, CF21) • cp1 = cp2⇔ (U10 = U20) ∧ (U11 = U21) ∧ (CO1
= CO2)
18. ∀ RO1, RO2 ⊆ ReliesOn, CP1, CP2 ⊆ Capability, DF1, DF2 ⊆ DerivesFrom,
M10, M11, M20, M21 ⊆ Mechanism, CO1, CO2 ⊆ CallsOn, U10, U11, U20,
U21 ⊆ Uses, CF10, CF11, CF20, CF21 ⊆ Configuration.
∃ tn1, tn2 ∈ TrustNotion | RO1 = (tn1, CP1), RO2 = (tn2, CP2), DF1 = (CP1,
M10), DF2 = (CP2, M20), CO1 = (M10, M11), CO2 = (M20, M21), U10 = (M10,
CF10), U20 = (M20, CF20), U11 = (M11, CF11), U21 = (M21, CF21) • tn1 = tn2
⇔ (DF1 = DF2) ∧ (CO1 = CO2) ∧ (U10 = U20) ∧ (U11 = U21)
Figure 3.2: Defining the causal graph.
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Figure 3.3: Pictorial representation of the vertices and edges in the causal graph
model.
computing system. In Line 9, we do not link Trust Notion to a particular comput-
ing system as it refers to a universal quality. The set for edges CallsOn, ReliesOn,
Uses and DerivesFrom are specified from line 10 to 13. The information about the
vertices and edges will be expressed as a triplet (v1, e, v2) where vertex v1 is related
to vertex v2 through a causal dependency e. Line 14 says that a causal graph is a
set containing the triples that describe the causal dependencies.
Lines 15 to 18 attempt to explain systematically how two graphs can be equal.
Line 15 looks at the most basic causal dependency between a mechanism and a con-
figuration. It says that their Uses edges are the same if the corresponding mecha-
nisms and configurations are the same although their systems may not be the same.
We then proceed to line 16 that defines how two CallsOn edges are the same. It says
that the CallsOn edges between two separate sets of mechanisms are the same if the
elemental mechanisms from each set are the same and they use the same configu-
rations although their systems are not the same. Lines 17 and 18 make use of the
definitions in lines 15 and 16. They explain how two capabilities or two trust no-
tions can be the same. Line 17 says that two capabilities can be the same if they
have the same set of Uses and the same set of CallsOn. In other words, two capa-
bilities are the same if they are derived from the same set of mechanisms and these
set of mechanisms have the same set of configurations. Line 18 says that two trust
notions can be the same if they rely on the same capabilities, and these capabilities
are derived from the same mechanisms, and these mechanisms use the same con-
figurations. Note that the requirement that the system may or may not be the same
is implicit.
At this point, we will introduce the basic pictorial representation of vertices and
directed edges of the causal graph. Mechanisms are represented as rectangles while
configurations are trapeziums. Finally, trust notions are circles and capabilities are
hexagons. Figure 3.3 shows this pictorial representation.
3.5 Praxis
We applied the causality-based model to the Metadata Access Point (MAP) server
of the Trusted Network Connect (TNC) open architecture. TNC is specified by the
Trusted Computing Group and it enables the application and enforcement of se-
curity requirements for endpoints connecting to an enterprise network [89]. The
MAP server acts as a database where metadata that describes endpoints is pub-
lished. Security devices can subscribe to the MAP server and read the published
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metadata as part of a security process such as access control. Communications with
the MAP server are carried out over the Interface for Metadata Access Point (IF-
MAP) protocol. Standard sets of metadata are defined for use by the MAP server to
determine information about an endpoint such as device status, location and char-
acteristics. There are currently two standards for metadata; the IF-MAP Metadata
for Network Security [90] and IF-MAP Metadata for Industrial Control System [91].
The specification of the standards defines the structure and content of the metadata
and includes XML schemas to represent this information. We created a new XML
schema to represent our causality-based model. This new XML schema is presented
in Listing 3.1. This new XML schema declares the four types of edges as complex
elements. Within the complex element, the vertices are further declared as com-
plex elements. Each complex element contains additional elements such as id and
system. On the declaration for the directed edge CallsOn, we used the term ”Main-
Mechanism” to represent the calling mechanism and the term ”SubMechanism” to
represent the mechanism that is being called on. This avoids the confusion caused
when the term ”Mechanism” is not differentiated.
1 <?xml version=”1.0”?>
2 <xsd:schema targetNamespace=”causal graph”
3 xmlns:xsd=”http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema”>
4 <xsd:element name=”causal graph data”>
5 <xsd:complexType>
6 <xsd:choice maxOccurs=”unbounded”>
7 <xsd:element name=”causal graph id” type=”xsd:string”/>
8
9 <!−−CallsOn−−>
10 <xsd:element name=”CallsOn”>
11 <xsd:complexType>
12 <xsd:sequence>
13 <xsd:element name=”MainMechanism”>
14 <xsd:complexType>
15 <xsd:sequence>
16 <xsd:element name=”id” type=”xsd:string”/>
17 <xsd:element name=”system” type=”xsd:string”/>
18 </xsd:sequence>
19 </xsd:complexType>
20 </xsd:element>
21 <xsd:element name=”SubMechanism” maxOccurs=”unbounded”>
22 <xsd:complexType>
23 <xsd:sequence>
24 <xsd:element name=”id” type=”xsd:string”/>
25 <xsd:element name=”system” type=”xsd:string”/>
26 </xsd:sequence>
27 </xsd:complexType>
28 </xsd:element>
29 </xsd:sequence>
30 </xsd:complexType>
31 </xsd:element>
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32
33 <!−−ReliesOn−−>
34 <xsd:element name=”ReliesOn”>
35 <xsd:complexType>
36 <xsd:sequence>
37 <xsd:element name=”TrustNotion”>
38 <xsd:complexType>
39 <xsd:sequence>
40 <xsd:element name=”id” type=”xsd:string”/>
41 </xsd:sequence>
42 </xsd:complexType>
43 </xsd:element>
44 <xsd:element name=”Mechanism” minOccurs=”0”>
45 <xsd:complexType>
46 <xsd:sequence>
47 <xsd:element name=”id” type=”xsd:string”/>
48 <xsd:element name=”system” type=”xsd:string”/>
49 </xsd:sequence>
50 </xsd:complexType>
51 </xsd:element>
52 </xsd:sequence>
53 </xsd:complexType>
54 </xsd:element>
55
56 <!−−Uses−−>
57 <xsd:element name=”Uses”>
58 <xsd:complexType>
59 <xsd:sequence>
60 <xsd:element name=”Mechanism”>
61 <xsd:complexType>
62 <xsd:sequence>
63 <xsd:element name=”id” type=”xsd:string”/>
64 <xsd:element name=”system” type=”xsd:string”/>
65 </xsd:sequence>
66 </xsd:complexType>
67 </xsd:element>
68 <xsd:element name=”Configuration” maxOccurs=”1”>
69 <xsd:complexType>
70 <xsd:sequence>
71 <xsd:element name=”id” type=”xsd:string”/>
72 <xsd:element name=”system” type=”xsd:string”/>
73 </xsd:sequence>
74 </xsd:complexType>
75 </xsd:element>
76 </xsd:sequence>
77 </xsd:complexType>
78 </xsd:element>
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79
80 <!−−DerivesFrom−−>
81 <xsd:element name=”DerivesFrom”>
82 <xsd:complexType>
83 <xsd:sequence>
84 <xsd:element name=”Capability”>
85 <xsd:complexType>
86 <xsd:sequence>
87 <xsd:element name=”id” type=”xsd:string”/>
88 </xsd:sequence>
89 </xsd:complexType>
90 </xsd:element>
91 <xsd:element name=”Mechanism” minOccurs=”0”>
92 <xsd:complexType>
93 <xsd:sequence>
94 <xsd:element name=”id” type=”xsd:string”/>
95 <xsd:element name=”system” type=”xsd:string”/>
96 </xsd:sequence>
97 </xsd:complexType>
98 </xsd:element>
99 </xsd:sequence>
100 </xsd:complexType>
101 </xsd:element>
102
103 </xsd:choice>
104 </xsd:complexType>
105 </xsd:element>
106 </xsd:schema>
Listing 3.1: XML schema of causal graph data model.
We also crafted an example causal graph and its corresponding XML format
that is based on our schema. This causal graph is shown as a graph in Figure 3.4
and in XML format in Listing 3.2. As the causality-based model is a novel approach,
we could not find any documentation that captures the causal dependencies of
trust notions, capabilities, mechanisms and configurations. Thus, this example ap-
proximates a design of data storage encryption using the Trusted Platform Module
(TPM) version 2.0 [4]. It describes how the capability of disk encryption is derived
from a software application named ”DiskLocker”. This software application is rep-
resented as a mechanism and it calls on various TPM 2.0 subsystems. These TPM
2.0 subsystems are represented as mechanisms. The ”DiskLocker” software and
some of the TPM 2.0 subsystem use configurations. For example, the configuration
of ”DiskLocker” states where the symmetric cryptographic key will be stored. In
another example, the random number generator has to be configured with a seed
value.
1 <causal graph data>
2
3 <ReliesOn>
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4 <TrustNotion> <id>confidentiality</id> </TrustNotion>
5 <Mechanism> <id>cpe:/a:example:disklocker:1.0</id>
6 <system>PHD MC355 004</system> </Mechanism>
7 </ReliesOn>
8
9 <DerivesFrom>
10 <Capability> <id>disk encryption</id> </Capability>
11 <Mechanism> <id>cpe:/a:example:disklocker:1.0</id>
12 <system>PHD MC355 004</system> </Mechanism>
13 </DerivesFrom>
14
15 <CallsOn>
16 <MainMechanism> <id>cpe:/a:example:disklocker:1.0</id>
17 <system>PHD MC355 004</system> </MainMechanism>
18 <SubMechanism> <id>cpe:/a:tpm:subsystem key generation:2.0</id>
19 <system>PHD MC355 004</system> </SubMechanism>
20 <SubMechanism> <id>cpe:/a:tpm:subsystem nv memory:2.0</id>
21 <system>PHD MC355 004</system> </SubMechanism>
22 <SubMechanism> <id>cpe:/a:tpm:subsystem rng:2.0</id>
23 <system>PHD MC355 004</system> </SubMechanism>
24 <SubMechanism> <id>cpe:/a:tpm:subsystem symmetric engine:2.0</id>
25 <system>PHD MC355 004</system> </SubMechanism>
26 </CallsOn>
27
28 <Uses>
29 <Mechanism> <id>cpe:/a:example:disklocker:1.0</id>
30 <system>PHD MC355 004</system> </Mechanism>
31 <Configuration> <id>CCE−071015−1</id>
32 <system>PHD MC355 004</system> </Configuration>
33 </Uses>
34 <Uses>
35 <Mechanism> <id>cpe:/a:tpm:subsystem key generation:2.0</id>
36 <system>PHD MC355 004</system> </Mechanism>
37 <Configuration> <id>CCE−071015−2</id>
38 <system>PHD MC355 004</system> </Configuration>
39 </Uses>
40 <Uses>
41 <Mechanism> <id>cpe:/a:tpm:subsystem nv memory:2.0</id>
42 <system>PHD MC355 004</system> </Mechanism>
43 <Configuration> <id>CCE−071015−3</id>
44 <system>PHD MC355 004</system> </Configuration>
45 </Uses>
46 <Uses>
47 <Mechanism> <id>cpe:/a:tpm:subsystem rng:2.0</id>
48 <system>PHD MC355 004</system> </Mechanism>
49 <Configuration> <id>CCE−071015−4</id>
50 <system>PHD MC355 004</system> </Configuration>
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51 </Uses>
52 <Uses>
53 <Mechanism> <id>cpe:/a:tpm:subsystem symmetric engine:2.0</id>
54 <system>PHD MC355 004</system> </Mechanism>
55 <Configuration> <id>CCE−071015−5</id>
56 <system>PHD MC355 004</system> </Configuration>
57 </Uses>
58 </causal graph data>
Listing 3.2: XML representation of the sample causal graph.
In this example, the ”DiskLocker” software uses symmetric cryptography to en-
crypt data. The symmetric cryptographic mechanism is provided by the TPM 2.0.
”DiskLocker” obtained a random number from the TPM 2.0 random number gener-
ator mechanism before the symmetric cryptographic mechanism of TPM 2.0 can be
used. This random number is passed on to the TPM 2.0 key generation mechanism
which produces a symmetric cryptographic key. This symmetric cryptographic key
is then used with the symmetric cryptographic mechanism to encrypt data. To pro-
tect the symmetric cryptographic key, ”DiskLocker” stores it in TPM 2.0 using the
TPM 2.0 non-volatile memory mechanism. The quality of the disk encryption capa-
bility is affected if ”DiskLocker” uses another random number generator that is not
trusted. As a result, the trust notion of confidentiality that relies on the capability of
disk encryption will be weaker than the situation where a trusted random number
is used. Although the actual operation of such an implementation is more complex
than that is described here, we decided to show just the necessary causal depen-
dencies to ease practical application. Nevertheless, the causality-based model can
be expanded to include more precise causal dependencies.
On the identity of mechanisms and configurations, a straightforward way to
represent them is to refer to the Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) Reference2
and the Common Configuration Enumeration (CCE) Reference3) of the National
Institute of Standards and Technology. CPE is an organised naming scheme for
computing systems, software, and packages. It is based on Uniform Resource
Identifiers (URIs) and contains a formal name format that support name verifica-
tion. CCE gives unique identifiers to system configurations to support correlation
of configuration data. Since the example is an approximation, we assign dummy
identifiers to support the simulation. We note that the TPM 2.0 is neither listed
in CPE nor CCE. The TPM is typically implemented as one device and the mech-
anisms described in this example are subsystems of the TPM device. However,
the TPM specification allows the exact implementation to vary. For example, only
the SM4 symmetric cryptographic algorithm is allowed in certain geographical re-
gions. Therefore, we identified the TPM subsystems as separate mechanisms and
consequently they have their own configurations.
We worked with the Fedora 20 operating system running the Linux kernel ver-
sion 3.19.8. For the MAP server, we reviewed the open source irond version 0.5.6
MAP server developed by the trusted computing research group at the Hochschule
Hannover, University of Applied Sciences and Arts 4. The latest version that sup-
2https://nvd.nist.gov/cpe.cfm
3https://nvd.nist.gov/cce/
4http://trust.f4.hs-hannover.de/
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Figure 3.4: Pictorial representation of a sample causal graph.
ported IF-MAP version 2.2 specification was used. It was a Java program and ref-
ered to stored XML schemas. We added our schema to that of IF-MAP Metadata for
Network Security. Then we examined the open source ifmapj version 2.3.0 Java li-
brary developed by the same team. We ran a MAP client program that made use of
this Java library. This MAP client program encapsulates our example XML shown
in Listing 3.2 and publishes it to the irond MAP server through an internal network.
From this simulation, we managed to demonstrate how the causality-based model
can be implemented on the TNC open architecture.
3.6 Trust Assessment
We developed an assessment rule to determine if a causal graph meets the require-
ment of a trust policy. A trust policy will consist of a set of assessment rules that
lay out what are the identity and type of the vertices and edges required in a causal
graph of a computing device before it can be trusted. We observed that the root of
causal graphs will always be the vertices of Trust Notion. Thus, we can craft trust
policies by starting with trust notions. To support this assessment, we formulated
a rule that is based on determining the existence of a particular triplet in the causal
graph. This is the most basic assessment rule and a trust policy will consist of a set
of such basic assessment rules. This basic assessment rule is specified in the Backus
Naur Form and it is shown in Listing 3.3 below.
1 (∗U, RO, CO and DF are the short form for Uses, ReliesOn, CallsOn and
DerivesFrom∗)
2 (∗ME, CF, TN and CP are the short form for Mechanism, Configuration,
TrustNotion and Capability∗)
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3 <VertexType> ::= <ME> | <CF> | <CP> | <TN>
4 <SourceVertex>, <DestinationVertex> ::= <VertexType> <VertexID> | <
VertexType> <id> <system>
5 <DependencyType> ::= <U> | <RO> | <CO> | <DF>
6 <Triplet> ::= ”(”<SourceVertex>”,” <DependencyType>”,” <
DestinationVertex>”)”
7 <BasicAssessmentRule> ::= ”Is” <DestinationVertex> ”∈ of a triplet
containing (”<SourceVertex> ”,” <DependencyType>”)?”
Listing 3.3: Specification of the basic assessment rule.
The specification begins by explaining the terms used. Line 3 states that the
type of vertex can be a mechanism, a configuration, a capability or a trust notion.
Line 4 then says that a target vertex is associated to an identity, and a system if
the vertex type is a mechanism or a capability. The type of causal dependency is
declared in line 5. Line 6 says that a triplet is projected as (SourceVertex, Dependen-
cyType, DestinationVertex). Hence, queries will be formulated around the concept
of a triplet. Line 7 states a precise question on the existence of a destination vertex
in a triplet. This question is the foundation of the assessment rule.
To develop a trust policy, we will have to understand how a mechanism inter-
acts with another and what capability and trust notion does it enable. The trust
policy will consist of numerous basic assessment rules that transverse through a
causal graph and checking every branch from the root node to the leaf node. Fig-
ure 3.5 shows an example of a trust policy for the causal graph in Figure 3.4.
1 for $c in
2 /causal graph data
3 where
4 $c/CallsOn/MainMechanism/id=”cpe:/a:example:disklocker:1.0”
5 return
6 if ($c/CallsOn/SubMechanism/id=”cpe:/a:tpm:subsystem key generation:2.0”)
then
7 <result1> yes </result1>
8 else
9 <result1> no </result1>
Listing 3.4: XQuery command to check for a specific mechanisms that
”DiskLocker” calls on.
The most direct way to assess a causal graph for trustworthiness is to process
all the rules with a Boolean AND function. If the causal graph does not satisfy
one rule, then the trust assessment will fail. However, we acknowledge that this
assessment method is not flexible. If the trust assessment is to consider a range of
values, then the rules can be assessed according to a Boolean Decision List [73].
However, we have to be careful with the complexity of the assessment process
although we can deduce that the problem space is achievable in polynomial time if
the number of rules is finite.
To implement the basic assessment rule, we investigated the use of the XQuery
language. For example, if the query is ”Is SubMechanism id=”cpe:/
a:tpm:subsystem key generation:2.0” system=”PHD MC355 004” ∈ of a triplet
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1. Is Capability id=”Disk Encryption” ∈ of a triplet containing (TrustNo-
tion=”Confidentiality”, RO)
2. Is Mechanism id=”cpe:/a:example:disklocker:1.0” sys-
tem=”PHD MC355 004” ∈ of a triplet containing (Capability id=”Disk
Encryption”, DF)
3. Is Configuration id=”CCE-071015-1” system=”PHD MC355 004” ∈ of
a triplet containing (Mechanism id=”cpe:/a:example:disklocker:1.0” sys-
tem=”PHD MC355 004”,U)
4. Is SubMechanism id=”cpe:/a:tpm:subsystem key generation:2.0” sys-
tem=”PHD MC355 004” ∈ of a triplet containing (MainMechanism
id=”cpe:/a:example:disklocker:1.0” system=”PHD MC355 004”, CO)
5. Is Configuration id=”CCE-071015-2” system=”PHD MC355 004” ∈ of a
triplet containing (Mechanism id=”cpe:/a:tpm:subsystem key generation:2.0”
system=”PHD MC355 004”, U)
6. Is SubMechanism id=”cpe:/a:tpm:subsystem nv memory:2.0” sys-
tem=”PHD MC355 004” ∈ of a triplet containing (MainMechanism
id=”cpe:/a:example:disklocker:1.0” system=”PHD MC355 004”, CO)
7. Is Configuration id=”CCE-071015-3” system=”PHD MC355 004” ∈ of a
triplet containing (Mechanism id=”cpe:/a:tpm:subsystem nv memory:2.0”
system=”PHD MC355 004”, U)
8. Is SubMechanism id=”cpe:/a:tpm:subsystem rng:2.0” sys-
tem=”PHD MC355 004” ∈ of a triplet containing (MainMechanism
id=”cpe:/a:example:disklocker:1.0” system=”PHD MC355 004”, CO)
9. Is Configuration id=”CCE-071015-4” system=”PHD MC355 004” ∈ of
a triplet containing (Mechanism id=”cpe:/a:tpm:subsystem rng:2.0” sys-
tem=”PHD MC355 004”, U)
10. Is SubMechanism id=”cpe:/a:tpm:subsystem symmetric engine:2.0” sys-
tem=”PHD MC355 004” ∈ of a triplet containing (MainMechanism
id=”cpe:/a:example:disklocker:1.0” system=”PHD MC355 004”, CO)
11. Is Configuration id=”CCE-071015-5” system=”PHD MC355 004” ∈ of a
triplet containing (Mechanism id=”cpe:/a:tpm:subsystem symmetric engine:2.0”
system=”PHD MC355 004”, U)
Figure 3.5: Example of a trust policy.
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containing (MainMechanism id=”cpe:/a:example:disklocker:1.0” system=”PHD
MC355 004”, CO)”, we can issue the XQuery command in Listing 3.4. The return
result will be ”yes” in this example.
3.7 Related Works
As far as we know, our work on the causality-based model is the first attempt at
describing the capabilities of a computing device. Although this causality-based
model can appear similar to the ontology of Chapter 5, there are key differences be-
cause they are intended for different purposes. First, the causality-based model in-
tends to describe the trustworthiness of a computing device. Hence, its description
covers the causal dependencies between trust notions, capabilities, mechanisms
and configuration. This description pertains to a specific implementation and its
configurations. On the other hand, the ontology of Chapter 5 is a mapping of a
class of computing device. In that chapter, the ontology maps the class of comput-
ing device secured with TPM 2.0 and does not include the applied configurations.
Thus, that ontology serves as a standard vocabulary for experts to share informa-
tion on TPM 2.0 with developers of trusted systems. Secondly, the structure of
the causality-based model depends on the unambiguous definitions of causal de-
pendencies and has rules governing its use while the structure of an ontology is
founded on class hierarchies and user defined semantic relations. As a result, the
ontology is not as robust as the causality-based description when used to describe
the trustworthiness of a computing device. However, these two methods can be
complementary. For example, the initial development of a causality-based descrip-
tion of a specific implementation can refer to the ontology of the class that this
computing device belongs to.
3.8 Summary
We revisit the requirements mentioned in Section 3.2. On the requirement to de-
scribe the capabilities of a computing device that give rise to its trustworthiness,
we have developed a causality-based model that describes the causal dependen-
cies between trust notions, capabilities, mechanisms and configurations. To make
the model clear and easy to understand, we have given the basic definitions of the
model and used set theory to further clarify the definitions. We then transformed
the causality-based model into a causal graph for the purpose of data representa-
tion. Additional definitions are given for the graph model to show clearly how
it can be used. During implementation, we have gained insights into how the
causality-based model can be extended to the schemas used by the MAP server
of the TNC open architecture and gave an example of a causal graph and its cor-
responding XML format. We also explained how to carry out trust assessment
of the XML based causal graph. These practical exercises show that the require-
ment to support digital representation of this model is met. Most importantly, this
causality-based model enables the descriptive property of Grawrock’s trust lan-
guage. The trust notions, capabilities, mechanisms, configurations and their causal
dependencies defined in Section 3.3 are the grammar of the trust language. On the
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other hand, the graph definition from Section 3.4 offers a standard form to ensure
that the structure of the trust language is consistent.
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Chapter 4
Provenance-based Attestation for Trustworthy
Computing
4.1 Introduction
Attestation, in the context of trustworthy computing, is carried out with the inten-
tion of uncovering if a computer can behave in an expected manner when given a
specific task to perform. Thus, the evidence given for trust assessment often identi-
fies the software stack running on the attesting computing and if they are in a state
that can be expected to perform a specific task in a trusted manner. This notion of
expected behavior is viewed by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) [49] as the
tenet of trustworthiness.
This chapter follows on from the previous chapter introducing our causality-
based model. When a causality-based description of the trustworthiness of a com-
puting device is given, the first logical step is to evaluate if the description meets
certain requirements. If the evaluation is successful, the next logical step is to check
if the mechanisms and configurations stated in the causality-based description be-
have in an expected manner to give rise to the capabilities and trust notions. This
step entails the attestation of the identity and state of these mechanisms and con-
figurations.
The prevailing practice of attestation is to compare the integrity measurements
of binaries that make up the software stack of a computer against pre-defined
trusted values. This technique is known as binary attestation [5]. When the com-
puter is booting up, integrity measurements are obtained by passing each binary
of the software stack through a hash function. The resulting hash digest is unique
to this particular software binary and its state. In many implementations, the in-
tegrity measurements are stored into a security device known as the Trusted Plat-
form Module (TPM) which is specified by the TCG [92].
Besides measuring the key components of the software stack, integrity measure-
ment can be extended to cover important configuration files such as the password
file. If all the integrity measurements of the key software binaries and configu-
rations match pre-defined trusted values, then it can be said that the computer is
trustworthy. When a software binary is altered and the pre-defined trusted value
is not updated under authorization to reflect the change, then the resulting hash
digest will be different from the pre-defined value and, thus, the trustworthiness of
the computer will be cast in doubt.
However, the implementation of binary attestation has faced many challenges
[74]. The main problem is that the integrity measurement value contains little infor-
mation. This integrity measurement value is only made meaningful when there is a
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reference value which reflects the identity and state of the source component. If no
such reference value is available, then binary attestation fails as there are no other
means to check the trustworthiness of the component. The situation of no reference
value can arise when a component in the measured software stack has changed but
the change is not reflected in the reference database. Although the change could be
malicious, it could also be the case that the change is legitimate and the component
remains trustworthy.
There have been efforts to develop alternatives to binary attestation. Property-
based attestation was proposed by Sadeghi and Stuble [74]. The main concept is
that attestation should verify if a computer possesses properties to fulfill certain
requirements of the party who asks for attestation. Its implementation relies on a
trusted third party that certifies the properties on the attesting computer. However,
this approach is challenged by the broad definition of ”property”. On the other
hand, Halder et al. [29] proposed semantic remote attestation which leverages
program analysis to determine whether a program’s execution will satisfy certain
properties. Similar to property-based attestation, this approach is thwarted by the
definition of ”property”. Meanwhile, Alam et al. [1] presented a model-based be-
havioral attestation where the trustworthiness of a target computer is based on the
behaviour of its policy model. But the semantics of this proposal are high level and
they require transformation to a low level policy that is implementable. Thus, find-
ing workable alternatives to binary attestation is still a very much open research
problem.
In view of these challenges, we investigate and develop a design for using
provenance data as evidence of trustworthiness in the attestation of a computer.
This chapter reports on this work. In Section 4.2, we articulate how provenance
data can be used as evidence of trustworthiness. Section 4.3 describes the goals
that guide the development of this design. Section 4.4 gives an overview of this
provenance-based attestation design. This is followed by Section 4.5 which ex-
plains the collection and representation of provenance data. The specification of
trust evaluation rule and the evaluation algorithm are covered in Section 4.6. We
share our experience at building the key mechanisms of this design in Section 4.7.
Threat modelling of this design is given in Section 4.8 and a mitigation to the iden-
tified threats is given in Section 4.9. Related works are discussed in Section 4.10
and the summary of this chapter is in Section 4.11.
4.2 Provenance Data as Trust Evidence
Provenance is the documentation of the origin of an object and the processes that
cause it to be in this current state [53]. Recording and storing the provenance data
of an object enable a party to evaluate the contextual and circumstantial evidence
of the origin of the object and its transformation to the current form. The semantics
of provenance describe how the state of an object is caused by an effect. In other
words, the semantics of provenance captures the causal dependencies between the
different states of an object and other elements. This description for dependency
path is often written as a triplet (x,y,z) where component x was related to another
component z through a property y. It can also be expressed as a directed acyclic
graph where the nodes are x and z while the directed edge is y. Hence, we can
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conjecture that the provenance of an object is composed of multiple provenance
data and they form a larger directed acyclic graph with numerous nodes that are
connected by directed edges.
In scientific research, provenance has been traditionally associated with e-Science
that makes use of provenance systems to track data objects used and generated
in computer simulated experiments [47]. Another popular implementation is the
use of provenance data models to track the origin, use and transformation of ob-
jects and resources on the Web [54]. However, we argue that the principle behind
provenance is applicable to the attestation of a computer. In this context, software
or configuration files in a computer are treated as an object. In the same vein, the
provenance data of this object will contain information about its origin and how it
is changed over time. If it can be ascertained that the object’s origin is reputable,
the change over time is authorized by a legitimate party and the change param-
eters are reliable, then there is a high degree of confidence in the identity of the
object and the expectation that it can perform the task intended by its creator. This
outcome is compatible with the trust notion of expected behavior defined by the
TCG. Thus, the provenance data of key components of a computer can be used as
evidence during attestation to back up its claim of trustworthiness.
The most important advantage that provenance data has over an integrity mea-
surement value is that it contains more information. When an integrity measure-
ment value does not match a reference value, it is difficult to trace what causes the
software to change to an unknown state. However, it is relatively straightforward
in the case of a provenance data as the semantics would have connected the infor-
mation together. This property of the provenance data also makes it better than
using a system log for identifying the cause, whether malicious or legitimate, as
a system log records events individually and does not connect them together. We
will describe this advantage further in Section 4.6.
The following is an example of an application of provenance-based attestation.
In an enterprise that has a Bring-Your-Own-Device (BYOD) policy [3], computers
are not always connected to the corporate computer network and any changes to
these computers can happen without the knowledge and authorization of the com-
puter network administrators. Thus, if binary attestation is its primary form of
attestation, provenance-based attestation can augment the trust evaluation when a
reference integrity measurement value is not available or when an integrity mea-
surement value does not match the reference value.
4.3 Design Goals
The following two goals are proposed to guide the development of the provenance-
based attestation design.
Design Goal 1 : The provenance data of a component has to contain suitable informa-
tion such that it can be used by another party to make a trust evaluation. This requires a
data model that could describe the provenance data of a computer component in
a manner so that this provenance data could be used as evidence of trustworthi-
ness for the attestation of a computer. In addition, this data model is required to
represent the provenance data of a computer component in a structured format so
that this format can be read by another party. This design goal also alludes to a
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Figure 4.1: A design of provenance-based attestation.
system design that describes how provenance data is collected and used by a trust
evaluator.
Design Goal 2 : Rules must be able to be created to guide the trust evaluation of a
provenance record. To evaluate provenance data for evidence of trustworthiness, the
evaluator should assess the presented data according to a set of pre-defined rules.
Hence, the rules are to be developed with reference to the kind of provenance data
that could be represented. For a thorough evaluation, the rules have to examine
all possible causal dependencies between the component and other agents and ac-
tivities of the host computer and the related attributes. Hence, the evaluation will
have to process the various rules against the provenance data and produce a result
to indicate the trustworthiness.
4.4 A Design for Provenance-based Attestation
Our design in Figure 4.1 describes the key modules in provenance-based attesta-
tion. We assume that the attesting computer can reach the trust evaluator over a
computer network.
The following paragraphs give a general description of the modules in this de-
sign. Detailed descriptions and designs are presented in Sections 4.5 and 4.6.
Provenance Aware System: A provenance aware system is a computer system
that contains automated mechanisms for capturing provenance data related to a
target object. A target object could be a software binary or a configuration file. It
is crucial that these mechanisms are deployed at strategic points in the computer
system so that they are triggered whenever a change is made to a target object. An
example of such mechanism would be software code inserted into an installer such
as rpm 1 and yum 2. Another example where these mechanisms can be inserted is
text editors such as vim 3 and gedit 4.
Besides implanting such mechanisms at the application level of the software
stack, system calls occurring at kernel level could also be monitored. For example,
when a system call such as vfs.write is activated, a mechanism can be activated to
capture provenance data related to this event. A provenance aware system can
be configured to monitor the same components measured by binary attestation.
Thus, when binary attestation fails, the related provenance data can be provided to
augment the trust evaluation process.
Provenance Record: When a target object is changed in a provenance aware sys-
tem, provenance data related to this instance of change will be captured as a prove-
1http://www.rpm.org/
2http://yum.baseurl.org/
3http://www.vim.org/
4https://wiki.gnome.org/Apps/Gedit
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nance record. The provenance record presents the captured provenance data in a
structured format so that it can be evaluated by another party to determine if the
target object is trustworthy. In additional, a provenance record is updated in real
time and hence it always reflects the up to date status of the target object. As nu-
merous target objects can be monitored in a provenance aware system, there can
be several provenance records existing in the attesting computer. Every prove-
nance record is identified by tagging it to the target object. During attestation, the
party conducting the trust evaluation can request the attesting computer to provide
provenance records of interest. In this design, the trustworthiness of a component
depends on the evaluation of its provenance record. Therefore, provenance records
should be protected from tampering. In addition, information in the provenance
records could reveal the composition of a computer. Hence, they should not be
read by an unauthorized entity.
Trust Evaluator: After the attesting computer sends over the requested prove-
nance record, the trust evaluator will examine the record for evidence that indicates
the trustworthiness of the target object. The evaluation takes in the provenance
record and a set of rules as inputs, examines the provenance record with reference
to the rules, and outputs a result about the trustworthiness of the target object.
Rules: The rules are crafted with the intention of checking a provenance record
for certain provenance data that indicate the trustworthiness of the target object.
The rules can check on the dependencies between the target object and other ele-
ments of the attesting computer. The rules can also check on the attributes of these
elements. As there can be numerous provenance records tagged to different target
objects, there will be different sets of rules that are meant to evaluate provenance
records of different target objects. If no rule set is available to evaluate a particu-
lar provenance record, then the trust evaluation can prompt the administrator for
intervention.
4.5 Collecting and Representing Provenance Records
To identify what provenance data to collect, we analyze what kind of provenance
data convey the TCG’s central notion of expected behavior. A provenance record
of a target object contains provenance data related to an instance of change. The
record will later allow an evaluator to ask questions on provenance as part of the
trust evaluation process. Some examples of questions are: ”What was the activity
that produced this version of software?”, ”Who authorized this software change?”
and ”Did the activity that produced this version of software use the correct inputs?”
Answering these questions requires analyzing the provenance record of the target
object. Hence, a provenance aware system has to capture, in a provenance record,
relevant information that could be used to answer these questions about the change
in state of the target object.
There are several data models for representing provenance data. The Open
Provenance Model (OPM) [53] is a well-known provenance data model published
by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) while the Dublin Core model [97] is
a generic metadata standard that can be customised to represent provenance data.
In April of 2013, the provenance working group of W3C published the PROV data
model [54]. This newer data model supersedes the Open Provenance Model and
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Figure 4.2: A graph describing the PROV data model redrawn from [54].
can be mapped to the Dublin Core model. We reviewed the specifications of the
PROV data model and found that the semantics are useful for answering the prove-
nance questions discussed in the previous paragraph. No change or extension to
the PROV data model is required. Although the Dublin Core model can be adapted
to represent provenance data, we decided to take a more direct approach and use
the PROV data model in this work. Nevertheless, we do not foresee any difficulties
with using the Dublin Core model in the design described in Section 4.4.
The PROV data model defines the representations of the entities, agents, activi-
ties and their relationship in the production of an object. We use the graph in Figure
4.2 to give an overview of the PROV data model. Brief explanations of the nodes
and edges in the PROV provenance graph in the context of provenance-based at-
testation are given in the following paragraphs. This is to aid the understanding of
the designs described in this chapter. A more detailed explanation of PROV data
model can be obtained from [54].
Entity: An entity is an object and examples are a software binary and a configu-
ration file.
Activity: In the context of provenance-based attestation, activities refer to the
process that changes an entity. For example, the rpm installer deploys a new soft-
ware version and removes the outdated version from a computer system.
Used and wasGeneratedBy: An activity can either use an entity or generate an
entity. For example, coding a program brings a program into existence. Another
example is patching an older software version to a newer software version. Note
that these two edges are directed and only exist between an entity node and activity
node. Past tense is used for these two terms because provenance is about events in
the past.
Agent, wasAssociatedWith and wasAttributedTo: An agent has a relationship with
an activity in such a way that the agent has responsibility for the activity taking
place. This relationship of responsibility is termed wasAssociatedWith. An agent
can be a decision making software, a person or an organization. On the other hand,
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Figure 4.3: Flowchart for upgrading iptables using rpm.
when an agent has responsibility for an entity, this relationship is termed wasAt-
tributedTo and it means that the agent is responsible for an activity that generated
that entity. wasAttributedTo can also be used as an abstract representation to rep-
resent the dependency that an entity was generated by an activity and this activity
was associated with an agent. Note that these two edges are directed and wasAs-
sociatedWith is used with an agent and an entity while wasAttributedTo is used
with an agent and an activity.
wasDerivedFrom: An entity can be derived from another entity. For example, this
version of configuration is derived from an earlier version. wasDerivedFrom can
be used as an abstract representation of the event when an activity uses an entity
to generate another entity.
A node or an edge in the PROV provenance graph can have attributes to de-
scribe certain contextual information. These attributes can possess a value. For
instance, an authority agent has an identity of ”computer administrator” and it has
a ”type” attribute which has the value ”person”. Meanwhile, an entity is always
drawn as a circle, an activity is a box and agents are hexagon shaped. In the PROV
data model, one can express a dependency path as a triplet, for example, (Entity,
wasGeneratedBy, Activity).
We will use the example of upgrading the iptables 5 program using the rpm pack-
age manager to show how a provenance record for this software can be represented.
iptables is commonly found in the Linux based operating system and it controls the
kind of network connectivity the operating system can have. Figure 4.3 shows a
generalized work flow for the process of using rpm to upgrade the iptables program
from version 1.4.20 to version 1.4.21. The flowchart shows that the source file is
obtained from a software provider and the upgrading is approved by an authority.
The rpm manager uses the source file iptables-1.4.21.src.rpm.
In provenance-based attestation, we wish to capture provenance data that can
be used to assist with trust evaluation. In this example, we are interested in the
causal dependencies amongst iptables, rpm, authority and software provider. We
are also interested in their attributes. Hence, the provenance record has to contain
this information. The provenance graph for this example is given in Figure 4.4.
5http://www.netfilter.org/projects/iptables/
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Figure 4.4: Provenance graph of upgrading iptables.
The rpm package manager is defined as an activity. The entities consist: of
the source file iptables-1.4.21.src.rpm; the software to be upgraded, iptables ver-
sion 1.4.20 and the software after upgrading; iptables version 1.4.21. The author-
ity agent has the responsibility of approving the upgrading while the software
provider agent has the responsibility of delivering the source file.
While the provenance graph provides a visual description of the provenance
record, the provenance aware system actually produces a textual provenance record.
The PROV data model has provision for using several textual schemas such as Terse
RDF Triple Language (Turtle) [6] and eXtensible Markup Language (XML) to repre-
sent a provenance record in text format. We found that both Turtle and XML have
similar capabilities but we chose to use XML schema as it is more widely used and
supported by many application tools. Listing 4.1 shows the XML based provenance
record for upgrading iptables. The XML based provenance record includes more in-
formation, such as time, role and attributes, which are not shown in the provenance
graph.
The XML based provenance record for this example of upgrading iptables begins
by tagging it to the target object and stating the namespace used (lines 1 to 4). It
then proceeds with the listing of nodes by their type: entity, agent or activity (lines
5 to 25). Each node has an identity name. For example, line 6 describes the ”iptables
version 1.4.21” entity. This entity does not have any attributes. Referring to lines
10 to 12, the ”rpm” activity has a value which is the code signing certificate. This
code signing certificate can be verified by the trust evaluator later to check on the
authenticity of the rpm installer. Meanwhile, from lines 13 to 25, the ”authority”
agent has attributes that describe its name, email address and an identity number
while the ”software provider” agent has attributes that describe its name and URL
web link.
The relationships between the nodes are next described (lines 26 to 52). These
can be considered as triplets that describe the causal dependencies. For example,
lines 27 to 30 simply describe that ”rpm” used ”iptables-1.4.21.src.rpm”. In addi-
tion, lines 40 to 46 describe that ”rpm” was associated with ”authority”. The role
of this association is to approve iptables patch to 1.4.21. There is a value which is
the approval identity number and the time of approval is recorded as well. The
provenance record ends with the additional information of the start and end time
of the patching process (lines 54 to 61). This information can be utilized if the trust
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evaluator wishes to find out when this event took place.
1 <?xml version=’1.0’ encoding=’UTF−8’?>
2 <prov: iptables version 1.4.21 provenance record
3 xmlns:prov=http://www.w3.org/ns/prov#
4 xmlns:foaf=”http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/”>
5 <!−−Entities−−>
6 <prov:entity prov:id=”iptables version 1.4.21”/>
7 <prov:entity prov:id=”iptables version 1.4.20”/>
8 <prov:entity prov:id=”iptables−1.4.21.src.rpm”/>
9 <!−−Activities−−>
10 <prov:activity prov:id=”rpm”>
11 <prov:value> Code Signing Certificate 03
ce7ecd0cc462b0b0bef08d400f5a39 </prov:value>
12 </prov:activity>
13 <!−−Agents−−>
14 <prov:agent prov:id=”authority”>
15 <prov:type> prov:Person </prov:type>
16 <foaf:givenName> Admin </foaf:givenName>
17 <foaf:mbox> mailto:admin@example.org </foaf:mbox>
18 <prov:value> ID Admin 4567 </prov:value>
19 </prov:agent>
20 <prov:agent prov:id=”software provider”>
21 <prov:type> prov:Organisation </prov:type>
22 <foaf:givenName> Netfilter </foaf:givenName>
23 <foaf:homepage> http://www.netfilter.org/projects/iptables/
24 downloads.html </foaf:homepage>
25 </prov:agent>
26 <!−−Relations−−>
27 <prov:used>
28 <prov:activity prov:ref=”rpm”/>
29 <prov:entity prov:ref=”iptables−1.4.21.src.rpm”/>
30 </prov:used>
31 <prov:used>
32 <prov:activity prov:ref=”rpm”/>
33 <prov:entity prov:ref=”iptables version 1.4.20”/>
34 </prov:used>
35 <prov:wasGeneratedBy>
36 <prov:entity prov:ref=”iptables version 1.4.21”/>
37 <prov:activity prov:ref=”rpm”/>
38 </prov:wasGeneratedBy>
39 <!−−Responsibilities and Attributions−−>
40 <prov:wasAssociatedWith>
41 <prov:activity prov:ref=”rpm”/>
42 <prov:agent prov:ref=”authority”/>
43 <prov:role>approve iptables patch to 1.4.21</prov:role>
44 <prov:value>Approval ID Z7890</prov:value>
45 <prov:time>2014−09−30T14:34:00</prov:time>
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46 </prov:wasAssociatedWith>
47 <prov:wasAssociatedWith>
48 <prov:activity prov:ref=”rpm”/>
49 <prov:agent prov:ref=”software provider”/>
50 <prov:role>provide iptables−1.4.21.src.rpm </prov:role>
51 <prov:time>2014−09−30T14:33:00</prov:time>
52 </prov:wasAssociatedWith>
53 <!−−Time−−>
54 <prov:wasStartedBy>
55 <prov:activity prov:ref=”rpm”/>
56 <prov:time>2014−09−30T14:35:00</prov:time>
57 </prov:wasStartedBy>
58 <prov:wasEndedBy>
59 <prov:activity prov:ref=”rpm”/>
60 <prov:time>2014−09−30T14:36:00</prov:time>
61 </prov:wasEndedBy>
62 </prov: iptables version 1.4.21 provenance record >
Listing 4.1: XML based provenance record for patching iptables.
The main benefit of this XML based provenance record over commonly found
records of change events in computer systems such as syslog is that the required
provenance data are put together in a structured format and connected together
meaningfully . Although it can be argued that the required provenance data can be
reconstructed by trawling through logs of a computer system, there is a risk that
certain provenance data is not captured at that moment in time and this results in
an incomplete provenance record.
4.6 Trust Assessment of Provenance Records
A rule set is required as a reference during the trust evaluation of a provenance
record. This rule set is a manifestation of the questions an evaluator will ask to
ascertain the trustworthiness of the target object. There are two categories of ques-
tions: one that asks about the causal dependencies between the target object and
other elements of the attesting computer and the other that asks about the attributes
of the related elements. Consequently, there is a rule type for each category of ques-
tions. With this requirement in mind, we formulate a rule specification grammar
to guide the expression of the rules in pseudo code. Listing 4.2 shows the rule
specification grammar expressed in Backus Naur Form.
This rule specification grammar begins by explaining the terms used. Line 6
states that <NodeType> can either be an entity, activity or agent. Line 7 explains
that both <QueryNode> and <TargetNode> are composed of the type and iden-
tity of node. <AttributeNode> at line 8 has the additional fields that describe
the attribute identity and content. Line 9 defines that <DependencyType> can
be used, wasGenerateBy, wasDerivedFrom, wasAttributedTo or wasAssociated-
With. <Dependency> at line 10 refers to the type of dependency and its attributes.
Hence, it has the additional fields of attribute identity and content.
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There are two rule types. The causal dependency type rule specified in line
11 is developed around the concept of expressing a causal dependency path as a
triplet which is explained in Section 4.2. Essentially, the rule asks if a destination
<QueryNode> can be found in the causal dependency path where<TargetNode>
is the source and <Dependency> is the edge. An example is : Is ACT rpm ∈ (ENT
iptables version 1.4.21 , WGB) ? This example checks if the triplet (iptables version
1.4.21, wasGeneratedBy, rpm) is present in the provenance record. The other type
of rule is the attribute rule described in line 12. The attribute rule asks if a node
contains an attribute of certain identity and if the content of the attribute has a
particular value. An example of an attribute rule is : Is value ∈ AGT Authority ∩
value = ID Admin 4567 ?
1 (∗U, WGB, WDF, WAT and WAW are the short form for used,
2 wasGeneratedBy, wasDerivedFrom, wasAttributedTo and
3 wasAssociatedWith∗)
4 (∗ENT, ACT and AGT are the short form for Entity, Activity
5 and Agent∗)
6 <NodeType> ::= <ENT> | <ACT> | <AGT>
7 <QueryNode>, <TargetNode> ::= <NodeType> <NodeID>
8 <AttributeNode> ::= <NodeType> <NodeID> <AttributeID> <
AttributeContent>
9 <DependencyType> ::= <U> | <WGB> | <WDF> | <WAT> | <WAW>
10 <Dependency> ::= <DependencyType> <AttributeID> <AttributeContent>
11 <DependencyRule> ::= ”Is” <QueryNode> ”∈ (”<TargetNode> ”,” <
Dependency> ”)?”
12 <AttributeRule> ::= ”Is” <AttributeID> ”∈” <AttributeNode> ”∩” <
AttributeContent> ”=” <value> ”?”
Listing 4.2: Rule specification grammar for trustworthy evaluation of provenance
record.
To develop specific dependency rules and attribute rules, we will have to un-
derstand the work flow that describes the change to a target object. An example of
work flow is given in Figure 4.3. Thereafter, we refer to the work flow and develop
a provenance graph of which an example is given in Figure 4.4. We can visualize
Figure 4.4 as a directed rooted tree and the leaf nodes always have a parent node
that describes the activity which produces the root node. The root node will refer
to the target object monitored by the provenance aware system. This is an impor-
tant observation. When we analyze other provenance records such as those about
a change to a configuration file, we could make similar observations as well.
From Listing 4.1, we can see that the provenance record contains attribute data
for the following nodes: rpm, Authority, Software Provider. Thus, by inspecting
Figure 4.4 and Listing 4.1 simultaneously, we can develop a set of specific depen-
dency rules and attributes rules to evaluate this particular provenance record and
the development of rules starts with the examination of the root node before ending
with the leaf nodes. Listing 4.3 shows the rule set for evaluating the provenance
record given in Listing 4.1. The rule set starts with a dependency rule covering
the root node and then through the branch node and eventually the leaf nodes. As
stated in the previous paragraph about similar observations of the directed rooted
59
4.6 Trust Assessment of Provenance Records
graph in the provenance record of both software binary and configuration file, the
structure of the rule set in Listing 4.3 can be the template for their evaluation.
1 Is ACT rpm ∈ (ENT iptables version 1.4.21 , WGB) ?
2 Is AGT Authority ∈ (ACT rpm , WAW) ?
3 Is AGT Software Provider ∈ (ACT rpm , WAW) ?
4 Is ENT iptables 1.4.21.src.rpm ∈ (ACT rpm , U) ?
5 Is ENT iptables version 1.4.20 ∈ (ACT rpm , U) ?
6 Is AGT Software Provider ∈ (ENT iptables 1.4.21.src.rpm , WGB) ?
7 Is value ∈ ACT rpm ∩ value = Code Signing Certificate 03
ce7ecd0cc462b0b0bef08d400f5a39 ?
8 Is value ∈ AGT Authority ∩ value = ID Admin 4567 ?
9 Is homepage ∈ AGT Software Provider ∩ homepage = http://www.netfilter.org/
projects/iptables/downloads.html ?
Listing 4.3: A set of dependency and attribute rules.
The most direct method to evaluate the provenance record given in Listing 4.1
and using the rule set from Listing 4.3 is to simply process all the rules using the
Boolean AND function and the function starts with the rules related to the root
node and ends with rules related to the leaf nodes. If the provenance record does
not satisfy any of the rules, then the function will output that the provenance record
does not attest to the trustworthiness of the target object iptables version 1.4.21.
However, we acknowledge that this evaluation method is rather straightforward
and could face issues in practical implementation as there could be multiple com-
puter configurations. Therefore, as an example, if we are flexible with the installer
software and trust yum as well, then the Boolean function for this scenario will be
in disjunctive normal form (DNF) where the outcome of the evaluation depends on
either the rules for rpm or the rules for yum.
If the requirement is for the trust evaluation to consider a range of values, for ex-
ample, trusting a range of software installers instead of just rpm, then the trust eval-
uator can use the Boolean Decision List [73] to address this challenge. Meanwhile,
in another example of the flexibility offered by this trust evaluation approach, the
trust evaluator can only insist that rules 2, 3, 7, 8 and 9 are met. In this case, the
trust evaluator is satisfied as long as the change to the target object is authorized
and obtained from an approved source. Moreover, this approach can be used to-
gether with techniques developed for eXtensible Access Control Markup Language
(XACML) [60] to provide for policy based trust evaluation. Therefore, we can con-
clude that these two rule types are the ”basic units” of a rule set used in the eval-
uation of a provenance record and they can be employed together with various
techniques to allow for more flexible evaluation of a provenance record. However,
the trust evaluator has to be careful with the complexity of the evaluation process
although we can deduce that the problem space is achievable in polynomial time if
the number of rules is finite. In addition, this approach to trust evaluation in prove-
nance based attestation has an advantage over binary attestation. From Section 4.1,
we understand that, in binary attestation, if the integrity measurement value does
not match the reference value, the evaluation cannot proceed further. However,
we show in this section that the trust evaluation in provenance-based attestation is
versatile and can be adapted to deal with different situations.
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Figure 4.5: A screen shot of System Tap running a monitoring script.
4.7 Proof of Concept
To build a provenance aware computer system, we explored two approaches. In
the first approach, we instrumented all software applications that are capable of
altering the trustworthy state. In the second approach, we inserted program scripts
at the kernel space to monitor actions that could alter the trustworthy state. We
worked with the Fedora 20 operating system running the Linux kernel version
3.17.4. On the instrumentation of a software application, we reviewed the source
code of the widely used text editor vim and inserted scripts using the autocmd
function. This method allowed us to capture provenance data related to the rela-
tionships used, wasGeneratedBy and wasDerivedFrom. For instrumentation at the
kernel space, we explored the tool System Tap version 2.6 6 and developed a script
to monitor the system call vfs.write. When this system call was activated, the mon-
itoring script will automatically capture and record the provenance data related to
used, wasGeneratedBy, wasAttributedTo and wasAssociatedWith. An example of
using System Tap is given in Figure 4.5. In this example, the script ”wgb.stp” was
ran with System Tap to monitor any vfs.write to the file ”/etc/test.txt”. When the
program vi carries out a vfs.write on this file, the provenance data of this event will
be captured.
Thus, we show that provenance information can be captured and recorded for
use later to support the trust evaluation of an object. However, we found that both
approaches are not exclusive and should be employed together to produce the most
complete provenance record. We also observed that the ability of a provenance
aware system to capture all provenance data of a target object depends on how
comprehensively the system is instrumented. In spite of this, we were unable to
monitor objects residing at the BIOS level as the instrumentations occur at the OS
level.
Meanwhile, we wanted to find out how provenance-based attestation will be
accepted by professionals. First, we presented the provenance-based attestation
design to a group of 10 people who have worked in information security for at least
a year and introduced to them the rule specification grammar. Then a quick survey
was conducted at the end of the 30 minute session and 8 of them stated that they
6https://sourceware.org/systemtap/
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could understand the rule specification grammar and found its usage during trust
evaluation to be easy. Although the sample size is small, this is a good indication
that the majority of information security professionals will not face a steep learning
curve and will be able to develop rules to evaluate provenance records.
To build the trust evaluator, we investigated the use of the XQuery language
to evaluate the XML-based provenance record for evidence that support the trust-
worthiness of its tagged object. We earlier summarised that there are two types of
rules for the evaluation of a provenance record. The dependency rule checks the
existence of a certain causal dependency path. For example, the object must be
changed by an authorized software. On the other hand, the attribute rule checks
the presence of certain attributes. For example, the identity is of a particular value.
These requirements are collectively expressed in a set of rules for a target object. We
then transformed the rules into the XQuery language and ran it against a sample
provenance record. Listing 4.4 shows the corresponding XQuery for the depen-
dency rule ”Is ACT rpm ∈ (ENT iptables version 1.4.21 , WGB) ?” and Listing 4.5
shows the corresponding XQuery for the attribute rule ”Is value ∈Agent Authority
∩ value = ID Admin 4567 ?”.
1 for $ pr in
2 doc(”prov rec.xml”)/prov:iptables version 1.4.21 provenance record
3 where
4 $pr/prov:wasGeneratedBy/prov:entity/@prov:ref=”iptables version 1.4.21”
5 return
6 if ($pr/prov:wasGeneratedBy/prov:activity/@prov:ref=”rpm”) then
7 <result1>success</result1>
8 else
9 <result1>fail</result1>
Listing 4.4: Dependency rule expressed as XQuery.
1 for $pr in
2 doc(”prov rec.xml”)/prov:iptables version 1.4.21 provenance record
3 where $pr/prov:agent/@prov:id=”authority”
4 return
5 if ($pr/prov:agent/prov:value=”ID Admin 4567”) then
6 <result2>success</result2>
7 else
8 <result2>fail</result2>
Listing 4.5: Attribute rule expressed as XQuery.
The XQueries contain a for loop that searches the xml document for a specific
markup. In the case of the dependency rule, it searches for the markup contain-
ing wasGeneratedBy, entity and iptables version 1.4.21 (line 4). Similarly for the
attribute rule, it searches for the markup containing agent and authority. If the
required markup is not found, the query will return a message stating that it is
an empty sequence. When the required markup is found, the XQuery algorithm
extracts the content and compares it to the value specified in the rule (line 6 of List-
ing 4.4 and line 5 of Listing 4.5). If the content matches the value specified in the
rule, then the XQuery algorithm will return success. Else, the XQuery algorithm
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will return fail. The interrogation is able to identify either the presence or absence
of dependency path or attribute as specified in the rule. Hence, we prove that a
provenance record can be evaluated against a pre-defined rule for the purpose of
attestation.
4.8 Threat Modelling of Our Design for Provenance-based
Attestation
The Microsoft Threat Modelling Tool is used for this work [67]. At the beginning of
the threat modelling process, the tool resolves the target design using a Data Flow
Diagram (DFD). A DFD will show all the elements involved in that design and the
boundaries that represent the separation between system components or privilege
level. This is followed by applying the STRIDE model to identify threat categories
for every element in the DFD. STRIDE stands for Spoofing, Tampering, Repudia-
tion, Information disclosure, Denial of service and Elevation of privilege. Chapter
6 contains further discussion on the Microsoft Threat Modelling Tool. A total of 39
potential threats were identified for our design shown in Figure 4.1. Appropriate
mitigations for all the identified threats were worked out. We highlight some of the
threats and the corresponding mitigation mechanisms in Table 4.1. The full threat
modelling report is contained in Appendix B. These mitigation mechanisms can
improve on the assurance of the trustworthiness conveyed by provenance-based
attestation and can be addressed in future work.
4.9 A Protocol for Provenance-based Attestation
The protocol for provenance-based attestation describes how a provenance aware
system (AS-PAS) stores a provenance record (PR) into the provenance record store
(AS-PRC), how the attesting computer and trust evaluator communicate securely
over the computer network, and how the trust evaluator verifies the authentic-
ity of a provenance record. From threat modelling in Section 4.8, we know that
provenance-based attestation is susceptible to the threat of spoofing and tamper-
ing. Therefore, we can make use of the digital signature and cryptographic func-
tions offered by a hardware-based TPM 2.0 to mitigate this threat. We wanted the
design to work for computers not equipped with the TPM and hence the steps
involving the TPM can be replaced by other digital signature and cryptographic
software, albeit with a different level of security. Listing 4.6 shows the sequence
of events between the attesting provenance aware system, provenance record store
and its TPM (AS-TPM).
At the moment the attesting computer AS-PAS produces a complete prove-
nance record of an event, it will call the TPM of the attesting computer AS-TPM
to perform a hash over the entire provenance record at line 2. From TPM 2.0 spec-
ification [92], the command to use is TPM2 SequenceComplete(). A hash digest
Digest PR is returned upon the successful completion of the command. Prior to
this, PAS has obtained from the TPM a key pair for use with signing its prove-
nance record. This key pair is derived from the storage primary seed of the TPM
and it consists of a public verification key PAS SignKey Pub and a private sign-
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Table 4.1: Threats and mitigations to provenance-based attestation.
S/N Element Type Description Mitigation
1 Provenance
aware system
S Attacker creates a
false provenance
record with the
intention of mis-
leading the trust
evaluator.
The provenance
aware system can
digitally sign the
provenance records.
This digital signa-
ture will be verified
by the trust eval-
uator. For high
assurance, the TPM
can be used to sign
the provenance
records. This pro-
cess is only possible
if the correct au-
thorisation value
is provided to the
TPM.
2 Provenance
aware system
T Attacker alters the
provenance records.
A signed hash di-
gest of a provenance
record is obtained
before it is stored.
For high assurance,
the TPM can be
used to generate this
signed hash digest
and produced a
digital certificate to
attest to this signed
hash digest. This
process is only pos-
sible if the correct
authorisation value
is provided to the
TPM.
3 Attestation ses-
sion between
provenance
aware system
and trust evalua-
tor
T, I Attacker either tam-
pers with the at-
testation session or
reads the data.
Network crypto-
graphic protocol
such as the TLS can
be used to secure the
attestation session.
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ing key PAS SignKey Priv. This private signing key in the TPM is loaded using
the command TPM2 Load() at line 3. TPM2 Commit() then readies the signing
key for use in a digital signature at line 4. Subsequently, at line 5, TPM2 Sign()
takes in DigestPR of the provenance record and produce a digital signature using
the committed signing key PAA PrivSignKey. The outcome of these steps is that
the provenance record is signed by the provenance aware system. The signing key
pair is generated, based on attributes provided by AS-PAS, from the unique storage
primary seed of the AS-TPM. Hence, this digital signature is uniquely linked to the
AS-PAS and in turn linked to AS-TPM. Consequently, the threat of spoofing and
tampering a provenance record is mitigated.
1 AS-PAS : produce provenance record PR
2 AS-PAS→ AS-TPM: Digest PR = TPM2 SequenceComplete(PR)
3 AS-PAS→ AS-TPM: HandlePAS SignKey Priv =TPM2 Load(PAS SignKey Priv)
4 AS-PAS→ AS-TPM: ECCPAS SignKey Priv = TPM2 Commit(HandlePAS SignKey Priv)
5 AS-PAS→ AS-TPM: SignPR = TPM2 Sign(Digest PR, ECCPAS SignKey Priv)
6 AS-PAS→ AS-PRC: store PR, SignPR
Listing 4.6: Using TPM to generate digital signature of a provenance record.
At line 6, the provenance aware system will then store the provenance record
PR and the digital signature SignPR into the provenance record store. To prevent
an attacker from gathering information about the computer by reading the stored
provenance record, the provenance record store can encrypt the provenance record
Encrypted PR using a cryptographic key Crypt Key. This will be done using a sym-
metric cryptographic function such as the Advanced Encryption Standard [70].
During attestation over the computer network, the provenance record store will
react to queries from the trust evaluator and reply with the relevant Encrypted PR,
Crypt Key, SignPR and PAS SignKey Pub. This information exchange over the
computer network can be secured using the transport layer security (TLS) [20]. The
details of TLS implementation are widely available in the literature and hence are
not covered in this thesis.
1 TE→ TE-TPM: Digest PR = TPM2 SequenceComplete(PR)
2 TE→ TE-TPM: HandlePAS SignKey Pub = TPM2 Load(PAS SignKey Pub)
3 TE→ TE-TPM: Verify PR = TPM2 VerifySignature(SignPR, Digest PR, Handle
PAS SignKey Pub)
4 If Verify PR == success, proceed to evaluate PR
Listing 4.7: Using TPM to verify digital signature of a provenance record.
Listing 4.7 shows how the trust evaluator (TE) can verify the digital signature
using its TPM (TE-TPM) . The trust evaluator will decrypt the provenance record
using the cryptographic key. This will be done using an appropriate symmet-
ric cryptographic function. To verify the integrity and authenticity of the prove-
nance record, the trust evaluator will make use of its TPM. At line 1, the command
TPM2 SequenceComplete() is called to obtain a hash digest of the provenance
record. Then the verification key PAS SignKey Pub is loaded using TPM2 Load()
at line 2. Next, at line 3, the command TPM2 VerifySignature() takes in SignPR,
Digest PR, HandlePAS SignKey Pub. The outcome of the verification check is returned
to the trust evaluator. If the check is successful, the trust evaluator will proceed to
65
4.10 Related Works
assess the provenance record according to the rules. The details of this trust eval-
uation are described in the Section 4.6. Upon completion of trust evaluation, the
trust evaluator will inform the provenance aware system about the outcome.
4.10 Related Works
Lyle et al. [47] noted that provenance and trusted computing could complement
each other. They examined the requirements of these two domains and found that
their principles and techniques could help to improve each other. Namiluko et al.
[56] continued that work and proposed using provenance information of objects in
a computing system for reasoning about trust properties. They extended the se-
mantics of The Open Provenance Model (OPM) [53] to capture trust relations and
discuss how these trust relations and provenance data can be used in the reason-
ing of trust properties. Our work differs in the intent and approach. We proposed a
complete design on using provenance data for attestation. In Section 4.5, we discuss
the collection of provenance data and present the use of the PROV data model. We
made no extension to PROV semantics while Namiluko et al. modified the OPM
data model. We further developed provenance-based attestation by proposing a
grammar for specifying rules used for the trust evaluation of provenance records.
In this aspect, our trust evaluation refers to rules that revolve around the depen-
dencies among the target object and other elements and the attributes of these el-
ements while Namiluko et al. checks for the authenticity of a software program
or configuration by verifying its identity and integrity measurement value. More-
over, we conducted threat modelling on our design and propose a mitigation to the
identified threats.
4.11 Summary
We have produced details on the collection of provenance data and leveraged the
PROV data model to represent the provenance data. We have also developed a
rule specification grammar and discussed how a provenance record can be evalu-
ated during attestation. During the proof of concept, we have gained insights into
how a provenance aware system can capture provenance data and by what method
the provenance data in the provenance record can be assessed with rules to deter-
mine the trustworthiness of a target object. Thus, in this chapter, we show that
the content of a provenance record can be used by another party to make a trust
evaluation. We also show that rules can be formulated for the trust evaluation of
a provenance record. Therefore, the design goals stated in Section 4.3 are met. In
summary, we contribute a design for provenance-based attestation and a rule spec-
ification grammar for evaluating a provenance record. Future research can build
upon this work, including those threat mitigation mechanisms that can improve on
the assurance of the trustworthiness conveyed by provenance data.
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Chapter 5
An Ontology of a Computing Device Secured
with Trusted Platform Module 2.0
5.1 Introduction
After examining trust properties, this part of the thesis moves on to deal with the
development of a trusted system which uses the TPM 2.0 as a building block.
An ontology defines a common vocabulary for researchers who need to share
information in a domain [57]. It includes machine-interpretable definitions of basic
concepts in the domain and the relations among them. In recent years, the onto-
logical approach has been used to build a common understanding between experts
and developers of information security technologies. Karyada et. al. propose to
use ontologies to capture and depict the knowledge of security experts [40]. In this
way, developers can exploit security expertise in order to make design choices that
will help them fulfill security requirements more effectively.
In this chapter, we will use an ontological approach to characterize security
rooted in trusted hardware. The aim is to achieve a common understanding be-
tween security experts who established such technologies and the developers who
make use of these technologies. As the field of trusted hardware covers numerous
security hardware technologies, we framed our effort around the capabilities of a
computing device secured with a Trusted Platform Module. This is to ensure mean-
ingful results can be obtained with a reasonable amount of resources. The TPM is
a device that is specified by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG). The TPM is de-
signed to improve the trust in computing devices by offering certain functionalities
such as cryptographic engine, secure storage, digital certification and trusted re-
porting of the identity and state of its host computing device. TPM 2.0 is the latest
specification from TCG [92].
The outcome of our research is an ontology that characterizes the capabilities
of a computing device secured with TPM 2.0. The main advantage of this ontol-
ogy is that it can be used to describe, in a way that is easily comprehended and
machine readable, the capabilities of such a computing device at various levels of
abstraction. In addition, a developer can review the ontology by asking compe-
tency questions and these questions can be expressed by a query language.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 gives the background
to the use of ontologies. This is followed by Section 5.3 that describes the ontology
development and explains the structure. Section 5.4 demonstrates how the ontol-
ogy can be queried. Section 5.5 reviews the related works and the summary of this
chapter is in Section 5.6.
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5.2 Background
5.2.1 Characterizing the capabilities
On how to characterize the capabilities of a computing device secured with TPM
2.0, we referred to the technical models described in the National Institute of Stan-
dards and Technology Special Publication 800-33 [84]. This publication was dis-
cussed previously in Chapter 3. These models encompass information at several
levels. They range from high level security objectives to low level specific tech-
nical details. For example, the low level technical primitive of cryptographic key
management is described as enabling the capability of access control enforcement
which in turn supports the security objective of confidentiality. The SP800-33 pub-
lication is intended to provide a description of the technical foundations that un-
derlie security capabilities. Since our intentions are broadly aligned, we will frame
our ontology of a computing device secured with TPM 2.0 on the structure of the
technical models described in this publication.
5.2.2 Purpose of ontology
Ontology development involves giving explicit formal specifications of the terms
in a domain and the relations among them [27]. Plainly, an ontology structures the
information into classes and instances while their relationships are termed as prop-
erties. Classes refer to general concepts while an instance denotes a specific case.
For example, cryptographic algorithm is a class and asymmetric key algorithm is a
subclass. Then, RSA is a subclass of asymmetric key algorithm and RSA with key
size 2048 is an instance of this subclass. In an ontology, a property refers to the
semantic relationships among the classes and instances. For example, the ability
of a computing device to produce a digital certificate is enabled by the asymmetric
engine of TPM 2.0. Therefore, ”is enabled by” is the property that describes the
semantic relationship between the production of digital certificate and asymmetric
engine.
Hence, we can envisage that an ontology of the capabilities of a computing
device secured with TPM 2.0 will have a class structure that depicts computer ca-
pabilities by classifying concepts under different classes. This class structure also
allows us to describe the concepts at different abstract levels. In addition, the prop-
erties of these classes define the relationships among themselves. At the mean time,
we consider this ontological approach as complementary to formal models such as
[25]. An ontology based description provides benefits at a higher level by provid-
ing expressive, semantic meanings to relationships while a formal model acts at
a finer level by giving unambiguous descriptions to these relationships. Further-
more, it is easier to obtain contextualized information from an ontology. This will
be discussed in Section 5.5.
5.2.3 Web Ontology Language
The Web Ontology Language (OWL) was specified by the World Wide Web Con-
sortium (W3C) in 2004 [93]. The language is based on the Resource Description
Framework (RDF) [43]. RDF is a language for encoding information on Web pages
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to assist computers searching for particular information. An RDF statement re-
volves around the triple model and it contains a subject, a predicate and an object.
Consider the example RDF statement ”TPM is specified by TCG”. The RDF com-
ponents for this statement are: the subject is ”TPM”, the predicate is the words ”is
specified by” and the object is ”TCG”. This ability to describe the semantics of data
enables RDF to support better discovery of resources and provides more mean-
ingful description of content. OWL extends the RDF schema by providing a more
expressive vocabulary and improving on the inference capabilities. A detailed de-
scription of OWL can be obtained from [93].
While there are other ontology languages such as the DARPA Agent Markup
Language [33] and the Ontology Interface Layer [22], they have been superseded
by OWL. Hence we reviewed OWL and found that the RDF triple model is espe-
cially useful for representing the classes and their relationships in an uncompli-
cated manner. In addition, OWL is designed to be compatible with the eXtensible
Markup Language (XML) and this allows an OWL based ontology to be processed
by the wide range of XML and RDF tools that are already available. This ability can
be leveraged when we wish to query an ontology.
5.3 An Ontological Approach
5.3.1 Developing an ontology
We followed the methodology described in [57] to create this ontology. This method-
ology ensures that the developed ontology is fit for use in its intended application.
In this work, we plan to use an ontology to characterize the capabilities of a com-
puting device. This ontology is examined by a developer to determine if the design
of a computing device meets certain trustworthiness requirements. Thus, this un-
derstanding is crucial to guiding the decision making during the ontology devel-
opment.
The first step is to define the domain and scope in which this ontology will be
used. We aim to represent, at different levels of abstraction, the description of the
capabilities of a computing device secured with TPM 2.0. This covers trust prim-
itives offered by TPM 2.0, capabilities and security objectives and their semantic
relationships. A key activity in this step is the crafting of a set of competency ques-
tions. Competency questions refer to those questions the ontology should be able
to answer when an entity wishes to understand the capabilities of the trustwor-
thy computing device. These questions will later serve to verify if the developed
ontology suits the intended application.
There are generally two types of competency questions. The first type refers to
exploratory questions which the developer can ask to obtain a broad understanding
of the computing device. The second type refers to specific questions on technical
details. The following are examples of some of the possible competency questions:
Exploratory Questions
• What are the properties of the notion of confidentiality?
• Which TPM 2.0 capability enables the device capability of access control?
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• Which TPM 2.0 subsystem does the TPM 2.0 capability of protected location
use?
Specific Questions
• Is the TPM 2.0 capable of attestation using the asymmetric engine?
• Is AES one of the symmetric key algorithms used by this TPM 2.0?
The next step is to consider if an existing ontology can be reused. We studied the
ontologies reviewed by Singh et al. [81] but we could not identify any ontology that
focused on either trusted computing or TPM. We also undertook online searches
and we could not find such an ontology. Thus, we believe that our endeavor is the
first of its kind.
In step 3, we enumerated all the terms of TPM 2.0 that we considered to be
relevant to the purpose of this ontology. This step was non-trivial as it took con-
siderable time to acquire knowledge by understanding TPM 2.0 specifications [92],
the book ”A Practical Guide to TPM 2.0” [4] and the book ”Trusted Computing
Plaform, TPM 2.0 in context” [68]. This knowledge is supplemented by our experi-
ence from working on TPM 2.0 research projects and from our interaction with key
personnel who have been involved in the development of TPM 2.0 specifications.
Meanwhile, we investigated trust notions from Chapter 2. We also studied the
security objectives listed in SP800-33. We believe that security and trust are not or-
thogonal. Trusted components are used to build secure systems. On the other hand,
security properties are often evaluated as part of the process of establishing trust
in a computing system. This association of trust and security is articulated in the
Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (Orange Book) of the United States
of America Department of Defense [71]. Therefore, our ontology will include both
security and trust notions. However, this step generates a long list of terms and
we decided to put aside those that are not relevant to the purpose of this ontology.
For example, there are terms such as power detection, execution engine, startup,
shutdown and self-test which relate to the internal operations of TPM. These terms
are not included in the ontology because they do not enable any capabilities of the
computing device.
The remaining steps created the TPM 2.0 ontology. The steps are: defining
classes and class hierarchy, defining class properties and their values, and creat-
ing instances. These steps are best illustrated together with the ontology and they
are described and explained in the next sub section.
5.3.2 An Ontology of a Computing Device Secured with TPM 2.0
The development of classes, their hierarchy and properties are closely intertwined.
We adopted a top down approach to develop the class hierarchy. The list of terms
we obtained from step 3 were scrutinized and we defined the most general con-
cepts. These general concepts are considered as classes. Then we zoomed in and
identified those terms that belong to these classes. These terms were considered as
subclasses. We reviewed the subclasses to check that they do not refer to the same
concept. This avoided repetitions and ensure that there were no further group-
ings. For example, TPM 2.0 subsystem is a class and it has asymmetric engine as a
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Figure 5.1: Graphical representation of the ontology based description.
subclass. Asymmetric engine further contains the algorithms RSA, ECC and SM2
as subclasses. Next, we leveraged our knowledge of TPM 2.0 and created proper-
ties that describe the semantic relationships between the classes. These steps were
repeated to refine the ontology. After several exercises of sorting the terms into
meaningful classes and ensuring that the ontology based description could meet
our requirements, we derived 4 different classes.
The 4 classes are:
• TPM 2.0 Capability: this describes the capabilities a TPM 2.0 can offer to the
host computing device. The capabilities are defined as subclasses of this class.
• TPM 2.0 Subsystem: this describes the subsystems of the TPM 2.0. Each of
the subsystems is defined as a subclass.
• Security and Trust Notion: this is an amalgamation of user level trust notions
and security objectives. Each of the notions is defined as a subclass of this
class.
• Device Capability: this describes at the abstract level what trusted functions
are offered in a particular computing device. Some examples of trusted func-
tions are defined as subclasses in this ontology.
We use OWL as the language for our ontology and this ontology is created
using Protege 1. Protege is an open source platform that provides a suite of tools to
construct ontologies. We chose Protege because it supports RDF and XML format
1http://protege.stanford.edu/
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and the ontology can be queried using SPARQL, an RDF data access language [69].
Figure 5.1 shows the graphical representation of these classes. The full ontology in
OWL format is given in Appendix C of this thesis.
The core class in this ontology is the TPM2.0Capability class. This class serves as
the linkage between low level trust primitives described in the TPM2.0SubSystem
class and high level device capability descriptions and user notions. It mirrors the
support services described in SP800-33 and characterizes the capabilities of TPM
2.0 which enable many trusted functions of the computing device. It consists of
the subclasses Certification, Attestation, ProtectedLocation and IntegrityMeasurement.
These subclasses were mainly referenced from TPM 2.0 specifications while addi-
tional information was gathered from [4] and [68]. We consider them as subclasses
because they are general concepts of the capabilities offered by TPM 2.0.
The TPM2.0Capability class is supported by primitives that are described in the
TPM2.0SubSystem class. There are 11 subclasses in TPM2.0SubSystem class and they
are AsymmetricEngine, SymmetricEngine, HashEngine, KeyGeneration, RNG, Autho-
rization, NVMemory, VolatileMemory, ExecutionEngine, PowerDetection and Manage-
ment. We have also defined another level of subclasses to describe the algorithms
used in the subclass of AsymmetricEngine, SymmetricEngine and HashEngine. These
subclasses were referenced from TPM 2.0 specifications and supplementary infor-
mation was gathered from [4] and [68]. The motive for TPM2.0SubSystem class is to
depict the primitives that underlie TPM 2.0 capabilities. Thus, the TPM2.0Capability
class is mapped to the TPM2.0SubSystem class by the property usesTPM2.0subsystem.
We can make use of the property value restriction feature of OWL to indicate that
a particular subclass of TPM2.0Capability class is only mapped to some subclass of
TPM2.0SubSystem. We also define supportsTPM2.0Capability which is an inverse to
the property usesTPM2.0subsystem. We have a two way mapping because it will
be useful when we query the ontology and wish to transverse through the classes
to uncover more information. An example of how the TPM2.0Capability class is
mapped to TPM2.0SubSystem class is as follows: The encryption of a protected
location uses a symmetric key and this symmetric key is generated from a seed.
Meanwhile, the seed is stored in the non-volatile memory of TPM 2.0. Thus, Pro-
tectedLocation is defined to have SymmetricEngine, KeyGeneration and NVMemory as
its useTPM2.0subsystem property values.
The TPM2.0Capability class is mapped to the SecurityAndTrustNotion class to il-
lustrate how TPM 2.0 capability supports the high level security and trust notions.
This mapping also serves as the bridge to low level trust primitives. The Secu-
rityAndTrustNotion class contains 7 subclasses and they are Confidentiality, Integrity,
Availability, Accountability, ExpectedBehaviour, Identity and Authenticity. These sub-
classes are referenced from the security objectives of SP800-33 and the objective
trust notions mentioned in Chapter 2. Subjective trust notions are not considered
in this ontology because their perception can defer from person to person. We con-
sider these objective trust notions as subclasses and they can be populated later
with instances that identify specific references. For example, secrecy of user pass-
word can be an instance of the subclass Confidentiality. The TPM2.0Capability class is
mapped to SecurityAndTrustNotion class via the property supportsSecurityAndTrust-
Notion.
Conversely, we also define isSupportedByTPM2.0Capability which is an inverse
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of the property supportsSecurityAndTrustNotion. As an example, assume that the
high level user trust notion of ExpectedBehaviour is desired and, from the ontology
based description, we know that the Attestation and IntegrityMeasurement subclass
of TPM2.0Capability support this notion via the property isSupportedByTPM2.0 Ca-
pability. As we trace the ontology based description further, we can see that At-
testation is linked via the property of useTPM2.0subsystem to AsymmetricEngine of
TPM2.0SubSystem class while IntegrityMeasurement is linked via the same property
to HashEngine and VolatileMemory.
Lastly, we define the DeviceCapability class to demonstrate how low level trust
primitives can be mapped to high level device functions. The DeviceCapability
class is mapped to the TPM2.0Capability class by the property isEnabledByTPM2.0-
Capability. We also define supportsTrustNotion which is an inverse of the property
isEnabledByTPM2.0Capability. In this ontology based description, we defined 3 ex-
amples of device functions that are described in [4]. They are SecureDataBackup,
AccessControl and IdentityManagement. These subclasses are used as examples here
and hence they are not fixed. The user of this ontology based description can define
more subclasses to describe other functions. As an example, in access control, we
want different users to have separate levels of access to a database. This function
can be enabled by leveraging the protected location function of TPM 2.0 which in
turn makes use of the authorization subsystem and symmetric key cryptographic
engine. Hence, from the ontology based description, AccessControl is mapped to
ProtectedLocation of the TPM2.0Capability class via the isEnabledByTPM2.0Capability
property. In turn, ProtectedLocation is mapped to Authorization and SymmetricEngine
of TPM2.0SubSystem class via the usesTPM2.0SubSystem property.
In this section, we introduced the ontology and characterized the constituent
classes. We also gave examples of how the ontology can be used to describe the
trustworthiness of a computing device by providing a map of low level trust prim-
itives to high level notions and capabilities of computing device. This ontology
will serve as useful foundation whereby experts can further populate the ontol-
ogy with instances that describe more specific implementation and configuration
information.
5.4 Querying
This section will address how a developer can query the ontology based description
to uncover its content. We studied the ontology and its OWL/RDF format and pro-
pose to translate the competency questions in Section 5.3.1 into SPARQL queries.
There are two types of questions. The intent of exploratory questions is to uncover
information by checking for the content of the components in a RDF triple. The
content can be used to infer certain information about the computing device. For
example, we refer to the competency question on the properties of confidentiality.
Listing 5.1 shows the description of the Confidentiality class in RDF/XML format.
If we wish to know all about its properties and values, a query using the SPARQL
function of SELECT and WHERE can be issued. Figure 5.2 shows the query and
Table 5.1 shows the result.
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SELECT ?property ?value
WHERE
{tpm2.0:Confidentiality rdfs:subClassOf ?object .
?object owl:onProperty ?property .
?object owl:someValuesFrom ?value }
Figure 5.2: SPARQL query for the Confidentiality class.
Table 5.1: Result for SPARQL query on the Confidentiality class.
S/N Property Value
1 isSupportedByTPM2.0Capability ProtectedLocation
2 isBackedByDeviceCapability SecureDataBackup
3 isBackedByDeviceCapability AccessControl
1 <owl:Class rdf:about=”&tpm2.0;Confidentiality”>
2 <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource=”&tpm2.0;SecurityAndTrustNotion”/>
3 <rdfs:subClassOf><owl:Restriction>
4 <owl:onProperty rdf:resource=”&tpm2.0;isSupportedByTPM2.0Capability”/>
5 <owl:someValuesFrom rdf:resource=”&tpm2.0;ProtectedLocation”/>
6 </owl:Restriction></rdfs:subClassOf>
7 <rdfs:subClassOf><owl:Restriction>
8 <owl:onProperty rdf:resource=”&tpm2.0;isBackedByDeviceCapability”/>
9 <owl:someValuesFrom rdf:resource=”&tpm2.0;AccessControl”/>
10 </owl:Restriction></rdfs:subClassOf>
11 <rdfs:subClassOf><owl:Restriction>
12 <owl:onProperty rdf:resource=”&tpm2.0;isBackedByDeviceCapability”/>
13 <owl:someValuesFrom rdf:resource=”&tpm2.0;SecureDataBackup”/>
14 </owl:Restriction></rdfs:subClassOf>
15 </owl:Class>
Listing 5.1: Description of the Confidentiality class in RDF/XML format.
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In another example, we refer to the competency question on which TPM 2.0
capability enables the device capability of access control. Listing 5.2 shows the
OWL/RDF description of AccessControl class.
1 <owl:Class rdf:about=”&tpm2.0;AccessControl”>
2 <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource=”&tpm2.0;DeviceCapability”/>
3 <rdfs:subClassOf><owl:Restriction>
4 <owl:onProperty rdf:resource=”&tpm2.0;backsTrustNotion”/>
5 <owl:someValuesFrom rdf:resource=”&tpm2.0;Accountability”/>
6 </owl:Restriction></rdfs:subClassOf>
7 <rdfs:subClassOf><owl:Restriction>
8 <owl:onProperty rdf:resource=”&tpm2.0;backsTrustNotion”/>
9 <owl:someValuesFrom rdf:resource=”&tpm2.0;Integrity”/>
10 </owl:Restriction></rdfs:subClassOf>
11 <rdfs:subClassOf><owl:Restriction>
12 <owl:onProperty rdf:resource=”&tpm2.0;backsTrustNotion”/>
13 <owl:someValuesFrom rdf:resource=”&tpm2.0;Confidentiality”/>
14 </owl:Restriction></rdfs:subClassOf>
15 <rdfs:subClassOf><owl:Restriction>
16 <owl:onProperty rdf:resource=”&tpm2.0;backsTrustNotion”/>
17 <owl:someValuesFrom rdf:resource=”&tpm2.0;Availability”/>
18 </owl:Restriction></rdfs:subClassOf>
19 <rdfs:subClassOf><owl:Restriction>
20 <owl:onProperty rdf:resource=”&tpm2.0;isEnabledByTPM2.0Capability”/>
21 <owl:someValuesFrom rdf:resource=”&tpm2.0;ProtectedLocation”/>
22 </owl:Restriction></rdfs:subClassOf>
23 </owl:Class>
Listing 5.2: Description of the AccessControl class in RDF/XML format.
For this query, we can make use of the FILTER function of SPARQL. Figure 5.3
shows the query and Table 5.2 shows the result. Meanwhile, the same query can be
altered to obtain answer to the competency question of which TPM 2.0 subsystem
does the TPM 2.0 capability of protected location uses.
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SELECT ?property ?value
WHERE
{tpm2.0:AccessControl rdfs:subClassOf ?object .
?object owl:onProperty ?property .
?object owl:someValuesFrom ?value
FILTER regex (str(?property), "isEnabledByTPM2.0Capability")}
Figure 5.3: SPARQL query for the AccessControl class.
Table 5.2: Result for SPARQL query on the AccessControl class.
S/N Property Value
1 isEnabledByTPM2.0Capability ProtectedLocation
ASK { tpm2.0:Attestation rdfs:subClassOf ?object .
?object owl:onProperty tpm2.0:usesTPM2.0SubSystem .
?object owl:someValuesFrom tpm2.0:AsymmetricEngine }
Figure 5.4: SPARQL query for the Attestation class.
A specific competency question is concerned with the presence of RDF triples.
For example, one can check the ontology to determine if the RDF triple (Attesta-
tion, usesTPM2.0SubSystem, AsymmetricEngine) exists. This example refers to the
competency question of asking if the TPM 2.0 capability of attestation is using the
asymmetric engine. The existence of this triple indicates that the TPM 2.0 capability
of attestation uses the asymmetric engine of TPM 2.0 subsystem. Listing 5.3 shows
the OWL/RDF format of the description for the Attestation class.
1 <owl:Class rdf:about=”&tpm2.0;Attestation”>
2 <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource=”&tpm2.0;TPM2.0Capability”/>
3 <rdfs:subClassOf><owl:Restriction>
4 <owl:onProperty rdf:resource=”&tpm2.0;supportsTrustNotion”/>
5 <owl:someValuesFrom rdf:resource=”&tpm2.0;ExpectedBehaviour”/>
6 </owl:Restriction></rdfs:subClassOf>
7 <rdfs:subClassOf><owl:Restriction>
8 <owl:onProperty rdf:resource=”&tpm2.0;supportsTrustNotion”/>
9 <owl:someValuesFrom rdf:resource=”&tpm2.0;Identity”/>
10 </owl:Restriction></rdfs:subClassOf>
11 <rdfs:subClassOf><owl:Restriction>
12 <owl:onProperty rdf:resource=”&tpm2.0;usesTPM2.0SubSystem”/>
13 <owl:someValuesFrom rdf:resource=”&tpm2.0;Authorization”/>
14 </owl:Restriction></rdfs:subClassOf>
15 <rdfs:subClassOf><owl:Restriction>
16 <owl:onProperty rdf:resource=”&tpm2.0;usesTPM2.0SubSystem”/>
17 <owl:someValuesFrom rdf:resource=”&tpm2.0;NVMemory”/>
18 </owl:Restriction></rdfs:subClassOf>
19 <rdfs:subClassOf><owl:Restriction>
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20 <owl:onProperty rdf:resource=”&tpm2.0;enablesDeviceCapability”/>
21 <owl:someValuesFrom rdf:resource=”&tpm2.0;IdentityManagement”/>
22 </owl:Restriction></rdfs:subClassOf>
23 <rdfs:subClassOf><owl:Restriction>
24 <owl:onProperty rdf:resource=”&tpm2.0;usesTPM2.0SubSystem”/>
25 <owl:someValuesFrom rdf:resource=”&tpm2.0;AsymmetricEngine”/>
26 </owl:Restriction></rdfs:subClassOf>
27 <rdfs:subClassOf><owl:Restriction>
28 <owl:onProperty rdf:resource=”&tpm2.0;usesTPM2.0SubSystem”/>
29 <owl:someValuesFrom rdf:resource=”&tpm2.0;VolatileMemory”/>
30 </owl:Restriction></rdfs:subClassOf>
31 <rdfs:subClassOf><owl:Restriction>
32 <owl:onProperty rdf:resource=”&tpm2.0;usesTPM2.0SubSystem”/>
33 <owl:someValuesFrom rdf:resource=”&tpm2.0;KeyGeneration”/>
34 </owl:Restriction></rdfs:subClassOf>
35 <rdfs:subClassOf><owl:Restriction>
36 <owl:onProperty rdf:resource=”&tpm2.0;supportsTrustNotion”/>
37 <owl:someValuesFrom rdf:resource=”&tpm2.0;Authenticity”/>
38 </owl:Restriction></rdfs:subClassOf>
39 </owl:Class>
Listing 5.3: Description of the Attestation class in RDF/XML format.
We can use the ASK command to query the ontology for a specific triple and
the command will return true or false depending on whether the specific triple can
be found. Figure 5.4 shows the SPARQL query. The result for this query is ”True”.
Meanwhile, the same query can be modified for the competency question ”Is AES
one of the symmetric key algorithms used by this TPM 2.0?”
In this section, we only discuss the queries that can be used to help to answer
the example competency questions posted in Section 5.3.1. This discussion will
serve as an introduction and there can be many other questions that the ontology
can answer using the powerful SPARQL tool. In the meantime, the ability of the
ontology described in Figure 5.1 to answer these questions validate that its struc-
ture and content are suitable for use by a developer to uncover information about
the design of a computing device secured by TPM 2.0.
5.5 Related Works
Kim et al. noted that annotation with security related metadata enables discov-
ery of resources that meet security requirements [41]. They presented the Naval
Research Laboratory (NRL) Security Ontology which focuses on the annotation of
security mechanisms, protocols, algorithms, credentials and objectives. The NRL
Security Ontology consists of the core class of Security Concept. It has subclasses
of Security Protocol, Security Mechanism and Security Policy. The Security Con-
cept class is defined to support the Security Objective class. The other classes of
the NRL Security Ontology include Security Algorithms, Security Assurance, Cre-
dentials, Service Security, Agent Security and Information Object. The authors ex-
plained that the classes of Service Security, Agent Security and Information Object
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classes are extensions of the DAML Security Ontology [18]. On the other hand, the
Credentials, Security Algorithm and Security Assurance classes provide values for
properties defined for concepts in the Security Concept class. As the authors ap-
plied this ontology to a Web Service Oriented Architecture, the Information Object
class was added to allow for the annotation of web service inputs and outputs. In
the paper, the authors also described an algorithm to perform matching of security
capabilities to security requirements. Although our ontology has the same intent
and approach as the NRL Security Ontology, we differ in the domain of the ontol-
ogy. Our domain is to describe the capabilities of a computing device secured by
TPM 2.0. We also explicitly explain how we can use SPARQL to query the ontology
for answers to the competency questions. On the other hand, the NRL Security
Ontology described how the matching algorithm works but was not clear on how
the algorithm can be implemented.
5.6 Summary
We have provided details on how an ontology of a computing device secured
with TPM 2.0 were developed and explained the contents and arrangements of
the classes and their properties. We have also given sample competency questions
that should be answered by this ontology and use SPARQL to demonstrate how to
obtain answers to the competency questions. Thus, from this work, we have gained
insights into how an ontology can be used as a standard vocabulary for experts to
share information on TPM 2.0 with developers of trusted systems.
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Chapter 6
Threat Model of a Scenario based on Trusted
Platform Module 2.0 Specification
6.1 Introduction
Protection offered by hardware security mechanisms, such as the TPM 2.0, can sig-
nificantly strengthen a trusted system. However, it is naive to implement TPM 2.0
without identifying threats to its use scenarios and apply appropriate mitigations.
There are several papers presented in the past discussing attacks on the TPM 1.2
specification, for example, [11], [12], [9], [28]. However, these works look at the
older TPM 1.2. Moreover, these works focused on examining TPM protocols, iden-
tifying weakness, and suggesting solutions to the problems. No threat model for
use scenarios of TPM was developed. Thus, in this chapter, we study the use of
threat modelling for the purpose of identifying threats to TPM 2.0 use scenarios
and recommending appropriate mitigations.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 explains the threat
modelling methodology. In Section 6.3, we describe the scenario for the threat
model and it is followed by threat identification and mitigations in Section 6.4.
Related works are discussed in Section 6.5 and the summary of this chapter is in
Section 6.6.
6.2 Threat Modelling
6.2.1 Background
Poor design of software internal code and interfaces during the design phase of
a computing device will eventually lead to vulnerabilities that could be exploited
by an attacker [86]. It is recommended to fix an issue during design phase where
it involves reworking a design rather than later in the production phase where it
requires significant reengineering and patch releases [19]. Microsoft suggested to
perform threat modelling early in the development life cycle because it can reveal
weaknesses that may require significant changes to the product [86].
Threat modeling is the process of enumerating and risk-rating malicious agents,
their attacks, and those attacks’ possible impacts on a system’s assets [83]. Threat
modelling happens either at the organization level or at the system level. In this
chapter, we study threat modelling at the system level. This process employs the
following steps:
1. Identify security objectives.
80
6.2 Threat Modelling
Figure 6.1: STRIDE-per-element matrix from [34].
2. Create an application overview.
3. Decompose the application.
4. Identify threats.
5. Identify vulnerabilities.
6. Work out mitigations.
Microsoft has made public numerous articles to promote its threat modelling
methodology [78], [35], [34], [67]. At the beginning of their threat modelling pro-
cess, the tool resolves the target scenario using a Data Flow Diagram (DFD). A DFD
will show all the elements involved in that scenario. An element can be an external
entity, a process, a data store or a data flow. A boundary that represents the sep-
aration between system components or privilege level will then be defined. This
is followed by applying the STRIDE model to identify threat categories for every
element in the DFD. STRIDE stands for Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Infor-
mation disclosure, Denial of service and Elevation of privilege. Only certain threat
categories can apply to certain elements [34]. Please see Figure 6.1.
The tool will automatically generate the threat categories for each element based
on Figure 6.1 but each threat category has to be analysed manually. The tool guides
the identification of specific threats by providing a set of questions. For every iden-
tified threat, an appropriate mitigation should be worked out. Before the threat
model report can be generated, additional information on assumptions, external
dependencies and security notes can be entered into the tool. It is important to
note that the threat model report is a live document and it should be constantly
updated whenever a new threat is detected or there is a configuration change to
the target scenario.
Besides Microsoft’s secure development life cycle threat modelling tool, there is
an array of threat modelling frameworks and tools, such as OCTAVE from Carnegie
Mellon University’s Software Engineering Institute [10] and the open source TRIKE
[76]. The OCTAVE threat modelling method is performed at the organization level
and hence it is not suitable for this study on system level threat modelling.
On the other hand, TRIKE is used to build threat models in order to support the
security auditing process from a risk management perspective. It uses spreadsheets
to describe different aspects of the system being modelled. This threat modelling
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Figure 6.2: To encrypt symmetric key for group share.
process begins with requirement analysis. This step involves the identification of
actors, assets and how actors interact with assets. This information is then used
to construct an actor-asset-action matrix. The next step requires the mapping of
this matrix to the DFD of the target scenario. Thereafter, threats are generated and
appropriate mitigations are worked out.
TRIKE shares similarities with the Microsoft threat modelling process. How-
ever, key differences include the number of threat classifications (2 for TRIKE and 6
for STRIDE), less support for threat mitigation and the fact that TRIKE has weaker
architecture representation of the target scenario. In addition, we find that the Mi-
crosoft threat modelling tool is better developed, easier to use and has more refined
user interface. Thus, we decided to use the Microsoft threat modelling tool in this
work.
6.3 Description of Scenario
We refer to the ontology described in Chapter 5 of this thesis and the TPM 2.0 spec-
ification [92] when crafting this scenario. In this simplified scenario, TPM 2.0 is
used to encrypt the cryptographic key used for encrypting data for sharing with
a group. This allows the key to be securely exchanged. This scenario is selected
because it uses TPM’s shielded storage feature and is applicable to a web appli-
cation situation where certain sensitive web data has to be securely shared with
other users over a computer network. The scenario illustrated in Figure 6.2 de-
scribes how a symmetric key used for encrypting data is shared using TPM’s key
duplication function. References to TPM commands from Chapter 3 of the TPM
2.0 specification are made at key points of this process. It is noted that TPM 2.0
commands are different from those of TPM 1.2.
In Figure 6.2, TPM2 Create is used to package the key into a TPM object. But be-
fore the command can be executed, an authorisation session for the use of a parent
object to create the child TPM object has to be started. Upon successful authorisa-
tion, TPM2 Create command will execute and produce a data object that contains
the key. This data object will have a flag setting indicating that it can be duplicated.
In addition, a user can specify an authorisation policy to control access to this data
object. The next step is to load this data object into the TPM RAM using the com-
mand TPM2 Load. This command will return a handle to the key object. The final
command to run is TPM2 Duplicate whereby this data object is repackaged and
encrypted. The output from TPM2 Duplicate is the encrypted duplicated object,
the symmetric encryption key used to encrypt the inner wrapper and a seed that
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Figure 6.3: To recover symmetric key for group share.
generates the symmetric encryption key for the outer wrapper. The confidentiality
of the seed value is protected by a public key provided by the destination TPM.
These outputs can be transferred to the destination TPM using a mechanism that
protects the confidentiality and integrity of the duplicated object and checks the
authenticity and authorisation of the destination TPM.
At the destination TPM, the reverse is carried out. Referring to Figure 6.3,
TPM2 Import is used to transfer the duplicated object into the destination TPM.
An authorisation session for the use of the new parent object is started. Upon
successful authorisation, the command will execute and the duplicated object is
decrypted. To protect the confidentiality of the key object, it is encrypted with an
encryption key derived from the new parent. This key object is then loaded into
the TPM RAM using the command TPM2 Load. A handle to the loaded key object
is returned to the user. To obtain the symmetric key, the authorisation data and key
object handle are provided to the command TPM2 Unseal. When this command
executes successfully, the symmetric key is presented to the user.
6.4 Threat Identification and Mitigation
Using Microsoft’s secure development lifecycle threat modelling tool, two DFDs
were drawn to represent the scenario of encrypting and decrypting the symmetric
key for group share. The DFDs are shown in Figure 6.4.
This tool analyzed the two DFDs individually and threat categories for every
element were generated. A total of 101 potential threats were identified for the pro-
cess of encrypting the symmetric key for group share while a total of 96 potential
threats were identified for the decrypting process. The data flow between the pro-
cesses and the TPM RAM are not accessible externally and hence they were not an-
alyzed (grey coloured lines). Appropriate mitigations for all the identified threats
were worked out. TPM 1.2 attacks [11], [12], [9], [28] identified in earlier studies
could not be applied directly to this threat model as the protocols and commands
for TPM 2.0 have been changed.
The threat modelling report is given in Appendix D but we will discuss some
of the more critical ones in Table 6.1.
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S/N Element Type Description Mitigation
1 TPM2 Import S Attacker attempts
to load a duplicated
key object that is not
generated by a TPM.
The source TPM
can insert a unique
identifying value into
the key object when
using TPM2 Create.
The destination TPM
will verify the au-
thencity of the key
object by inspecting
this identifying value.
2 TPM2 Star-
tAuthSession
I The cryptographic
protection for the
authorized sessions
can be weakened if
the nonce and salt
value used in the
generation of the
session key have
low entropy.
The method used by
the software applica-
tion to generate the
nonce and salt value
has to meet security
requirements, for
example NIST SP
800-90A. An alter-
native method is to
use TPM’s random
number generator
(RNG) to provide
these values. How-
ever, TPM’s RNG
has to meet security
requirements as well.
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3 Key object
(TPM2 Create
to User Applica-
tion)
I The sensitive part
of the key object
is symmetrically
encrypted using a
key derived from
the parent object.
A random value
is included in the
process as an ini-
tialization vector
(IV). When an ob-
ject is created for
duplication, the IV
is set to zero. The
key objects can be
susceptible to cryp-
tographic analysis
if the parent object
is reused multiple
times.
The user application
has to avoid reusing
the parent object mul-
tiple times when cre-
ating an object for du-
plication.
4 TPM2 Create I User denies execut-
ing this command.
TPM will have to rely
on the TCB to keep
a log of the com-
mands performed on
TPM. The availability
of a log is crucial to
forensic investigation
in the event of a secu-
rity incident. An ex-
ample of a guideline
for the security man-
agement of the log
will be NIST SP 800-
92.
Table 6.1: Threats and mitigations to use scenario.
Since TPM’s design objectives do not include protection from physical attacks,
this thesis will not dwell on this threat but a user should be aware of the types of
physical attack [61], [87] and take appropriate mitigations.
6.5 Related Works
Mo¨ckel and Abdallah discussed the threat modelling process and its usefulness to
the design of an electronic banking application [52]. They also used the Microsoft
threat modelling tool. However, we went further and discussed about other threat
modelling tools such as OCTAVE and TRIKE and explained why we chose to use
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Figure 6.4: DFD for encrypting symmetric key (left) and for recovering symmetric
key (right).
the Microsoft tool. Moreover, they used the threat modelling tool on the abstract
design of an application while we applied threat modelling to the use scenario of a
trusted firmware.
6.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have developed a use scenario for TPM 2.0 and studied the use
of threat modelling for the purpose of identifying threats and mitigations to TPM
2.0 use scenarios. The scenario is on using a TPM to share a symmetric crypto-
graphic key and the threat model of this scenario is produced. The usage of threat
modelling allows us to recommend improvements to the security of TPM 2.0 use
scenarios.
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Chapter 7
Para-Virtualizing the Trusted Platform
Module: An Enterprise Framework Based on
Version 2.0 Specification
7.1 Introduction
We now consider how TPM 2.0, as a building block for trust properties, can be
used in a modern system. Virtualization is a fundamental technology that is widely
used in Enterprise IT infrastructures. Users of virtualization technology need some
level of assurance about the expected behavior of a virtual machine (VM) and its
ability to protect confidential information from unauthorized disclosure. The TPM
specified by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) offers security properties that
can be leveraged by the users of virtualization technology to increase the protection
of the system and data from cyber security threats [77].
However, the TPM was originally designed for use with a computing system in
a one to one relationship. In a virtualized system, the design will require enhance-
ments to the TPM in order for it to work in an environment where a computer
hardware platform hosts several VMs. There are generally two types of techniques
to enable a TPM hardware chip to support multiple VMs. The first type is full vir-
tualization of the TPM which is exemplified by the work of Perez et al. [64]. In
that paper, the authors described the creation of software virtual TPM instances
contained in a privileged VM. Each virtual TPM will support a unique VM. This
design is aligned to the virtual TPM framework proposed in TCG’s Virtualized
Trusted Platform Architecture Specification [88] and Open Trusted Computing’s
VTPM Architecture [59]. Although the designs often extend the chain of trust from
the TPM hardware chip to the virtual TPM, the security protection for confidential
data provided by the TPM’s hardware based protected storage is not offered. A
probable reason could be that these designs are based on the older TPM 1.2 speci-
fication and the limited amount of TPM memory is unable to support the require-
ments of the virtualized environment. In addition, the long chain of trust from the
TPM hardware chip to the virtual TPM can be fragile as the attack surface is now
larger compared to a non-virtualized implementation.
This chapter will analyze the other type of technique which is para-virtualizing
the TPM. England and Loeser wrote that TPM para-virtualization refers to the
method of mediating guest VM access to hardware TPM using a software com-
ponent [21]. The design will require no change to most TPM functionality but
some aspects of the device interface may change. A major advantage offered by
this technique is that the access control to TPM’s protected storage resides in the
hardware chip and this feature is desired by organizations that require hardware
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based security; for example, government Enterprise IT. Moreover, the chain of trust
is now shorter as the VM can access the TPM hardware chip in a more direct man-
ner. However, in a para-virtualization design, the use of the resources belonging
to a single TPM by multiple VMs has to be managed to ensure fair sharing and
prevent cross-interference. On the other hand, the TPM has to provide sufficient
resources to support the operation of several VMs. With the advent of the newer
TPM 2.0 specification, it is timely to examine if the newer specification can better
support para-virtualization requirements. We will introduce a para-virtualization
framework that leverage new capabilities offered by TPM 2.0. The framework will
also address the challenges for achieving TPM para-virtualization in Enterprise IT,
for example, backup and migration.
This chapter presents a theoretical research rather than a presentation of an ac-
tual implementation. Section 7.2 contains a quick study of the new TPM 2.0 speci-
fication from the TCG and Section 7.3 analyzes the state of the art regarding para-
virtualizing the TPM. With this background knowledge, Section 7.4 will then ex-
amine the extent to which TPM 2.0 core functions are suitable for para-virtualizing.
This is followed by design requirements in Section 7.5. Section 7.6 describes a the-
oretical framework for para-virtualizing TPM 2.0 in the context of an Enterprise IT
infrastructure. Section 7.7 revisits the design requirements and the summary of this
chapter is in Section 7.8.
7.2 More About TPM 2.0
The Trusted Computing Group (TCG) wrote in the Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
version 2.0 specification [92] that trust conveys an expectation of behaviour from
the computer system. In other words, a user can trust a computer if it always
behaves as it is intended to. The assessment of trust always begins from some
baseline, or ”root of trust”. In a computing platform, the three roots of trust for
measurement, storage and reporting provide the minimum functionality required
to describe the attributes that contribute towards its trustworthiness. The TPM and
supporting components aim to provide these three roots of trust.
TPM 2.0 is the latest specification from the TCG and it replaces the previous
TPM 1.2 specification. The changes and enhancements to TPM 2.0 compared to the
previous TPM version include: support for additional cryptographic algorithms,
enhancements to the availability of the TPM to applications, enhanced authoriza-
tion mechanisms, simplified TPM management, and additional capabilities to en-
hance the security of platform services.
7.2.1 Architecture
TPM 2.0 is designed to be a self-contained computing device. This allows the TPM
device to be trusted to carry out computations without relying on external comput-
ing resources. The following are short descriptions of the subsystems in a TPM 2.0
device while a detailed explanation can be obtained from the TPM 2.0 specification
and the ontology described in Appendix C.
I/O Buffer This component enables the host computing system to communicate
with the TPM. It can be a shared memory. Data to be processed by the TPM will be
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validated at this point.
Cryptography Subsystem The cryptographic engine supports commonly used
cryptographic functions like hashing, asymmetric operations such as digital signa-
ture and key exchange, symmetric encryption, random number generator and key
derivation function. These cryptographic functions can be used by the other TPM
components or the host computer.
Authorization Subsystem Before a TPM command is executed, this subsystem
checks that proper authorization data has been given by the calling application.
Volatile Memory This memory holds transient TPM data, including Platform
Configuration Registers (PCRs), data objects and session data. A PCR contains the
integrity measurements of critical components in the host computer. A data object
can either be a cryptographic key or other data. The TPM uses sessions to manage
the execution of series of commands.
Non-Volatile (NV) Memory This memory is used to store persistent TPM data
that includes the platform seed, endorsement seed, storage seed and monotonic
counter. Additional PCR banks can be created in this memory.
Management Subsystem This subsystem oversees the operation of the various
TPM states. Basic TPM states include power-off, initialization, start up, shut down,
self-test, failure and field upgrade.
Execution Engine This firmware contains the program instructions and data
structures that are required to run a TPM command. These program instructions
and data structures cannot be altered by the host computing platform. In the event
of a firmware upgrade, there are security mechanisms to ensure that the update is
authorized and the new firmware is checked for authenticity and integrity.
7.2.2 Core Functions
A Trusted Computing Base (TCB) can be a BIOS, Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM)
or operating system that has proved to be highly secure and hence trustworthy.
When a TCB is made to work together with a TPM, they can offer the capabili-
ties of integrity measurement and reporting, protected data storage, certification
and attestation and authentication. In integrity measurement, a hash function is
performed by the BIOS on the first software component that is started when the
computer powers up. The hash function will produce a digest of that software
component. If that software component is altered, the digest will be different from
the one obtained when the software component was first measured. This digest
can be stored in the PCR located in either the volatile or non-volatile memory of the
TPM. TrustedGRUB 1 is an application that implements this integrity measurement
at system start. A TPM can have an authenticity certificate from the manufacturer
and this feature is used in conjunction with the integrity measurement to report the
”trustworthiness state” of a computing platform.
A unique feature of the TPM is the use of primary seeds to generate hierarchies
of keys for use in cryptographic functions. The intention of this feature is to pro-
vide the flexibility to support different types of cryptographic functions without
increasing the storage memory requirement. To establish trust in a key derived
from a TPM primary seed, the TPM can produce a digital certificate indicating that
1http://www.trust.rub.de/projects/trustedgrub/
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the processes used for creating and protecting the key meet the necessary security
requirements. During attestation, a TPM can vouch for the authenticity and prop-
erties of either the host computing platform, a piece of software or a cryptographic
key.
TPM non-volatile memory is typically used to store cryptographic keys that
protect sensitive data. In this method, the sensitive data is encrypted with a cryp-
tographic key derived from a root key inside the TPM chip. This cryptographic
key is usually stored into the non-volatile memory of the TPM chip. To read the
sensitive data, the user has to provide an authorization data to the TPM chip and
only upon successful authorization will the cryptographic key be released from the
TPM chip. This is known as protected storage.
7.3 State of the Art for Para-Virtualizing the TPM
The following sub-sections will give brief descriptions of two projects on para-
virtualizing TPMs. It is important to note that these two projects are based on the
older TPM 1.2 specification.
7.3.1 Para-Virtualized TPM Sharing
In [21], the authors describe a para-virtualization design that allows a VMM to
time share a TPM among its VMs. The concept of associating a TPM context to a
particular VM is proposed. A TPM context will contain the important data that
defines a TPM state, for example, keys and sessions. When a particular VM wishes
to use the physical TPM, the associated TPM context is loaded into that physical
TPM. The loaded TPM context can be saved and cleared from the physical TPM to
allow another TPM context to be loaded when required. TPM contexts are saved in
the hypervisor. As a result, the design is able to support most TPM applications.
To implement this design, the authors located the TPM para-virtualization man-
agement software in the hypervisor. Figure 7.1 gives a high level view of this de-
sign.
The TPM para-virtualization management software contains the following com-
ponents:
Scheduler Schedules shared access to the physical TPM.
Command Blocking Filters TPM commands based on a pre-determined list of
allowed commands. This is to ensure the safe operation of the TPM by disallowing
applications in the VM from executing certain TPM commands.
Virtual PCRs Each VM is assigned a set of virtual PCRs and they are managed
by the hypervisor.
Context Manager This component inspects every TPM command and loads the
associated context into the physical TPM so that the VM can only access its own
TPM resources.
Resource Virtualization Certain limited TPM resources are virtualized, for ex-
ample, key slots, authorization sessions and transport sessions. These virtualized
TPM resources are tied to a context that is provided by the context manager.
The use of virtual PCRs to store integrity measurements of the VM is not desired
by organizations that require hardware based protected storage. Furthermore, the
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Figure 7.1: Architecture for para-virtualizing TPM sharing from [21].
Figure 7.2: Layout of the multi-context TPM from [85].
authors do not elaborate on TPM migration and the management of TPM endorse-
ment credentials in their paper.
7.3.2 Enhancing TPM with Hardware-Based Virtualization Techniques
The paper [85] presented the design of a TPM that supports hardware-based virtu-
alization. In this design, the VMM time multiplexes the hardware TPM in a manner
similar to [21]. However, a difference is that the hardware TPM has to be modified
to include additional non-volatile memory to store the various TPM contexts. The
layout of this multi-context TPM is shown in Figure 7.2.
The VMM manages the transition of one TPM context to another using the TPM
control structure. The VMM links every TPM context to its own TPM control struc-
ture. Figure 7.3 shows the content of the TPM control structure. When a new TPM
context is to be loaded, the VMM will store the previous TPM control structure and
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Figure 7.3: TPM control structure from [85].
load the new TPM control structure. To protect the confidentiality of the TPM con-
trol structure, it is encrypted and the cryptographic key is stored in the TPM root
data structure.
Another feature is the concept of protection rings in the TPM. This TPM pro-
tection ring has a two level hierarchy that differentiates a privileged TPM mode
from a non-privileged TPM mode. The TPM protection ring leverages the Intel VT
architecture and hence can be considered as a form of hardware-based protection.
There are two forms of CPU operation in the Intel VT architecture. The VMX root
operation in which the VMM runs and the VMX non-root operation in which the
VM runs. Only the VMX root can run the privileged TPM mode while the VMX
non-root can only run in the non-privileged TPM mode. In addition, the authors
extended the TCG specification for TPM to include extra commands to manage the
transition between TPM modes and to control the different TPM contexts. These
extra TPM commands can only be executed by VMX root.
For VM migration, the authors described that their TPM context migration pro-
tocol is similar to the concept TCG introduced for migratable keys. On TPM cre-
dentials, the authors proposed to establish a certificate chain with the root Endorse-
ment Key (EK). For every TPM context, the TPM generates a new EK which is then
certified by the root EK. When the TPM context is migrated, the EK will then be
re-certified with the root EK of the destination platform.
This design covers many technical aspects of para-virtualizing TPMs, including
credentials and migration. However, the TPM 2.0 is a new design and we shall
examine in the following section if it is suitable for para-virtualization.
7.4 Examining TPM 2.0 Suitability for Para-Virtualizing
TPM 2.0 core functions are found to be generally suitable for use in a para-virtuali-
zed design and only some typical virtualization functions are required at the VMM
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Figure 7.4: TPM 2.0 key distribution for multiple VM .
level to allow a single TPM 2.0 device to support multiple VMs. Our analysis of
the suitability of TPM 2.0 core functions for para-virtualized are described in the
following paragraphs.
7.4.1 Endorsement and Storage Keys
Figure 7.4 shows how the TPM keys can be distributed to multiple VMs. An en-
dorsement key is derived from the endorsement primary seed located inside the
TPM and it is the basis for the root of trust of reporting. Several endorsement keys
can be generated and assigned to the various VMs hosted on the computing plat-
form. Thus, an endorsement key can be migrated together with the associated VM.
However, we recommend to obtain a new endorsement key after VM migration
from the destination TPM since the host computing platform has changed. Con-
sequently, a new certificate will have to be obtained for the new endorsement key
after VM migration.
For keys derived from the storage root key, they can be created to be migrat-
able by setting the duplication flag. These keys are assigned to the VMs and kept
outside the TPM. As an example, when a VM wishes to use the TPM for certifica-
tion, the certifying key is loaded into the TPM using the command TPM2 Load.
At the end of the session, the certifying key is unloaded from the TPM. The TPM
can then start a new session with another VM. During VM migration, a certifying
key can be packaged as a duplicable data object using TPM2 Duplicate and then
migrated over to the designated TPM. TPM2 Import will load the migrated data
object into the destination TPM. Meanwhile, the use of a TPM authorization ses-
sion will ensure that only the right VM can access its certifying keys. The resulting
effect is comparable to the notion of process and resource isolation between VMs.
Nevertheless, the credential for a certifying key may have to be re-issued after a
migration as the host computer has changed.
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7.4.2 Protected Storage
There are various TPM 2.0 commands that can move data in and out of either the
volatile or non-volatile memory: for example, TPM2 Load, TPM2 LoadExternal,
TPM2 Unseal, TPM2 NV Write and TPM2 NV Read. The use of TPM autho-
rization data will ensure that only the right VM can access its data in the protected
storage. The mechanism for the migration of these data in protected storage is the
same as those for certifying keys. For data that are encrypted and where the access
control depends on the host computing platform integrity measurements, this can
cause a problem during VM migration when the host computer platform is differ-
ent. The use of TPM 2.0 Enhanced Authorization will allow a more flexible access
control policy for this type of protected data. For example, the authorization policy
can either check the host platform integrity measurements or other security prop-
erties. In the meantime, the amount of volatile and non-volatile memory has to be
managed to avoid a situation whereby there is insufficient memory for use by all
the VMs on that host computer.
7.4.3 Integrity Measurement and Reporting
TPM2 NV DefineSpace can be used to create PCR banks in the NV memory. TPM2
PCR Extend will then be used to record the integrity measurements of the VMs
into the PCRs located in the NV memory. For the host machine, TPM2 PCR Extend
will be used to record the integrity measurements into the PCRs located in the
volatile memory. This arrangement will allow the integrity measurement of both
the virtual and host machine be stored inside the TPM at the same time. As above,
the amount of NV memory has to be managed to avoid the situation whereby
there are more VMs than the TPM can support. TPM2 Quote is used to report
the integrity measurement stored in a particular PCR. When reporting the integrity
measurements to a requestor, TPM2 Load is used to insert the relevant attestation
key into the TPM. This key is then used to sign the integrity measurement. The
mechanisms for the migration and access control of PCRs are the same as those for
certifying keys.
In addition to the points above, TPM 2.0 is designed with a context manage-
ment feature that is intended to be used to manage TPM resources among various
applications. In a virtualized environment, this feature can instead be used to man-
age TPM resources among various VMs. The TPM 2.0 specification states that the
structure of the context is decided by the vendor. In other words, there can be a
customized context structure to support TPM 2.0 para-virtualization requirements.
As with most hardware virtualization, TPM 2.0 will require some software com-
ponents at the VMM level to allow it to support multiple VMs. For example, a soft-
ware component is required to provide some form of usage management to ensure
that every VM has fair use of the TPM. Another software component is required
to block state altering TPM commands issued by non-management VMs. The ar-
chitectures described in the TCG’s virtualized trusted platform specification [88]
are more suited to the full virtualization technique although certain aspects such as
TPM migration are applicable to this para-virtualized TPM framework.
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7.5 Requirements for Para-Virtualizing TPM 2.0
As discussed in Section 7.4, TPM 2.0 core functions are generally able to support
para-virtualization. However, we noted that there have to be mechanisms to assign
and ensure the fair use of TPM resources to multiple VMs. In addition, issues
pertaining to an Enterprise IT environment, such as migration, certification and
logging have to be addressed as well. VM migration occurs when a VM is moved
from one physical computer to another. This process is commonly carried out if the
VM requires a differently specified physical computer to support its computation
tasks. VM migration can also happen when the owner moved the VM from one
physical computer to another to facilitate maintenance activities. To this end, the
design requirements presented in [77], [64], [21] and [85] were considered and we
suggest the following:
1. The way that an application uses the para-virtualized TPM should be the
same as for a hardware TPM.
2. The para-virtualized TPM should always be available for use by the VM.
3. Strong association between the VM and its TPM resources. This association
should be maintained after the migration of the VM.
4. TPM resources belonging to a VM should not be accessible by another VM.
5. The size of both volatile and non-volatile memory in the TPM should sup-
port the additional memory required to host multiple VMs on a single physical
computer.
6. Data stored in protected storage locations should be preserved unless in-
structed by their owners. These data should be moved together with the VM dur-
ing migration and then stored into the protected storage location of the destination
TPM.
7. The security strength of protected storage location in a para-virtualized TPM
should be the same as for a hardware TPM.
8. The activity of the para-virtualized TPM should be logged. The log file as-
sociated with a particular VM should be moved to the destination host computing
platform during VM migration.
9. Non-privileged VMs cannot execute commands that can alter the state of the
TPM.
10. The para-virtualized TPM should have verifiable credentials at all times.
11. Individual VM interaction with the para-virtualized TPM should be isolated
from each other to avoid interference.
12. The keys of a para-virtualized TPM should be backed up as part of business
continuity planing.
7.6 An Enterprise Framework for Para-Virtualizing TPM
2.0
The framework shown in Figure 7.5 contains components at the VMM and hard-
ware level to support the para-virtualization of TPM 2.0. This framework allows
the multiplexing of TPM 2.0 functions and resources for use by VMs and their ap-
plications at the same time while preserving the hardware based protected stor-
age. The development of this framework is based on the survey of TPM para-
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Figure 7.5: Enterprise framework for para-virtualizing TPM 2.0.
virtualizing works in Section 7.3, the analysis of para-virtualizing TPM 2.0 core
functions in Section 7.4 and the design requirements from Section 7.5 of this chap-
ter.
As shown in Section 7.4, the TPM 2.0 core functions are generally suitable for
use in a para-virtualized design. Hence, the software components at the VMM level
do not emulate TPM functions but instead focus on ensuring fair usage of TPM and
on addressing requirements such as migration and logging.
A major difference from existing concepts is the removal of the virtual PCRs
as the store for integrity measurements of VMs because they will be stored in the
TPM NV memory. As a result, VM integrity measurements enjoy the security of
hardware based protected storage. In addition, a privileged VM is used to manage
the hardware TPM and para-virtualized TPM service. This gives the system ad-
ministrator a separate conduit to control the hardware TPM and para-virtualized
TPM service. There are also provisions for TPM hardware enhancements and a log
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manager. These are security features desired by a high security Enterprise IT infras-
tructure. Moreover, this framework covers external components that are essential
for the proper functioning of the para-virtualized TPM in an Enterprise IT environ-
ment. The following subsections describe the components in this framework.
7.6.1 Extended functions and additional memory
The framework allows modifications to be carried out on the TPM hardware to sup-
port the requirements of the virtualized environment. For example, the amount of
memory can be increased to include more PCR banks to store the integrity measure-
ments of multiple VMs. Although hardware modifications can be costly, certain
high security requirements, for example, government Enterprise IT, may demand
and pay for this enhancement. In addition, the modified hardware can contain ex-
tended functions to support new virtualization techniques such as the single root
I/O virtualization standard specified by the PCI-SIG [62]. Hardware techniques
such as the use of field-programmable gate arrays described in [65] can be used to
implement the modifications. Depending on security requirements and the amount
of modification, a new platform certificate may have to be issued for the modified
TPM to vouch that the platform contains a genuine TPM and that the communica-
tion path between the TPM and the host computer is trusted.
7.6.2 Command filter
As there are commands that can alter the TPM state, for example TPM2 Shutdown,
it is necessary that only the TPM manager in the privileged VM can execute such
commands. All commands from the VM to the hardware TPM will be inspected
and any state-altering command from a non-privileged VM will be blocked from
execution. The command filter can make use of the hardware based virtualization
technique described in [85] to enforce the restriction on the use of selected TPM
commands.
7.6.3 Scheduler
This component sequences VM access to the hardware TPM in a time division mul-
tiplexing manner. This will ensure that every VM has an opportunity to use the
TPM. The algorithm for sequencing can be either round robin or demand based. In
round robin, the scheduler can poll every VM and ask if it likes to use the TPM.
However, it is a challenge to decide the optimal time allocated for each request. If
the time is set too short, then too much switching from one VM to another will take
place and the round robin design will become slow. If the time is set too long, then
time could be wasted if a VM uses the TPM for less than the allocated time. Alter-
natively, the scheduler can arrange access to the TPM whenever the VM makes a
request. The time that a VM can use the TPM will be limited. If the TPM is currently
servicing a request, any new request will be queued in a first-in-first-out memory
cache.
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7.6.4 Resource manager
To achieve strong association between VMs and their TPM resources, the resource
manager will administer the assignment of TPM resources such as keys. It is envi-
sioned that the VM will use keys derived from the primary seed in the hardware
TPM. In turn, each VM will build their key hierarchy based on their assigned key.
Meanwhile, the resource manager will create PCR banks in the TPM NV memory
and assign them to the VM. PCRs in the TPM volatile memory will be reserved for
use by the host computer and VMM. For the purpose of attestation, the resource
manager can provide the PCR contents in the TPM volatile memory to the VM.
The other task carried out by the resource manager is to work together with the
scheduler to isolate the TPM processes and resources of the VM. The mechanisms
used to achieve this effect can include the use of the TPM context management
feature and authorization sessions. TPM commands such as TPM2 ContextSave,
TPM2 ContextLoad, TPM2 FlushContext and TPM2 StartAuthSession will be em-
ployed. This will prevent one VM from accessing the TPM resources of another
VM. TPM contexts are saved in the VMM.
7.6.5 Migration manager
During VM migration, this component will work together with the resource man-
ager to oversee the packing of the associated TPM resources into duplicable data
objects. The command TPM2 duplicate will be used to prepare the data object for
migration. This component will also work with the migration authority to operate
a migration protocol that securely moves the duplicated data object to the desig-
nated TPM. On the other hand, if the host computer is to receive a migrated VM,
the migration manager can carry out the task of authenticating and verifying the
trustworthiness of the migrating VM.
7.6.6 Log manager
The availability of a log is crucial for forensic investigation in the event of a security
incident. The log manager will log all the operations performed by the VM on the
hardware TPM. The log manager can make frequent integrity measurements of
the log file and store the measurements in the hardware TPM. This will allow the
detection of unauthorized changes to the log file. Meanwhile, the log manager with
work together with the migration manager and migration authority to move the
log file associated with a particular VM to the destination host computing platform
during VM migration.
7.6.7 TPM manager
This resides in a privileged VM and is primarily used to manage the hardware TPM
and configure the para-virtualized TPM service. The privilege status of this VM can
either be enforced from the VMM or controlled by the hardware based virtualiza-
tion technique described in [85]. The TPM manager can check the integrity of the
VMM components by querying the hardware TPM.
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7.6.8 TPM and Virtual TPM driver
The TPM driver contains the software stack that enables the VMM to communi-
cate with the hardware TPM while the Virtual TPM driver contains the software
stack that enables the VM to communicate with the para-virtualized TPM service
in the VMM. To detect unauthorized changes to these two components, integrity
measurements are carried out when they are started. The integrity measurements
are then stored in the TPM.
7.6.9 Backup manager
This and the next two components are external to the computer platform but part of
the Enterprise IT infrastructure. To support business continuity planning, the TPM
keys for the VM should be archived and stored securely in a physically separate
location. In the event of an incident that causes the TPM keys to be lost, the backup
TPM keys can be retrieved to support the continuation of business operation.
7.6.10 Migration authority
Besides administrating the migration of VMs, the migration authority can work
with the TPM migration manager to ensure that the accompanying TPM resources
are moved to the correct destination TPM.
7.6.11 Certificate authority
This component will verify the credentials of TPM keys provided by the VM and is-
sue the appropriate certificates when it is satisfied with the credentials. After a VM
has been migrated, it can work with the migration authority to recheck the creden-
tials of the TPM keys and issue new certificates. More importantly, the certificate
authority can revoke a particular certificate when required.
7.7 Requirements Revisited
To assess the thoroughness of the design of this framework, it is compared to the
requirements listed in Section 7.5. Firstly, there are no changes to the TPM com-
mands and most TPM commands are available to the VM except for those that can
alter the TPM state. This meets the requirement of retaining the same TPM us-
age model. Secondly, the scheduler will sequence the TPM commands issued by
the VMs. Besides ensuring that every VM can interact with the TPM, it works in
conjunction with the resource manager to switch from one VM’s TPM session to
another session. The resource manager will link the TPM resource to the VM and
access control is achieved by using authorization sessions. The resulting effect is
equivalent to isolating each VM’s interaction with the TPM.
Meanwhile, the migration manager works with the resource manager to main-
tain the association between a TPM resource and its VM during migration. In
addition, this framework allows for modifying the TPM hardware and this pro-
vision gives the flexibility to complement TPM hardware with additional memory
to meet the TPM memory requirement of multiple VMs. TPM 2.0 NV memory is
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a protected data storage of this framework. The resource manager can store a cer-
tain number of integrity measurements from numerous VMs into this hardware
memory. Hence, the security protection of integrity measurement in this para-
virtualized TPM is the same as for a plain hardware TPM. The other requirement
relating to logging is fulfilled by the log manager while the backup manager is used
as part of the business continuity plan. As for certification, this framework uses an
external certificate authority to check on the credentials of TPM keys. When it is
satisfied with the credentials, it will issue a certificate to vouch for the TPM keys.
Last of all, the command filter makes sure that non-privileged VM cannot execute
commands that can alter the TPM state. To conclude, this framework meets the
requirements set forth in Section 7.5.
7.8 Summary
We found that TPM 2.0 core functions are generally suitable for para-virtualization.
This indicates that the technical barrier to using TPM 2.0 in a virtualization envi-
ronment can be potentially lowered. The proposed framework is holistic as it cov-
ers important considerations at different levels of the virtualization environment.
Differences from existing concepts include storing integrity measurements of VMs
in TPM NV memory and using a privileged VM to manage the hardware TPM
and para-virtualized TPM service. There are also provisions for TPM hardware
enhancements and a log manager. Moreover, this framework covers external com-
ponents that are essential for the proper functioning of the para-virtualized TPM in
an Enterprise IT environment. Thus, the studies and framework expressed in this
chapter provide a comprehensive basis for future work in para-virtualizing TPM
2.0 and integrating the design with an Enterprise IT virtualization environment.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion and Future Work
8.1 Thesis Summary
At the beginning of this thesis, we provided some questions to guide this research
on identifying trust properties. The first part of this thesis describes how we answer
these research questions. To address the understanding of trust by computer users,
we conducted a socio-technical study on trust notions and obtained a list of con-
cepts that computer users associated with trust in a computing device. More im-
portantly, this list affirms the properties of trust in this thesis. Then we proceeded
to work on Grawrock’s challenge of a language that could describe the trustwor-
thiness of a computing device. In this aspect, we researched and developed a novel
causality-based model to describe the trustworthiness of a computing device. This
model provides information on the causal dependencies between trust notions, ca-
pabilities, mechanisms and configurations. We made use of both semantic and set
theoretic definitions to specify this model. Thereafter, we implemented the model
in the TNC architecture. In addition, we discussed how this description can be
evaluated. In the next step, we worked on using attestation to convey assurance on
the trustworthiness of a computing device. We made a point about the limitations
of binary attestation and set about introducing provenance-based attestation as an
alternative. We presented a design and leveraged the PROV data model for this
method of attestation. We examined approaches to implementation and looked at
how a provenance record can be evaluated. Then we analysed the design using
threat modelling and produced an attestation protocol. Consequently, we gained
insights into the properties of trust and how they can be expressed, evaluated and
attested.
The second part of this thesis describes how we answer the research questions
we provided on developing trusted systems. To address the sharing of information
on trusted hardware between experts and developers, we crafted an ontology of
a computing device secured with TPM 2.0. This ontology was recorded in XML
format and we demonstrated how a developer can obtain information from the on-
tology by using SPAQRL queries. On the method to identify threats to use scenarios
of trusted hardware, we developed a use scenario of TPM 2.0 and studied the use
of threat modelling to identify threats and suggest mitigations. Subsequently, we
worked on an application of trusted hardware. We examined how TPM 2.0 can
be used in a modern system by putting forward a framework for para-virtualizing
TPM 2.0. This framework will be of use to those who wish to use the newer TPM in
the Enterprise IT virtualization environment. As a result, we have gained informa-
tion on using TPM 2.0 as a building block for trust properties in trusted systems.
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8.2 Future Work
In the following sub sections, we discuss the plethora of research still to be under-
taken to address limitations in our work.
8.2.1 Study on Trust Notions
A limitation of this study is that the survey sample size could be larger to better
represent the population. In addition, more in depth studies, for example face to
face interviews, could be conducted to better examine the conceptual relationship
of trust, stake and risk proposed by Solhauf et al [82]. Finally, the study could be
made more focused by reducing the number of notions.
8.2.2 Causality-based Model
Our causality-based model at this stage lays the foundation for two types of fu-
ture work. The first type refers to the concept of predictions in causal models.
For example, an evaluator can predict the trustworthiness of a computing device
if it is presented with causal graphs describing the trust notions and capabilities.
This type of future work will be a progression from our original intent of develop-
ing the causality-based model for end-to-end trust. The second type refers to the
concept of interventions in causal models. For example, a security engineer can ex-
amine reference causal graphs and adjust either the mechanisms or configurations
of a computing device to make sure that certain trust notions and capabilities are
achieved. These two types of future work will require the development of algo-
rithms that could understand the semantics of the causal graph and subsequently
carry out intelligent processing.
We mentioned in Section 3.2 that our causality-based model does not have the
ability to deal with the probability of a causal dependency. However, if we expand
this causality-based model to include the probability of a causal dependency, then
we can develop sophisticated models that predict the trustworthiness of a comput-
ing device in an uncertain environment. For example, we can model a weak causal
dependency to reflect an attack and find out how the trust notions and capabilities
are affected. This ability can be used in a cyber test range where it requires the mod-
elling of computing devices under attack [8], [98]. This future work will require the
use of Bayesian networks that employ probabilistic and statistical models.
8.2.3 Provenance-based Attestation
The provenance-based attestation described in Chapter 4 is feasible but will require
more work before it can be considered as mature. A key area for improvement is
establishing the trustworthiness of provenance itself. We mentioned in Table 4.1
the use of digital signatures to mitigate the threat of an attacker creating a false
provenance record. This mitigation can be further strengthened when we consider
other works on this issue. For example, Hartig proposed extending RDF to in-
clude trust information and the use of a modified SPARQL for trust assessment
[31]. Meanwhile, Groth et al. described a protocol for recording the documenta-
102
8.2 Future Work
tion of a system execution [26]. This protocol ensures that the documentation can
accurately record provenance data.
The other limitation is the lack of a systematic methodology for capturing prove-
nance data. Besides the techniques discussed in Section 4.6, we believe a robust
way to capture provenance data is for all components of the software stack to log
provenance data using a standard format such as the PROV data model. This will
involve the developers of these components to modify program code. It will not be
a trivial effort but the benefit can outweigh the inconvenience.
8.2.4 Ontology Development
A drawback of our ontology is that it only focus on TPM 2.0 and does not provide
more information about other technologies that can interact with it. Thus, the on-
tology can be expanded or merged with other ontologies to provide more details
of how other technologies can work with TPM 2.0. Besides technology oriented
ontologies, our ontology can also be merged with ontologies that describe abstract
concepts of cyber security [58]. This is because our ontology features the mapping
of low level technical primitives to high level trust notions. Finally, ontology devel-
opment is a continual process. Classes and properties should be added or deleted
to address new developments.
8.2.5 Threat Modelling
The threat model has not been validated to ensure the quality and accuracy of the
threats and mitigations. This involves checking that all the potential threats are
identified and the mitigations are assessed to be adequate. Shostack has written
about guidelines to validate the threat models [79]. However, this is still a manual
process and we are not aware of any fully automated threat modelling process.
8.2.6 Para-Virtualizing TPM 2.0
This framework is based on a paper study of the TPM 2.0 specification. From the
view point of a high level design, this framework can be considered to be rea-
sonable. To validate this framework, the components in the VM monitor have to
be implemented and tested. An ideal candidate for the VM monitor is the open
source Xen hypervisor [13]. The Xen hypervisor can support para-virtualization
and hardware based virtualization technology such as Intel VT and AMD V CPU
architecture extension. The hypervisor has a driver for the TPM although it is for
the TPM 1.2 specification.
The techniques described in [21], [75] and [85] can be redeployed and used to
implement this framework but significant challenges still exist. The performance
of this para-virtualized TPM design is one area to be investigated further. Research
can be carried out to develop better algorithms in the scheduler to sequence VM
requests for TPM resources. The strength of the isolation between each VM inter-
action with the para-virtualized TPM is another research area to be studied. The
commonly used integrity measurement method of obtaining a digest from hashing
a software component can be difficult to implement in a virtualized environment.
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This is because VM migration can take place and the configuration of host com-
puting platforms can differ. Attestation in such an environment will be tedious as
there will be a variety of measurements to contend with. Hence, the provenance-
based attestation presented in Chapter 4 of this thesis can be examined for use in
this environment as it does not rely on integrity measurements.
The development of use scenarios for this framework is a task not to be ne-
glected. It will be difficult to persuade organizations to take up this framework if
there are no functional use scenarios. Meanwhile, the threat modeling process stud-
ied in Chapter 6 can be conducted on these scenarios. The results can be used by
researchers to harden the design, and organizations who wish to adopt the frame-
work can put in mitigation measures recommended from the threat model to avoid
any pitfalls. Lastly, the use of the TPM monotonic counter by VMs is not addressed
in the proposed framework and further work can be done to study this matter.
8.3 Conclusion
The issue of identifying trust properties is particularly challenging due to the var-
ied understanding of trust and the difficulty in linking these understandings to the
underlying trust primitives. The work presented in this thesis addresses these chal-
lenges by bringing together the two distinct research domain of trust notions and
trust primitives. We consider the causality-based model as our main contribution
as it could describe, in a novel way, the trustworthiness of a computing device with
reference to trust notions, capabilities, computing mechanisms and their configu-
rations. This contribution is made comprehensive as we have conducted a study
on trust notions and proposed using provenance data as trust evidence to attest to
components in the trust description. Thus, we are now in a position where we can
begin to further explore the trust language envisioned by Grawrock. In addition,
we have gained more information on using TPM 2.0 as a building block of trust
properties through our work on ontology, use scenario, threat modelling and para-
virtualization. These contributions extend our knowledge on developing trusted
systems.
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Appendix A
A Socio-Technical Study on User Centered
Trust Notions and Their Correlation to Stake in
Practical Information Technology Scenarios -
Secondary Analyses
The online survey collected a wealth of data on how different demographic groups
rank the subjective and objective trust notions in the two scenarios. Although the
analyses of these data do not contribute towards answering the research questions,
we thought we should present the findings in this thesis for those who are inter-
ested.
A.0.1 Scenario One
A number of other hypothesis tests using two tailed independent sample t-test at
5% significance level were carried out. These hypothesis tests aimed to analyse the
results further to find out if there was any statistical difference in the mean rank
of notions among different segments of the demographics. Each hypothesis test
was carried out once for the six subjective trust notions and eight objective trust
notions. The results of the hypothesis tests are described in the following.
Hypothesis testing 3
H0 : The mean rank of the subjective and objective trust notions between male
and female are equal. H1 : The mean rank of the subjective and objective trust
notions between male and female are not equal.
Analysis. There are 67 female respondents and 88 male respondents. H0 is re-
jected for the objective notion of security standard. The male respondents are more
concerned about security standard (mean rank of 4.22 against 4.90) than female
respondents.
Hypothesis testing 4
H0 : The mean rank of the subjective and objective trust notions between re-
spondents of bachelor degree or higher and those of associate degree or high school
graduates are equal. H1 : The mean rank of the subjective and objective trust no-
tions between respondents of bachelor degree or higher and those of associate de-
gree or high school graduates are not equal.
Analysis. There were 106 respondents with bachelor degree or higher qualifica-
tion and 50 respondents with associate degree or high school qualification. The hy-
pothesis test was carried out for each of the six subjective trust notions and each of
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the eight objective trust notions. H0 is rejected for the subjective notion of aesthet-
ics. Respondents with bachelor degree or higher place less emphasis on aesthetics
(mean rank of 5.20 against 4.56) compared to respondents with associate degree
or high school qualification. In addition, H0 is rejected for the objective notion of
identity and authenticity of the mass market laptop computer, data confidentiality
and the availability of required function or data. When compared with respondents
with associate degree or high school qualification, respondents with bachelor de-
gree or higher consider data confidentiality (mean rank of 2.33 against 3.38) to be
more important while giving less importance to identity and authenticity of the
mass market laptop computer (mean rank of 4.86 against 4.30) and the availability
of required functions or data (mean rank of 5.31 against 4.78).
Hypothesis test 5
H0 : The mean rank of the subjective and objective trust notions between re-
spondents who are early adopters and those who are minimalist are equal. H1 :
The mean rank of the subjective and objective trust notions between respondents
who are early adopters and those who are minimalist are not equal.
Analysis. There were 86 respondents who were early adopters and 60 respon-
dents who were minimalists. The hypothesis test was carried out for each of the six
subjective trust notions and each of the eight objective trust notions. H0 is rejected
for the objective notion of identity and authenticity of the mass market laptop com-
puter and availability of required functions or data. The results show that early
adopters give less importance availability of required functions or data (mean rank
of 5.43 against 4.87) but more importance to identity and authenticity of the mass
market laptop computer (mean rank of 4.36 against 5.07). This could be because
early adopters understand that new technologies may still require some improve-
ment to work perfectly and it is alright that required functions or data are unavail-
able occasionally. However, early adopters are concerned that this new technology
must come from the original manufacturer and not be a fake.
A.0.2 Scenario Two
A number of other hypothesis tests using two tailed independent sample t-test at
5% significance level were carried out. These hypothesis tests aimed to find out
if there was any statistical difference in the mean rank of notions among different
segments of the demographics. Each hypothesis test was carried out once for the six
subjective trust notions and eight objective trust notions. The results are described
in the following.
Hypothesis test 6
H0 : The mean rank of the subjective and objective trust notions between male
and female are equal. H1 : The mean rank of the subjective and objective trust
notions between male and female are not equal.
Analysis. There were 74 female respondents and 81 male respondents. The
hypothesis test was carried out for each of the six subjective trust notions and each
of the eight objective trust notions. H0 is not rejected in all the tests. This outcome
is different from the same hypothesis test result for scenario one.
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Hypothesis test 7
H0 : The mean rank of the subjective and objective trust notions between re-
spondents of bachelor degree or higher and those of associate degree or high school
graduates are equal. H1 : The mean rank of the subjective and objective trust no-
tions between respondents of bachelor degree or higher and those of associate de-
gree or high school graduates are not equal.
Analysis. There were 105 respondents with bachelor degree or higher qualifi-
cation and 50 respondents with associate degree or high school qualification. The
hypothesis test was carried out for each of the six subjective trust notions and each
of the eight objective trust notions. H0 is rejected for the subjective notion of useful-
ness, aesthetics, vendors technical competence and vendors interest in respondents
wellbeing. The results show that respondents holding bachelor degree or higher
place more emphasis on the usefulness (mean rank of 3.01 against 3.92) and less
emphasis on aesthetics (mean rank of 5.13 against 4.72), vendors technical compe-
tence (mean rank of 3.38 against 2.96) and vendors interest in respondents wellbe-
ing (mean rank of 3.96 against 3.54). This observation for the subjective notion of
aesthetics is the only similarity with the observations from hypothesis testing of the
same demographic segment in scenario one.
Hypothesis test 8
H0 : The mean rank of the subjective and objective trust notions between re-
spondents who are early adopters and those who are minimalist are equal. H1 :
The mean rank of the subjective and objective trust notions between respondents
who are early adopters and those who are minimalist are not equal.
Analysis. There were 76 respondents who are early adopters and 72 respon-
dents who are minimalists. The hypothesis test was carried out for each of the six
subjective trust notions and each of the eight objective trust notions. H0 is rejected
for the objective notion of identity and authenticity of the embedded computing
devices. Early adopters consider this notion (mean rank of 4.38 against 5.04) to be
more important and this is the same observation for early adopters in scenario one.
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Threat Modelling Report of the
Provenance-based Attestation Design
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Threat Model: User application use TPM to encrypt data for group share
Threat Model Information Data Flow Diagrams Threats and Mitigations
Certifications External Dependencies Implementation Assumptions
External Security Notes
Threat Model Information
Component User application use TPM to encrypt data for group share
Product Trusted Platform Module 2.0
SourceUrl
Owner Trusted Computing Group
Participants Jiun Yi Yap, Allan Tomlinson
Reviewers
Url
Summary A PhD research project at Royal Holloway University of London Information Security Group
History
Data Flow Diagrams
Context
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Threats and Mitigations
Elements
Element Type Description
Data Flow Authorisation data
Data Flow Key handle
Data Flow Key handle
Data Flow Key object ready for migration
Data Flow (NotGenerated) Key object (this element is not accessible from entry points) 
Data Flow (NotGenerated) Key object (this element is not accessible from the entry points) 
Data Flow Key object
Data Flow Key object
Data Flow (NotGenerated) Memory address (This element is not accessible from the entry points.) 
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Threats against User Application
Spoofing (Threat #25) 
Threat: Attacker uses social engineering methods to gains access to the computing system and attempt to 
interact with TPM. 
Mitigation: This threat can be mitigated if the use of TPM is combined with more sophisticated authentication 
methods, eg smart card, 2FA.
Most TPM commands require authorisation. TPM authorised a user based on its knowledge of a secret 
credential. If the authorisation fails, the user will not be able to carry out the commands. However, the 
credential has to be stored securely in the TCB. 
Spoofing (Threat #121) 
Threat: Attacker eavesdrops on authorisation session between user application and TPM. 
Mitigation: The salt used to generate the session key is encrypted by a key protected by TPM. The session key 
in turns encrypt the data exchanges during the session between the user application and TPM.
Spoofing (Threat #144) 
Threat: Attacker inserts malicious codes into the computing system and attempt to interact with TPM 
Mitigation: TPM will have to reply on the security of the TCB to stop malicious codes from entering the 
computing system. The integrity measurement at system start up can protect against this type of threat but 
there is a risk of run time attacks.
Most TPM commands require authorisation. TPM authorised a user based on its knowledge of a secret 
credential. If the authorisation fails, the user will not be able to carry out the commands. However, the 
credential has to be stored securely in the TCB.
Spoofing (Threat #145) 
Threat: Attacker makes changes to the authorisation value in TPM either by gaining unauthorised access to the 
computing system or by inserting malicious codes. 
Mitigation: Changes to the authorisation value in TPM will require the authorisation of the administrator. 
Data Flow (NotGenerated) Memory address (This element is not accessible from the entry points.) 
Data Flow Session Handle
Data Flow Symmetric key
Data Store TPM RAM
Interactor User Application
Process TPM2_ Create
Process TPM2_ Duplicate
Process TPM2_Load
Process TPM2_StartAuthSession
TrustBoundary
External Interactors
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However, the administrator credential has to be stored securely in the TCB.
Spoofing (Threat #146) 
Threat: Attacker guess the authorisation value. 
Mitigation: TPM has a dictionary attack protection feature and will enter a lock out mode when there is 
successive authorization failure. However, the authorisation value must not be of a value that can be guessed 
easily.
Repudiation (Threat #26) 
Threat: User denies carrying out certain commands. 
Mitigation: TCB will have to keep a log of the commands performed on TPM. In addition, TCB will have to 
protect the integrity of this log. Meanwhile, TCB has to store the authorisation values securely to prevent 
misuse.
Repudiation (Threat #124) 
Threat: Attacker pretends to be a user application and replays commands. 
Mitigation: TPM sessions make use of nouces to mitigate against replay attacks.
Repudiation (Threat #125) 
Threat: Attacker accesses the computing system and edits log to misrepresent the record of commands. 
Mitigation: Besides strong authenication of user, TCB has to make sure only authorisation changes can be 
made to the log.
Threats against TPM2_ Create
Spoofing (Threat #130) 
Threat: Attacker creates a data object outside the TPM and attempt to pass off the object as one that is 
created by TPM. 
Mitigation: TPM can attest to the data that it has created by using the command TPM2_Hash and TPM2_Sign. 
TPM2_Hash will validate the object to make sure that it is indeed created by the TPM and output a digest if 
successful. TPM2_Sign will then attest to the object by producing a digital signature. The parent key used for 
digital signature can be installed during manufacturing and certified by the manufacturer for authenticity.
Spoofing (Threat #133) 
Threat: Attacker pretends to be user application and attempt to execute this command. 
Mitigation: The integrity measurement at system start up can detect the presence of unauthorised software. 
However, there is a risk of executing unauthorised software during run time and the security features of the 
TCB will have to mitigate this threat.
This command is only authorised to be used by the user role and the command will check for successful 
authorisation before executing. However, the credential has to be stored securely in the TCB. In addition, the 
TCB will have to authenticate the user.
Processes
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Spoofing (Threat #134) 
Threat: Attacker guess the authorisation value. 
Mitigation: TPM has a dictionary attack protection feature and will enter a lock out mode when there is 
successive authorization failure. However, the authorisation value must not be of a value that can be guessed 
easily.
Tampering (Threat #86) 
Threat: Attacker carries out a buffer overflow attack in an attempt to access other data stored in the TPM. 
Mitigation: TPM2_Create validates the input data before executing the process of creating the new object. If 
input validation fails, the command will not execute. In addition, TPM only allows a protected capability to 
access data in a shield location. Data outside a shielded location has its integrity and confidentiality protected 
cryptographically. Hence, the risk of adnormal behaviour due to memory buffer overflow attack is minimal.
Tampering (Threat #147) 
Threat: Attacker attempts to change the behaviour of this command by changing TPM firmware to an 
unauthorised version. 
Mitigation: During field upgrade process, the TCB has to carry out integrity check on the new firmware and 
ensure that the firmware is endorsed by the manufacturer.
Tampering (Threat #148) 
Threat: Attacker injects a compromised primary seed into the TPM and attempts to break the cryptographic 
protections that uses the compromised primary seed. 
Mitigation: When the TPM is first manufactured, a primary seed can be injected into the TPM and the 
manufacturer will provide a credential to that. This process can be audited by a trusted third party. When the 
TPM is used, the credential can be checked to ensure authenticity. 
The TPM primary seed can be changed after manufacture using the command TPM2_ChangeEPS. This 
command required physical presence authorisation. When a primary seed is changed, any existing key 
hierarchy will become void.
Repudiation (Threat #87) 
Threat: User application denies that object is created by TPM. 
Mitigation: The object produced by TPM2_Create will include an unique value (TPM_GENERATED_VALUE).
TPM will only allow a restricted signing key to sign an object that has this unique value. This unique value can 
only be produced by the TPM and it has integrity protection. As confidence in the attestation of an object is 
related to the confidence in the signing key, the highest confidence is provided by a restricted signing key that 
is created on the TPM with a certificate from the TPM manufacturer.
Repudiation (Threat #149) 
Threat: User application denies executing this command on TPM. 
Mitigation: TPM will have to rely on the TCB to keep a log of the commands performed on TPM. The 
availability of a log is crucial to forensic investigation in the event of a security incident. An example of a 
guideline for the security management of the log will be NIST SP 800-92.
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Information Disclosure (Threat #131) 
Threat: Attacker carries out memory buffer overflow attacks in an attempt to access data stored in TPM. 
Mitigation: TPM2_Create carries out validation of input data. The command will fail if data validation is not 
successful. In addition, TPM only allows a protected capability to access data in a shield location. Data outside a 
shielded location has its integrity and confidentiality protected cryptographically. Hence, the risk of information 
disclosure due to memory buffer overflow attack is minimal.
Information Disclosure (Threat #140) 
Threat: Attacker launches physical attacks on TPM to obtain parent seed value in an attempt to break the 
cryptographic protection for the created object. 
Mitigation: TPM is not designed to withstand physical attacks. User can consider using physical measures (eg. 
a lock) to prevent unauthorised physical access to computing system.
Information Disclosure (Threat #150) 
Threat: Attacker attempts to weaken the cryptographic protection implemented by this command for the 
created object by modifying the cryptographic algorithm during firmware upgrade. 
Mitigation: During field upgrade process, the TCB has to carry out integrity check on the new firmware and 
ensure that the firmware is endorsed by the manufacturer.
Information Disclosure (Threat #151) 
Threat: Attacker injects a compromised primary seed into the TPM and attempts to break the cryptographic 
protections that uses the compromised primary seed. 
Mitigation: When the TPM is first manufactured, a primary seed can be injected into the TPM and the 
manufacturer will provide a credential to that. This process can be audited by a trusted third party. When the 
TPM is used, the credential can be checked to ensure authenticity. 
The TPM primary seed can be changed after manufacture using the command TPM2_ChangeEPS. This 
command required physical presence authorisation. When a primary seed is changed, any existing key 
hierarchy will become void.
Denial of Service (Threat #89) 
Threat: Attacker attempts to use up all the TPM computing resources by sending this command repeatedly. 
Mitigation: TPM relies on the TCB to mitigate this type of attack. The integrity measurement at system start up 
ensure that the TCB is not compromised by malicious software. However, the TCB will need to be protected 
against run time attacks. TPM does not have any feature to control resource consumption but there is 
dictionary attack protection for authorisation session. 
Denial of Service (Threat #152) 
Threat: Attacker attempts to use up all the TPM memory by providing malicious input paramenters. 
Mitigation: TPM2_Create validates the input parameters before executing the process of creating the new 
object. If input validation fails, the command will not execute. 
Elevation of Privilege (Threat #90) 
Threat: Attacker attempts to elevate priviledge vertically by carrying out buffer overflow attacks through 
TPM2_Create. 
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Mitigation: TPM2_Create validates the input data before executing the process of creating the new object. If 
input validation fails, the command will not execute. In addition, priviledge commands will require another 
authorisation session.
Elevation of Privilege (Threat #153) 
Threat: Attacker attempts to elevate priviledge horizontally by attempting to create a child object from a 
hierarchy that he does not have access to. 
Mitigation: Authorisation is required for the use of parent object in this command.
Threats against TPM2_ Duplicate
Spoofing (Threat #97) 
Threat: Attacker pretends to be user application and attempt to execute this command. 
Mitigation: The integrity measurement at system start up can detect the presence of unauthorised software. 
However, there is a risk of executing unauthorised software during run time and the security features of the 
TCB will have to mitigate this threat.
This command is only authorised to be used by the duplication role. The command will check for successful 
authorisation and correct policy digest before executing. However, the credential has to be stored securely in 
the TCB. In addition, the TCB will have to authenticate the user.
Spoofing (Threat #160) 
Threat: Attacker guess the authorisation value. 
Mitigation: TPM has a dictionary attack protection feature and will enter a lock out mode when there is 
successive authorization failure. However, the authorisation value must not be of a value that can be guessed 
easily.
Tampering (Threat #98) 
Threat: Attacker carries out a buffer overflow attack in an attempt to access other data stored in the TPM. 
Mitigation: This command validates the input data before executing the process of duplicating the new object. 
If input validation fails, the command will not execute. In addition, TPM only allows a protected capability to 
access data in a shield location. Data outside a shielded location has its integrity and confidentiality protected 
cryptographically. Hence, the risk of adnormal behaviour due to memory buffer overflow attack is minimal.
Tampering (Threat #161) 
Threat: Attacker attempts to change the behaviour of this command by changing TPM firmware to an 
unauthorised version. 
Mitigation: During field upgrade process, the TCB has to carry out integrity check on the new firmware and 
ensure that the firmware is endorsed by the manufacturer.
Tampering (Threat #162) 
Threat: Attacker edits an object and attempt to load it into TPM and duplicate it. 
Mitigation: This command will check the integrity, attributes and cryptographic binding of the object before 
loading it into the TPM. The command will not execute and it return an error code if the check fails. If 
TPM2_Load executes successfully, an object handled will be returned to the user application which in turn pass 
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this handle to the TPM2_Duplicate command. TPM2_Duplicate command will check if this object is supposed to 
be duplicated and that the policy requirements are met.
Tampering (Threat #163) 
Threat: Attacker attempts to import the duplicated object into another TPM that is not suppose to recieve this 
duplicated object. 
Mitigation: The duplicated object can have two layers of encryption. The inner layer of encryption is carried 
out using a symmetric key generated by the source TPM. It is important to note that this symmetric key should 
meet security requirements. 
The out layer of encryption is carried out using a symmetric key generated from a seed obtained from the 
destination TPM. It is importat to note that this seed should meet security requirements. This seed is shared 
between the source and destination TPM using asymmetric encryption. Hence, another TPM will not be able to 
import this duplicated object unless it has access to the seed.
Repudiation (Threat #99) 
Threat: User application denies executing this command on TPM. 
Mitigation: As the TPM does not keep an internal log, the TCB will have to keep a log of the commands 
performed on TPM. In addition, TCB will have to protect the integrity of this log and only allows authorised 
changes to be made to the log. Meanwhile, TCB has to store the authorisation values securely to prevent 
misuse.
Repudiation (Threat #164) 
Threat: User application denies duplicating this object using the source TPM. 
Mitigation: The outer layer of encryption is carried out using a key derived from a seed that is shared between 
the source and destination TPM using asymmetric encryption. However, the mechanism to share this seed must 
be secure.
As the TPM does not keep an internal log, the TCB will have to keep a log of the commands performed on TPM. 
In addition, TCB will have to protect the integrity of this log and only allows authorised changes to be made to 
the log. Meanwhile, TCB has to store the authorisation values securely to prevent misuse.
Information Disclosure (Threat #100) 
Threat: Attacker launches physical attacks on TPM to obtain seed value in an attempt to break the 
cryptographic protection for the duplicated object. 
Mitigation: TPM is not designed to withstand physical attacks. User can consider using physical measures (eg. 
a lock) to prevent unauthorised physical access to computing system.
Information Disclosure (Threat #165) 
Threat: Attacker attempts to obtain the seed value used to provide the outer layer of encryption by cracking 
the sharing protocol which uses asymmetric encrpytion. 
Mitigation: The public key infrastructure and cryptographic functions used for this purpose have to meet 
security requirements. The attestation feature of the TPM can also be used to provide some assurance on the 
authenticity and security of the endpoints.
Information Disclosure (Threat #166) 
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Threat: Attacker sends a compromised seed value to this command in an attempt to weaken the cryptographic 
protection for the duplicated object. 
Mitigation: This command requires policy authorisation. The policy can include checks on the integrity of the 
computing system. This protects against the insertion of malicious codes that compromise the seed value 
sharing mechanism.
TPM has to rely on the TCB to check on the authenticity and integrity of the seed value. The destination TPM 
can send a digital certificate to vouch for the authenticity and integrity of the seed value. The source TPM can 
then verify the digital certificate with the Certificate Authority. Meanwhile, the detailed design and 
implementation for this mechanism has to meet security requirements. 
Information Disclosure (Threat #167) 
Threat: Attacker attempts to trick the source TPM to send the duplicated object to an unauthorised TPM. 
Mitigation: The TPM has to rely on an external migration authority to securely manage the duplication of 
objects among TPMs. The migration authority should have features for authentication and authorisation and 
the implementation must meet security requirements.
Denial of Service (Threat #101) 
Threat: Attacker attempts to use up all the TPM computing resources by sending this command repeatedly. 
Mitigation: TPM relies on the TCB to mitigate this type of attack. The integrity measurement at system start up 
ensure that the TCB is not compromised by malicious software. However, the TCB will need to be protected 
against run time attacks. TPM does not have any feature to control resource consumption but there is 
dictionary attack protection for authorisation session. 
Denial of Service (Threat #168) 
Threat: Attacker launches DOS attack against the migration infrastructure. 
Mitigation: TPM has to rely on the infrastructure provider to mitigate this type of attack. If all the computing 
systems in the network are equipped with TPM, then the integrity measurement and attestation function can 
provide a higher level of trustworthiness.
Elevation of Privilege (Threat #102) 
Threat: Attacker attempts to elevate priviledge vertically by carrying out buffer overflow attacks. 
Mitigation: Priviledge commands will require another authorisation session.
Elevation of Privilege (Threat #169) 
Threat: Attacker attempts to elevate priviledge horizontally by attempting to duplicate an object that he does 
not have access to. 
Mitigation: Authorisation is required for the use of object in this command.
Threats against TPM2_Load
Spoofing (Threat #91) 
Threat: Attacker pretends to be user application and attempt to execute this command. 
Mitigation: The integrity measurement at system start up can detect the presence of unauthorised software. 
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However, there is a risk of executing unauthorised software during run time and the security features of the 
TCB will have to mitigate this threat.
This command is only authorised to be used by the user role and the command will check for successful 
authorisation before executing. However, the credential has to be stored securely in the TCB. In addition, the 
TCB will have to authenticate the user.
Spoofing (Threat #154) 
Threat: Attacker guesses the authorisation value. 
Mitigation: TPM has a dictionary attack protection feature and will enter a lock out mode when there is 
successive authorization failure. However, the authorisation value must not be of a value that can be guessed 
easily.
Spoofing (Threat #155) 
Threat: Attacker creates a TPM object externally and attempts to load this object into TPM. 
Mitigation: This command will check the integrity, attributes and cryptographic binding of the object before 
loading it into the TPM. The command will not execute and it return an error code if the check fails.
Tampering (Threat #92) 
Threat: Attacker carries out a memory buffer overflow attack in an attempt to access other data stored in the 
TPM. 
Mitigation: This command validates the input data before executing the process of creating the new object. If 
input validation fails, the command will not execute. In addition, TPM only allows a protected capability to 
access data in a shield location. Data outside a shielded location has its integrity and confidentiality protected 
cryptographically. Hence, the risk of adnormal behaviour due to memory buffer overflow attack is minimal.
Tampering (Threat #156) 
Threat: Attacker attempts to change the behaviour of this command by changing TPM firmware to an 
unauthorised version. 
Mitigation: During field upgrade process, the TCB has to carry out integrity check on the new firmware and 
ensure that the firmware is endorsed by the manufacturer.
Tampering (Threat #157) 
Threat: Attacker edits an object and attempt to load it into TPM. 
Mitigation: This command will check the integrity, attributes and cryptographic binding of the object before 
loading it into the TPM. The command will not execute and it return an error code if the check fails.
Repudiation (Threat #93) 
Threat: User application denies executing this command on TPM. 
Mitigation: As the TPM does not keep an internal log, the TCB will have to keep a log of the commands 
performed on TPM. In addition, TCB will have to protect the integrity of this log and only allows authorised 
changes to be made to the log. Meanwhile, TCB has to store the authorisation values securely to prevent 
misuse.
Repudiation (Threat #158) 
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Threat: User application denies loading this object to the TPM. 
Mitigation: As the TPM does not keep an internal log, the TCB will have to keep a log of the commands 
performed on TPM. In addition, TCB will have to protect the integrity of this log and only allows authorised 
changes to be made to the log. Meanwhile, TCB has to store the authorisation values securely to prevent 
misuse.
Information Disclosure (Threat #94) 
Threat: Attacker carries out memory buffer overflow attacks in an attempt to access data stored in TPM. 
Mitigation: This command carries out validation of input data. The command will fail if data validation is not 
successful. In addition, TPM only allows a protected capability to access data in a shield location. Data outside a 
shielded location has its integrity and confidentiality protected cryptographically. Hence, the risk of information 
disclosure due to memory buffer overflow attack is minimal.
Denial of Service (Threat #95) 
Threat: Attacker attempts to use up all the TPM memory by providing malicious input paramenters. 
Mitigation: If the TPM memory does not have enough space to load the object, the command will not execute 
and an error code will be returned.
Elevation of Privilege (Threat #96) 
Threat: Attacker attempts to elevate priviledge vertically by carrying out buffer overflow attacks through this 
command. 
Mitigation: This command validates the input data before executing. If input validation fails, the command will 
not execute. In addition, priviledge commands will require another authorisation session.
Elevation of Privilege (Threat #159) 
Threat: Attacker attempts to elevate priviledge horizontally by attempting to load a child object from a 
hierarchy that he does not have access to. 
Mitigation: Authorisation is required for the use of parent object in this command.
Threats against TPM2_StartAuthSession
Spoofing (Threat #108) 
Threat: Attacker guess the authorisation value. 
Mitigation: TPM has a dictionary attack protection feature and will enter a lock out mode when there is 
successive authorization failure. However, the authorisation value must not be of a value that can be guessed 
easily.
Spoofing (Threat #171) 
Threat: Attacker starts an authorisation session and attempt to execute TPM commands. 
Mitigation: The session will not continue if the correct authorisation value is not provided to the command 
that follows.
Spoofing (Threat #180) 
Threat: Attacker attempts to change the authorisation value. 
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Mitigation: The command to change the authorisation value will require the user to provide knowledge of the 
original authorisation value.
Therefore, the authorisation value has to be stored securely in the TCB. Any user who wishes to access the 
authorisation value must be authenticated and authorised by the TCB.
Tampering (Threat #109) 
Threat: Attacker replays an authorisation session. 
Mitigation: Nonces are used in TPM sessions to prevent replay attacks. It is important that the use of the 
nonce must follow TPM's specifications.
Tampering (Threat #170) 
Threat: Attacker attempts to change the behaviour of this command by changing TPM firmware to an 
unauthorised version. 
Mitigation: During field upgrade process, the TCB has to carry out integrity check on the new firmware and 
ensure that the firmware is endorsed by the manufacturer.
Tampering (Threat #172) 
Threat: Attacker edits the session key. 
Mitigation: The generation of the session key requires the user application to supply the authorisation value to 
the object that the user application intends to use in the next TPM command. The salt value used in the 
generation of the session key is protected cryptographically as well. However, the TCB will have to store the 
authorisation value securely to prevent misuse.
If the authorisation value is easy to guess, then it is important that an attacker cannot eaves drop on the 
authorised session as it may be possible to recover the session key.
Repudiation (Threat #110) 
Threat: User application denies executing this command on TPM. 
Mitigation: As the TPM does not keep an internal log, the TCB will have to keep a log of the commands 
performed on TPM. In addition, TCB will have to protect the integrity of this log and only allows authorised 
changes to be made to the log. Meanwhile, TCB has to store the authorisation values securely to prevent 
misuse.
Repudiation (Threat #173) 
Threat: User application denies starting an authorisation session. 
Mitigation: Starting an authorisation session will require the knowledge of the authorisation value. TCB has to 
securely manage the authorisation value to prevent misuse.
Information Disclosure (Threat #111) 
Threat: Attacker steals the session key. 
Mitigation: The generation of the session key requires the user application to supply the authorisation value to 
the object that the user application intends to use in the next TPM command. The salt value used in the 
generation of the session key is protected cryptographically as well. However, the TCB will have to store the 
authorisation value securely to prevent misuse.
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If the authorisation value is easy to guess, then it is important that an attacker cannot eaves drop on the 
authorised session as it may be possible to recover the session key.
Information Disclosure (Threat #174) 
Threat: Attacker uses physical means to obtain the session key from the TPM. 
Mitigation: TPM is not designed to withstand physical attacks. User can consider using physical measures (eg. 
a lock) to prevent unauthorised physical access to computing system.
Information Disclosure (Threat #175) 
Threat: Attacker weakens the cryptographic properties of authorised session by compromisng the salt value 
used in the generation of the session key. 
Mitigation: The method used to generate the salt value has to meet security requirements. Integrity 
measurement at system startup can prevent unauthorised changes to the salt generating mechanism. However, 
the TCB will have to put in place security measures to mitigate the risk of run time attacks. 
An alternate method is to use TPM's random number generator to provide the salt value. Similarly, TPM's RNG 
has to meet security requirements.
Denial of Service (Threat #112) 
Threat: Attacker attempts to use up all the TPM computing resources by sending this command repeatedly. 
Mitigation: TPM will return an error code if there is not enough memory to start this session. TPM does not 
have feature to control resource consumption. 
The integrity measurement at system start up ensure that the TCB is not compromised by malicious software. 
However, the TCB will need to be protected against run time attacks.
Elevation of Privilege (Threat #113) 
Threat: Attacker attempts to elevate priviledge horizontally by starting an authorisation session to an object 
that he does not have access to. 
Mitigation: When the authorised session is used on another object, the authorisation value to the new object 
has to be provided. Therefore, authorisation value has to be managed securely to prevent misuse.
Threats against Authorisation data
Tampering (Threat #114) 
Threat: Attacker alters data used to start an authorised session. 
Mitigation: The salt value is encrypted.
The derivation of the session key requires the authorisation value. This authorisation value is not passed from 
user application to TPM in the data flow.
Information Disclosure (Threat #115) 
Threat: Attacker generates session key based on data sniffed from this data flow. 
Data Flows
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Mitigation: The salt value is encrypted.
The derivation of the session key requires the authorisation value. This authorisation value is not passed from 
user application to TPM in the data flow. However, it is important that the authorisation value cannot be 
guessed easily.
Information Disclosure (Threat #178) 
Threat: Attacker tries to read the actual salt value. 
Mitigation: The salt value is encrypted with a key loaded in TPM.
Information Disclosure (Threat #179) 
Threat: Attacker makes use of physical means to read the key stored in TPM. 
Mitigation: The TPM is not designed to withstand physical attacks. However, this risk can be mitigated if the 
computing system is secured physically.
Denial of Service (Threat #116) 
Threat: Attacker hijacks authorisation session. 
Mitigation: The establishment of the authorised session will require the knowledge of the authorisation value. 
Nouces are used to protect against replay attacks.
Threats against Key handle
Tampering (Threat #48) 
Threat: Attacker obtains object handle and attempt to carry out a TPM command on that object. 
Mitigation: TPM command will check that the authorisation value provided by the user for the object matches 
the authorisation value stored in the TPM. The command will only operate on the object if the authorisation is 
successful. Hence, the TCB has to securely manage the authorisation value to prevent misuse.
Information Disclosure (Threat #49) 
Threat: Attacker obtains object handle and use TPM commands to decrypt the data in the object's private area. 
Mitigation: TPM command will check that the authorisation value provided by the user for the object matches 
the authorisation value stored in the TPM. The command will only operate on the object if the authorisation is 
successful. Hence, the TCB has to securely manage the authorisation value to prevent misuse.
Denial of Service (Threat #50) 
Threat: Attacker denies user application from using the object handle. 
Mitigation: Integrity measurement at system start up can check for the presence of malicious software.
Strong authentication and authorisation must be used to prevent misuse of object handle.
Threats against Key handle
Tampering (Threat #57) 
Threat: Attacker obtains object handle and attempt to carry out a TPM command on that object. 
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Mitigation: TPM command will check that the authorisation value provided by the user for the object matches 
the authorisation value stored in the TPM. The command will only operate on the object if the authorisation is 
successful. Hence, the TCB has to securely manage the authorisation value to prevent misuse.
Information Disclosure (Threat #58) 
Threat: Attacker obtains object handle and use TPM commands to decrypt the data in the object's private area. 
Mitigation: TPM command will check that the authorisation value provided by the user for the object matches 
the authorisation value stored in the TPM. The command will only operate on the object if the authorisation is 
successful. Hence, the TCB has to securely manage the authorisation value to prevent misuse.
Denial of Service (Threat #59) 
Threat: Attacker denies user application from using the object handle. 
Mitigation: Integrity measurement at system start up can check for the presence of malicious software.
Strong authentication and authorisation must be used to prevent misuse of object handle.
Threats against Key object ready for migration
Tampering (Threat #60) 
Threat: Attacker attempts to edit the duplicated data object. 
Mitigation: The data object is encrypted with a key derived from a seed generated by the source TPM. This 
seed value is encrypted by the public key from the new parent at destination TPM.
Information Disclosure (Threat #61) 
Threat: Attacker obtain sensitive information from the duplicated object. 
Mitigation: The data object is encrypted with a key derived from a seed generated by the source TPM. This 
seed value is encrypted by the public key from the new parent at destination TPM.
Denial of Service (Threat #62) 
Threat: Attacker denies user access to duplicated object. 
Mitigation: Integrity measurement at system start up can check for the presence of malicious software.
Strong authentication and authorisation must be used to prevent misuse of duplicated object.
It will depend on the security of the mechanism used to migrate the duplicated object from the source TPM to 
the destination TPM.
Threats against Key object
Tampering (Threat #33) 
Threat: Attacker attempts to edit the created data object. 
Mitigation: If the object is not in a shielded location of a TPM, the integrity and confidentiality of the sensitive 
area of an object is protected cryptographically.
Information Disclosure (Threat #34) 
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Threat: The sensitive part of the key object is symmetrically encrypted using a key derived from the parent 
object. A random value is included in the process as an initialization vector (IV). When an object is created for 
duplication, the IV is set to zero. The key objects can be susceptible to cryptographic analysis if the parent 
object is reused multiple times. 
Mitigation: The user application has to avoid reusing the parent object multiple times when creating an object 
for duplication. 
Denial of Service (Threat #35) 
Threat: Attacker denies user access to created object. 
Mitigation: Integrity measurement at system start up can check for the presence of malicious software.
Strong authentication and authorisation must be used to prevent misuse of created object.
Threats against Key object
Tampering (Threat #107) 
Threat: Attacker attempts to edit the created data object. 
Mitigation: If the object is not in a shielded location of a TPM, the integrity and confidentiality of the sensitive 
area of an object is protected cryptographically.
Information Disclosure (Threat #120) 
Threat: Attacker obtain sensitive information from the created object. 
Mitigation: TPM2_Create will encrypt the sensitive area of the object with an encryption key derived from the 
parent object.
Denial of Service (Threat #47) 
Threat: Attacker denies user access to created object. 
Mitigation: Integrity measurement at system start up can check for the presence of malicious software.
Strong authentication and authorisation must be used to prevent misuse of created object.
Threats against Session Handle
Tampering (Threat #117) 
Threat: Attacker alters the nonce value returned by the TPM. 
Mitigation: If the nonce value is altered, the session will not be able to proceed because the nonce value held 
by the TPM will be different. The nonce value is used in the generation of the HMAC integrity check value and 
session key.
Tampering (Threat #176) 
Threat: Attacker reuse session handle. 
Mitigation: Session handle for HMAC or policy authorisation can only be used once. However, session handle 
for password authorisation can be reused. Hence, the TCB has to securely manage the password to prevent 
misuse.
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Tampering (Threat #181) 
Threat: Attacker uses replay attacks to establish a session with TPM. 
Mitigation: Nonces are used in TPM sessions to prevent replay attacks. It is important that the use of the 
nonce must follow TPM's specifications.
Information Disclosure (Threat #118) 
Threat: Attacker reads the session handle. 
Mitigation: Knowledge of the session handle does not implied that a TPM command does not need to check 
the authorisation value. If the attacker does not know the authorisation, the TPM command will not execute.
Denial of Service (Threat #119) 
Threat: Attacker denies user access to session handle. 
Mitigation: Integrity measurement at system start up can check for the presence of malicious software.
Strong authentication and authorisation must be used to prevent misuse of session handle.
Threats against Symmetric key
Tampering (Threat #36) 
Threat: An attacker can wire tap the connection between the CPU and TPM and make unauthorised changes to 
the data exchanges. 
Mitigation: TPM sessions can use HMAC to protect the integrity of data exchanges between CPU and TPM. 
However, the TPM can carry out different type of session (unsalted, unbounded to salted and bounded). 
Therefore, the user application has to choose an appropriate type of session. 
Meanwhile, the attacker will have to gain physical access to the computing system in order to tap the 
communication bus between the CPU and TPM.
Tampering (Threat #80) 
Threat: Attacker insert malicious codes into the data path between the user application and TPM to hijack the 
session. 
Mitigation: The TPM will have to rely on the security of the TCB to prevent an attacker from inserting malicious 
codes between the user application and TPM. The integrity measurement of the TCB at system start up can 
offer protection against this type of attack but there is a risk of run time attack.
In addition, the session can be encrypted.
Information Disclosure (Threat #37) 
Threat: An attacker can wire tap the connection between the CPU and TPM and read the data exchange. 
Mitigation: TPM sessions can use symmetric cryptography to protect the confidentiality of data exchanges 
between CPU and TPM. However, the TPM can carry out different type of session (unsalted, unbounded to 
salted and bounded). Therefore, the user application has to choose an appropriate type of session. 
Meanwhile, the attacker will have to gain physical access to the computing system in order to tap the 
communication bus between the CPU and TPM.
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Information Disclosure (Threat #82) 
Threat: Attacker launches physical attacks on TPM to obtain cryptographic key that encrypts the data exchange 
between the user application and TPM. 
Mitigation: TPM is not designed to withstand physical attacks. User can consider using physical measures (eg. 
a lock) to prevent unauthorised physical access to computing system.
Information Disclosure (Threat #143) 
Threat: Attacker insert malicious codes into the data path between the user application and TPM to read the 
data exchanges. 
Mitigation: The TPM will have to rely on the security of the TCB to prevent an attacker from inserting malicious 
codes between the user application and TPM. The integrity measurement of the TCB at system start up can 
offer protection against this type of attack but there is a risk of run time attack.
Denial of Service (Threat #38) 
Threat: Attacker attempts to use up all TPM computing resources by sending large number of commands to 
TPM. 
Mitigation: TPM relies on the TCB to mitigate this type of attack and the integrity measurement at system start 
up ensure that the TCB is not compromised by malicious software. However, the TCB will need to be protected 
against run time attacks. TPM does not control resource consumption but there is dictionary attack protection 
for authorisation session. 
Threats against TPM RAM
Tampering (Threat #63) 
Threat: Malicious codes in the computing system attempt to alter the data stored in TPM RAM. 
Mitigation: TPM will have to reply on the security of the TCB to stop malicious codes from entering the 
computing system. The integrity measurement at system start up can protect against this type of threat but 
there is a risk of run time attacks.
TPM only allow access to data stored in shielded location if the command authorisation is successful. However, 
the TPM specification allows vendor specific commands to access and modify shielded locations on a TPM 
under certain circumstances. If such vendor specific commands are considered for implementation, they have 
to be evaluated to determine whether they meet security requirements.
When an object is loaded into the TPM, the user will be given a handle to reference this object. The TCB has to 
securely manage the use of this handle and the authorisation value of the parent object to prevent misuse. 
The TPM has to rely on the TCB to log down the commands that access the data stored in the TPM. 
Repudiation (Threat #64) 
Threat: Attacker can access the computing system and edit the log file that records the interactions of the user 
app with the TPM. 
Mitigation: TPM does not store log files internally. It will rely on the TCB to keep logs. Therefore, the TCB has 
to protect the integrity of the log files and ensure that only authorised changes can be made. 
Data Stores
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Information Disclosure (Threat #65) 
Threat: Malicious codes in computing system attempt to read the data stored in TPM RAM. 
Mitigation: TPM will have to reply on the security of the TCB to stop malicious codes from entering the 
computing system. The integrity measurement at system start up can protect against this type of threat but 
there is a risk of run time attacks.
Although data can be stored without encryption in TPM RAM, commands that access the data stored in the 
TPM RAM will require authorisation. The TCB has to ensure that the authorisation value is stored securely.
In addition, TPM RAM will lose the stored data after a restart.
Information Disclosure (Threat #142) 
Threat: Attacker makes use of physical means to read data stored in TPM RAM. 
Mitigation: The TPM is not designed to withstand physical attacks. However, this risk can be mitigated if the 
computing system is secured physically.
Denial of Service (Threat #66) 
Threat: Attacker attempts to run the TPM RAM out of space. 
Mitigation: If there are no more space in TPM RAM, the response code will indicate to the user that there is 
not enough space to store the object. The TPM should not crash if it runs out of RAM space.
Certifications
No certifications have been made for this threat model.
External Dependencies
ID Name URL Origin Team Owner External Owner Notes
1 TPM device driver External TPM manufacturer
2 Trusted Software Stack External TCG
Implementation Assumptions
ID Date/Time Element 
Impacted
Assumption
1 03/12/2013 
4:12:26PM
All It is assumed that the TPM manufacturer will follow the TPM specification 
closely.
2 03/14/2013 
4:45:56PM
All It is assumed that the cryptographic standards used by the TPM are robust.
3 03/22/2013 
2:48:28PM
All It is assumed that the internal TPM program codes are secure.
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External Security Notes
ID Notes
1 The Trusted Computing Base has to ensure that authorisation values used by user applications with TPM are managed 
securely.
2 There must be strong user authentication and authorisation.
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Threat Model: User uses TPM 2.0 to decrypt file used for group share
Threat Model Information Data Flow Diagrams Threats and Mitigations
Certifications External Dependencies Implementation Assumptions
External Security Notes
Threat Model Information
Component User uses TPM 2.0 to decrypt file used for group share
Product Trusted Platform Module 2.0
SourceUrl
Owner Trusted Computing Group
Participants Jiun Yi Yap, Allan Tomlinson
Reviewers
Url
Summary A PhD research project at Royal Holloway University of London Information Security Group
History
Data Flow Diagrams
Context
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Threats and Mitigations
Elements
Element Type Description
Data Flow Authorisation Data 
Data Flow Key Handle
Data Flow Key Handle
Data Flow Key Object Encrypted by New Parent
Data Flow Key Object Encrypted by New Parent
Data Flow (NotGenerated) Key Object (This element is not accessible from the entry points.) 
Data Flow (NotGenerated) Key Object (This element is not accessible from the entry points.) 
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Threats against User Application
Spoofing (Threat #1) 
Threat: Attacker uses social engineering methods to gains access to the computing system and attempt to 
interact with TPM. 
Mitigation: This threat can be mitigated if the use of TPM is combined with more sophisticated authentication 
methods, eg smart card, 2FA.
Most TPM commands require authorisation. TPM authorised a user based on its knowledge of a secret 
credential. If the authorisation fails, the user will not be able to carry out the commands. However, the 
credential has to be stored securely in the TCB. 
Spoofing (Threat #71) 
Threat: Attacker eavesdrops on authorisation session between user application and TPM. 
Mitigation: The salt used to generate the session key is encrypted by a key protected by TPM. The session key 
in turns encrypt the data exchanges during the session between the user application and TPM.
Spoofing (Threat #72) 
Threat: Attacker inserts malicious codes into the computing system and attempt to interact with TPM 
Mitigation: TPM will have to reply on the security of the TCB to stop malicious codes from entering the 
computing system. The integrity measurement at system start up can protect against this type of threat but 
there is a risk of run time attacks.
Most TPM commands require authorisation. TPM authorised a user based on its knowledge of a secret 
credential. If the authorisation fails, the user will not be able to carry out the commands. However, the 
credential has to be stored securely in the TCB.
Spoofing (Threat #73) 
Threat: Attacker makes changes to the authorisation value in TPM either by gaining unauthorised access to the 
computing system or by inserting malicious codes. 
Data Flow (NotGenerated) Memory Address (This element is not accessible from the entry points.) 
Data Flow (NotGenerated) Memory Address (This element is not accessible from the entry points.) 
Data Flow Migrated Key Object
Data Flow Session Handle
Data Flow Symmetric Key for Decryption
Data Store TPM RAM
Interactor User Application
Process TPM2_ Import
Process TPM2_ Unseal
Process TPM2_Load
Process TPM2_StartAuthSession
TrustBoundary
External Interactors
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Mitigation: Changes to the authorisation value in TPM will require the authorisation of the administrator. 
However, the administrator credential has to be stored securely in the TCB.
Spoofing (Threat #74) 
Threat: Attacker guess the authorisation value. 
Mitigation: TPM has a dictionary attack protection feature and will enter a lock out mode when there is 
successive authorization failure. However, the authorisation value must not be of a value that can be guessed 
easily.
Spoofing (Threat #111) 
Threat: Attacker diverts communication between user application and local TPM to another malicious TPM. 
Mitigation: The authorization data is never sent in clear from the user application to TPM. The malicious TPM 
must know the authorization data before it can trick the user application to believer that it is the local TPM.
Repudiation (Threat #2) 
Threat: User denies carrying out certain commands. 
Mitigation: TCB will have to keep a log of the commands performed on TPM. In addition, TCB will have to 
protect the integrity of this log. Meanwhile, TCB has to store the authorisation values securely to prevent 
misuse.
Repudiation (Threat #75) 
Threat: Attacker pretends to be a user application and replays commands. 
Mitigation: TPM sessions make use of nouces to mitigate against replay attacks.
Repudiation (Threat #76) 
Threat: Attacker accesses the computing system and edits log to misrepresent the record of commands. 
Mitigation: Besides strong authenication of user, TCB has to make sure only authorisation changes can be 
made to the log.
Threats against TPM2_ Import
Spoofing (Threat #25) 
Threat: Attacker attempts to load a migratable key object that is not generated by a TPM. 
Mitigation: The source TPM can insert an unique identifying value into the key object when using 
TPM2_Create. The destination TPM will verify the authencity of the key object by inspecting this identifying 
value.
Spoofing (Threat #90) 
Threat: Attacker pretends to be user application and attempt to execute this command. 
Mitigation: The integrity measurement at system start up can detect the presence of unauthorised software. 
However, there is a risk of executing unauthorised software during run time and the security features of the 
Processes
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TCB will have to mitigate this threat.
The command will check for successful authorisation before executing. However, the credential has to be 
stored securely in the TCB. In addition, the TCB will have to authenticate the user.
Spoofing (Threat #91) 
Threat: Attacker guess the authorisation value. 
Mitigation: TPM has a dictionary attack protection feature and will enter a lock out mode when there is 
successive authorization failure. However, the authorisation value must not be of a value that can be guessed 
easily.
Spoofing (Threat #92) 
Threat: Attacker attempts to change the authorisation value of the new parent. 
Mitigation: The command to change the authorisation value will require the user to provide knowledge of the 
original authorisation value.
Therefore, the authorisation value has to be stored securely in the TCB. Any user who wishes to access the 
authorisation value must be authenticated and authorised by the TCB.
Tampering (Threat #26) 
Threat: Attacker carries out a buffer overflow attack in an attempt to access other data stored in the TPM. 
Mitigation: This command validates the input data before executing the process of importing the migrateable 
key object. If input validation fails, the command will not execute. In addition, TPM only allows a protected 
capability to access data in a shield location. Data outside a shielded location has its integrity and 
confidentiality protected cryptographically. Hence, the risk of adnormal behaviour due to memory buffer 
overflow attack is minimal.
Tampering (Threat #94) 
Threat: Attacker edits a migrateable key object and attempts to import it. 
Mitigation: The migrateable key object has confidentiality and integrity protection provided by cryptographic 
means. However, there is a risk that the symmetric key for the inner wrapper and seed for the outer wrapper 
may be compromised. The TCB will have to protect these data by storing them securely and checking the 
identity and authorisation of the user requesting to access these date. 
Tampering (Threat #95) 
Threat: Attacker attempts to change the behaviour of this command by changing TPM firmware to an 
unauthorised version. 
Mitigation: During field upgrade process, the TCB has to carry out integrity check on the new firmware and 
ensure that the firmware is endorsed by the manufacturer.
Repudiation (Threat #27) 
Threat: User application denies executing this command on TPM. 
Mitigation: As the TPM does not keep an internal log, the TCB will have to keep a log of the commands 
performed on TPM. In addition, TCB will have to protect the integrity of this log and only allows authorised 
changes to be made to the log. Meanwhile, TCB has to store the authorisation values securely to prevent 
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misuse.
Repudiation (Threat #96) 
Threat: User application denies importing this object using the TPM. 
Mitigation: Importing the object will require knowledge of the authorisation value of the new parent. TCB will 
have to check the identity and authorisation of the user if it requests access to the authorisation value.
As the TPM does not keep an internal log, the TCB will have to keep a log of the commands performed on TPM. 
In addition, TCB will have to protect the integrity of this log and only allows authorised changes to be made to 
the log. 
Information Disclosure (Threat #28) 
Threat: Attacker attempts to obtain the seed value used to provide the outer layer of encryption by cracking 
the sharing protocol which uses asymmetric encrpytion. 
Mitigation: The public key infrastructure and cryptographic functions used for this purpose have to meet 
security requirements. The attestation feature of the TPM can also be used to provide some assurance on the 
authenticity and security of the endpoints.
Information Disclosure (Threat #97) 
Threat: Attacker launches physical attacks on TPM to obtain the new parent key in an attempt to break the 
cryptographic protection for the migrated key object. 
Mitigation: TPM is not designed to withstand physical attacks. User can consider using physical measures (eg. 
a lock) to prevent unauthorised physical access to computing system.
Information Disclosure (Threat #98) 
Threat: Attacker carries out crypt analysis on key objects encrypted by the same parent key. 
Mitigation: To reduce this risk, the TCB has to ensure that the same parent key must not be reused multiple 
times. A good method is to continuously expand the object hierarchy so that there are fresh keys to use for 
encrypting the key object.
Denial of Service (Threat #29) 
Threat: Attacker attempts to use up all the TPM computing resources by sending this command repeatedly. 
Mitigation: TPM relies on the TCB to mitigate this type of attack. The integrity measurement at system start up 
ensure that the TCB is not compromised by malicious software. However, the TCB will need to be protected 
against run time attacks. TPM does not have any feature to control resource consumption but there is 
dictionary attack protection for authorisation session. 
Denial of Service (Threat #99) 
Threat: Attacker launches DOS attack against the migration infrastructure. 
Mitigation: TPM has to rely on the infrastructure provider to mitigate this type of attack. If all the computing 
systems in the network are equipped with TPM, then the integrity measurement and attestation function can 
provide a higher level of trustworthiness.
Elevation of Privilege (Threat #30) 
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Threat: Attacker attempts to elevate priviledge vertically by carrying out buffer overflow attacks. 
Mitigation: Priviledge commands will require another authorisation session.
Elevation of Privilege (Threat #100) 
Threat: Attacker attempts to elevate priviledge horizontally by attempting to duplicate an object that he does 
not have access to. 
Mitigation: The seed to derive the key used to decrypt the outer wrapper is protected by the new parent key. If 
the attacker tries to import a migrateable object, he must have the authorisation value to this new parent key.
TCB has to securely store this authorisation value and identity and authorisation checking must be carried out if 
a user request access to this authorisation value.
Threats against TPM2_ Unseal
Spoofing (Threat #37) 
Threat: Attacker pretends to be user application and attempt to execute this command. 
Mitigation: The integrity measurement at system start up can detect the presence of unauthorised software. 
However, there is a risk of executing unauthorised software during run time and the security features of the 
TCB will have to mitigate this threat.
This command is only authorised to be used by the user role and the command will check for successful 
authorisation before executing. However, the credential has to be stored securely in the TCB. In addition, the 
TCB will have to authenticate the user.
Spoofing (Threat #102) 
Threat: Attacker guesses the authorisation value. 
Mitigation: TPM has a dictionary attack protection feature and will enter a lock out mode when there is 
successive authorization failure. However, the authorisation value must not be of a value that can be guessed 
easily.
Spoofing (Threat #103) 
Threat: Attacker attempts to change the authorisation value. 
Mitigation: TPM has a dictionary attack protection feature and will enter a lock out mode when there is 
successive authorization failure. However, the authorisation value must not be of a value that can be guessed 
easily.
Tampering (Threat #38) 
Threat: Attacker carries out a memory buffer overflow attack in an attempt to access other data stored in the 
TPM. 
Mitigation: This command validates the input data before executing the process of creating the new object. If 
input validation fails, the command will not execute.
Tampering (Threat #104) 
Threat: Attacker attempts to change the behaviour of this command by changing TPM firmware to an 
unauthorised version. 
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Mitigation: During field upgrade process, the TCB has to carry out integrity check on the new firmware and 
ensure that the firmware is endorsed by the manufacturer.
Repudiation (Threat #39) 
Threat: User application denies executing this command on TPM. 
Mitigation: As the TPM does not keep an internal log, the TCB will have to keep a log of the commands 
performed on TPM. In addition, TCB will have to protect the integrity of this log and only allows authorised 
changes to be made to the log. Meanwhile, TCB has to store the authorisation values securely to prevent 
misuse.
Information Disclosure (Threat #40) 
Threat: Attacker attempts to use this command to recover a cryptographic key which he does not have access 
to. 
Mitigation: The command will not execute if authorisation fails. If the key is generated by TPM, the command 
will also check if the creator of the key object allows decryption of the cryptographic. In addition, integrity 
check will detect unauthorised changes to the attributes of the key object.
Denial of Service (Threat #41) 
Threat: Attacker attempts to use up all the TPM memory by providing malicious input paramenters. 
Mitigation: If the command input refers to an invalid object handle, the command will return an error code.
Elevation of Privilege (Threat #42) 
Threat: Attacker attempts to elevate priviledge vertically by carrying out buffer overflow attacks through this 
command. 
Mitigation: This command validates the input data before executing. If input validation fails, the command will 
not execute. In addition, priviledge commands will require another authorisation session.
Elevation of Privilege (Threat #105) 
Threat: Attacker attempts to elevate priviledge horizontally by attempting to unseal a data object that he does 
not have access to. 
Mitigation: The provided authorisation value has to match that of the data object. If there is no match, the 
command will not execute.
Threats against TPM2_Load
Spoofing (Threat #31) 
Threat: Attacker pretends to be user application and attempt to execute this command. 
Mitigation: The integrity measurement at system start up can detect the presence of unauthorised software. 
However, there is a risk of executing unauthorised software during run time and the security features of the 
TCB will have to mitigate this threat.
This command is only authorised to be used by the user role and the command will check for successful 
authorisation before executing. However, the credential has to be stored securely in the TCB. In addition, the 
TCB will have to authenticate the user.
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Spoofing (Threat #77) 
Threat: Attacker guesses the authorisation value. 
Mitigation: TPM has a dictionary attack protection feature and will enter a lock out mode when there is 
successive authorization failure. However, the authorisation value must not be of a value that can be guessed 
easily.
Spoofing (Threat #78) 
Threat: Attacker creates a TPM object externally and attempts to load this object into TPM. 
Mitigation: This command will check the integrity, attributes and cryptographic binding of the object before 
loading it into the TPM. The command will not execute and it return an error code if the check fails.
Tampering (Threat #32) 
Threat: Attacker carries out a memory buffer overflow attack in an attempt to access other data stored in the 
TPM. 
Mitigation: This command validates the input data before executing the process of loading the new object. If 
input validation fails, the command will not execute. In addition, TPM only allows a protected capability to 
access data in a shield location. Data outside a shielded location has its integrity and confidentiality protected 
cryptographically. Hence, the risk of adnormal behaviour due to memory buffer overflow attack is minimal.
Tampering (Threat #79) 
Threat: Attacker attempts to change the behaviour of this command by changing TPM firmware to an 
unauthorised version. 
Mitigation: During field upgrade process, the TCB has to carry out integrity check on the new firmware and 
ensure that the firmware is endorsed by the manufacturer.
Tampering (Threat #80) 
Threat: Attacker edits an object and attempt to load it into TPM. 
Mitigation: This command will check the integrity, attributes and cryptographic binding of the object before 
loading it into the TPM. The command will not execute and it return an error code if the check fails.
Repudiation (Threat #33) 
Threat: User application denies executing this command on TPM. 
Mitigation: As the TPM does not keep an internal log, the TCB will have to keep a log of the commands 
performed on TPM. In addition, TCB will have to protect the integrity of this log and only allows authorised 
changes to be made to the log. Meanwhile, TCB has to store the authorisation values securely to prevent 
misuse.
Repudiation (Threat #81) 
Threat: User application denies loading this object to the TPM. 
Mitigation: As the TPM does not keep an internal log, the TCB will have to keep a log of the commands 
performed on TPM. In addition, TCB will have to protect the integrity of this log and only allows authorised 
changes to be made to the log. Meanwhile, TCB has to store the authorisation values securely to prevent 
misuse.
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Information Disclosure (Threat #34) 
Threat: Attacker carries out memory buffer overflow attacks in an attempt to access data stored in TPM. 
Mitigation: This command carries out validation of input data. The command will fail if data validation is not 
successful. In addition, TPM only allows a protected capability to access data in a shield location. Data outside a 
shielded location has its integrity and confidentiality protected cryptographically. Hence, the risk of information 
disclosure due to memory buffer overflow attack is minimal.
Denial of Service (Threat #35) 
Threat: Attacker attempts to use up all the TPM memory by providing malicious input paramenters. 
Mitigation: If the TPM memory does not have enough space to load the object, the command will not execute 
and an error code will be returned.
Elevation of Privilege (Threat #36) 
Threat: Attacker attempts to elevate priviledge vertically by carrying out buffer overflow attacks through this 
command. 
Mitigation: This command validates the input data before executing. If input validation fails, the command will 
not execute. In addition, priviledge commands will require another authorisation session.
Elevation of Privilege (Threat #82) 
Threat: Attacker attempts to elevate priviledge horizontally by attempting to load a child object from a 
hierarchy that he does not have access to. 
Mitigation: Authorisation is required for the use of parent object in this command.
Threats against TPM2_StartAuthSession
Spoofing (Threat #15) 
Threat: Attacker guess the authorisation value. 
Mitigation: TPM has a dictionary attack protection feature and will enter a lock out mode when there is 
successive authorization failure. However, the authorisation value must not be of a value that can be guessed 
easily.
Spoofing (Threat #83) 
Threat: Attacker starts an authorisation session and attempt to execute TPM commands. 
Mitigation: The session will not continue if the correct authorisation value is not provided to the command 
that follows.
Spoofing (Threat #93) 
Threat: Attacker attempts to change the authorisation value. 
Mitigation: The command to change the authorisation value will require the user to provide knowledge of the 
original authorisation value.
Therefore, the authorisation value has to be stored securely in the TCB. Any user who wishes to access the 
authorisation value must be authenticated and authorised by the TCB.
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Tampering (Threat #16) 
Threat: Attacker replays an authorisation session. 
Mitigation: Nonces are used in TPM sessions to prevent replay attacks. It is important that the use of the 
nonce must follow TPM's specifications.
Tampering (Threat #84) 
Threat: Attacker attempts to change the behaviour of this command by changing TPM firmware to an 
unauthorised version. 
Mitigation: During field upgrade process, the TCB has to carry out integrity check on the new firmware and 
ensure that the firmware is endorsed by the manufacturer.
Tampering (Threat #85) 
Threat: Attacker edits the session key. 
Mitigation: The generation of the session key requires the user application to supply the authorisation value to 
the object that the user application intends to use in the next TPM command. The salt value used in the 
generation of the session key is protected cryptographically as well. However, the TCB will have to store the 
authorisation value securely to prevent misuse.
If the authorisation value is easy to guess, then it is important that an attacker cannot eaves drop on the 
authorised session as it may be possible to recover the session key.
Repudiation (Threat #17) 
Threat: User application denies executing this command on TPM. 
Mitigation: As the TPM does not keep an internal log, the TCB will have to keep a log of the commands 
performed on TPM. In addition, TCB will have to protect the integrity of this log and only allows authorised 
changes to be made to the log. Meanwhile, TCB has to store the authorisation values securely to prevent 
misuse.
Repudiation (Threat #86) 
Threat: User application denies starting an authorisation session. 
Mitigation: Starting an authorisation session will require the knowledge of the authorisation value. TCB has to 
securely manage the authorisation value to prevent misuse.
Information Disclosure (Threat #18) 
Threat: Attacker steals the session key. 
Mitigation: The generation of the session key requires the user application to supply the authorisation value to 
the object that the user application intends to use in the next TPM command. The salt value used in the 
generation of the session key is protected cryptographically as well. However, the TCB will have to store the 
authorisation value securely to prevent misuse.
If the authorisation value is easy to guess, then it is important that an attacker cannot eaves drop on the 
authorised session as it may be possible to recover the session key.
Information Disclosure (Threat #87) 
Threat: Attacker uses physical means to obtain the session key from the TPM. 
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Mitigation: TPM is not designed to withstand physical attacks. User can consider using physical measures (eg. 
a lock) to prevent unauthorised physical access to computing system.
Information Disclosure (Threat #88) 
Threat: The cryptographic properties of authorised session can be weaken if the nonce and salt value used in 
the generation of the session key have low entropy. 
Mitigation: The method used to generate the nonce and salt value has to meet security requirements, for 
example NIST SP 800-90A. An alternate method is to use TPM's random number generator to provide the salt 
value. Similarly, TPM's RNG has to meet security requirements.
Denial of Service (Threat #19) 
Threat: Attacker attempts to use up all the TPM computing resources by sending this command repeatedly. 
Mitigation: TPM will return an error code if there is not enough memory to start this session. TPM does not 
have feature to control resource consumption. 
The integrity measurement at system start up ensure that the TCB is not compromised by malicious software. 
However, the TCB will need to be protected against run time attacks.
Elevation of Privilege (Threat #20) 
Threat: Attacker attempts to elevate priviledge horizontally by starting an authorisation session to an object 
that he does not have access to. 
Mitigation: When the authorised session is used on another object, the authorisation value to the new object 
has to be provided. Therefore, authorisation value has to be managed securely to prevent misuse.
Threats against Authorisation Data 
Tampering (Threat #3) 
Threat: Attacker alters data used to start an authorised session. 
Mitigation: The salt value is encrypted.
The derivation of the session key requires the authorisation value. This authorisation value is not passed from 
user application to TPM in the data flow.
Information Disclosure (Threat #4) 
Threat: Attacker generates session key based on data sniffed from this data flow. 
Mitigation: The salt value is encrypted.
The derivation of the session key requires the authorisation value. This authorisation value is not passed from 
user application to TPM in the data flow. However, it is important that the authorisation value cannot be 
guessed easily.
Information Disclosure (Threat #68) 
Threat: Attacker tries to read the actual salt value. 
Data Flows
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Mitigation: The salt value is encrypted with a key loaded in TPM.
Information Disclosure (Threat #69) 
Threat: Attacker makes use of physical means to read the key stored in TPM. 
Mitigation: The TPM is not designed to withstand physical attacks. However, this risk can be mitigated if the 
computing system is secured physically.
Denial of Service (Threat #5) 
Threat: Attacker hijacks authorisation session. 
Mitigation: The establishment of the authorised session will require the knowledge of the authorisation value. 
Nouces are used to protect against replay attacks.
Threats against Key Handle
Tampering (Threat #52) 
Threat: Attacker obtains object handle and attempt to carry out a TPM command on that object. 
Mitigation: TPM command will check that the authorisation value provided by the user for the object matches 
the authorisation value stored in the TPM. The command will only operate on the object if the authorisation is 
successful. Hence, the TCB has to securely manage the authorisation value to prevent misuse.
Information Disclosure (Threat #53) 
Threat: Attacker obtains object handle and use TPM commands to decrypt the data in the object's private area. 
Mitigation: TPM command will check that the authorisation value provided by the user for the object matches 
the authorisation value stored in the TPM. The command will only operate on the object if the authorisation is 
successful. Hence, the TCB has to securely manage the authorisation value to prevent misuse.
Denial of Service (Threat #54) 
Threat: Attacker denies user application from using the object handle. 
Mitigation: Integrity measurement at system start up can check for the presence of malicious software.
Strong authentication and authorisation must be used to prevent misuse of object handle.
Threats against Key Handle
Tampering (Threat #55) 
Threat: Attacker obtains object handle and attempt to carry out a TPM command on that object. 
Mitigation: TPM command will check that the authorisation value provided by the user for the object matches 
the authorisation value stored in the TPM. The command will only operate on the object if the authorisation is 
successful. Hence, the TCB has to securely manage the authorisation value to prevent misuse.
Information Disclosure (Threat #56) 
Threat: Attacker obtains object handle and use TPM commands to decrypt the data in the object's private area. 
Mitigation: TPM command will check that the authorisation value provided by the user for the object matches 
the authorisation value stored in the TPM. The command will only operate on the object if the authorisation is 
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successful. Hence, the TCB has to securely manage the authorisation value to prevent misuse.
Denial of Service (Threat #57) 
Threat: Attacker denies user application from using the object handle. 
Mitigation: Integrity measurement at system start up can check for the presence of malicious software.
Strong authentication and authorisation must be used to prevent misuse of object handle.
Threats against Key Object Encrypted by New Parent
Tampering (Threat #46) 
Threat: Attacker attempts to edit the key object. 
Mitigation: The key object is cryptographically protected by the new parent.
Information Disclosure (Threat #47) 
Threat: Attacker obtain sensitive information from the key object. 
Mitigation: The key object is cryptographically protected by the new parent.
Denial of Service (Threat #48) 
Threat: Attacker denies user access to key object. 
Mitigation: Integrity measurement at system start up can check for the presence of malicious software.
Strong authentication and authorisation must be used to prevent misuse of created object.
Threats against Key Object Encrypted by New Parent
Tampering (Threat #49) 
Threat: Attacker attempts to edit the key object. 
Mitigation: The key object is cryptographically protected by the new parent.
Information Disclosure (Threat #50) 
Threat: Attacker obtain sensitive information from the key object. 
Mitigation: The key object is cryptographically protected by the new parent.
Denial of Service (Threat #51) 
Threat: Attacker denies user access to key object. 
Mitigation: Integrity measurement at system start up can check for the presence of malicious software.
Strong authentication and authorisation must be used to prevent misuse of created object.
Threats against Migrated Key Object
Tampering (Threat #43) 
Threat: Attacker attempts to edit the migrated data object. 
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Mitigation: The data object is encrypted with a key derived from a seed generated by the source TPM. This 
seed value is encrypted by the public key from the new parent at destination TPM.
Information Disclosure (Threat #44) 
Threat: Attacker obtain sensitive information from the migrated object. 
Mitigation: The data object is encrypted with a key derived from a seed generated by the source TPM. This 
seed value is encrypted by the public key from the new parent at destination TPM.
Denial of Service (Threat #45) 
Threat: Attacker denies user access to migrated object. 
Mitigation: Integrity measurement at system start up can check for the presence of malicious software.
Strong authentication and authorisation must be used to prevent misuse of duplicated object.
It will depend on the security of the mechanism used to migrate the duplicated object from the source TPM to 
the destination TPM.
Threats against Session Handle
Tampering (Threat #6) 
Threat: Attacker alters the nonce value returned by the TPM. 
Mitigation: If the nonce value is altered, the session will not be able to proceed because the nonce value held 
by the TPM will be different. The nonce value is used in the generation of the HMAC integrity check value and 
session key.
Tampering (Threat #89) 
Threat: Attacker reuse session handle. 
Mitigation: Session handle for HMAC or policy authorisation can only be used once. However, session handle 
for password authorisation can be reused. Hence, the TCB has to securely manage the password to prevent 
misuse.
Information Disclosure (Threat #7) 
Threat: Attacker reads the session handle. 
Mitigation: Knowledge of the session handle does not implied that a TPM command does not need to check 
the authorisation value. If the attacker does not know the authorisation, the TPM command will not execute.
Denial of Service (Threat #8) 
Threat: Attacker denies user access to session handle. 
Mitigation: Integrity measurement at system start up can check for the presence of malicious software.
Strong authentication and authorisation must be used to prevent misuse of session handle.
Threats against Symmetric Key for Decryption
Tampering (Threat #58) 
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Threat: An attacker can wire tap the connection between the CPU and TPM and make unauthorised changes to 
the data exchanges. 
Mitigation: TPM sessions can use HMAC to protect the integrity of data exchanges between CPU and TPM. 
However, the TPM can carry out different type of session (unsalted, unbounded to salted and bounded). 
Therefore, the user application has to choose an appropriate type of session. 
Meanwhile, the attacker will have to gain physical access to the computing system in order to tap the 
communication bus between the CPU and TPM.
Tampering (Threat #106) 
Threat: Attacker insert malicious codes into the data path between the user application and TPM to hijack the 
session. 
Mitigation: The TPM will have to rely on the security of the TCB to prevent an attacker from inserting malicious 
codes between the user application and TPM. The integrity measurement of the TCB at system start up can 
offer protection against this type of attack but there is a risk of run time attack.
Information Disclosure (Threat #59) 
Threat: Attacker tries to obtain the session key that is used to encrypt the return value. 
Mitigation: The TCB has to put in place security mechanism to protect the session key it uses with the TPM. 
When the return value leaves the TPM, the TCB has to store the return value securely. User access to the return 
value should be authenticated and check for authorisation.
Information Disclosure (Threat #107) 
Threat: An attacker can wire tap the connection between the CPU and TPM and read the data exchange. 
Mitigation: TPM sessions can use symmetric cryptography to protect the confidentiality of data exchanges 
between CPU and TPM. However, the TPM can carry out different type of session (unsalted, unbounded to 
salted and bounded). Therefore, the user application has to choose an appropriate type of session. 
Meanwhile, the attacker will have to gain physical access to the computing system in order to tap the 
communication bus between the CPU and TPM.
Information Disclosure (Threat #108) 
Threat: Attacker launches physical attacks on TPM to obtain cryptographic key that encrypts the data exchange 
between the user application and TPM. 
Mitigation: TPM is not designed to withstand physical attacks. User can consider using physical measures (eg. 
a lock) to prevent unauthorised physical access to computing system.
Information Disclosure (Threat #109) 
Threat: Attacker insert malicious codes into the data path between the user application and TPM to read the 
data exchanges. 
Mitigation: The TPM will have to rely on the security of the TCB to prevent an attacker from inserting malicious 
codes between the user application and TPM. The integrity measurement of the TCB at system start up can 
offer protection against this type of attack but there is a risk of run time attack.
Denial of Service (Threat #60) 
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Threat: Attacker attempts to use up all TPM computing resources by sending large number of commands to 
TPM. 
Mitigation: TPM relies on the TCB to mitigate this type of attack and the integrity measurement at system start 
up ensure that the TCB is not compromised by malicious software. However, the TCB will need to be protected 
against run time attacks. TPM does not control resource consumption but there is dictionary attack protection 
for authorisation session. 
Threats against TPM RAM
Tampering (Threat #21) 
Threat: Malicious codes in the computing system attempt to alter the data stored in TPM RAM. 
Mitigation: TPM will have to reply on the security of the TCB to stop malicious codes from entering the 
computing system. The integrity measurement at system start up can protect against this type of threat but 
there is a risk of run time attacks.
TPM only allow access to data stored in shielded location if the command authorisation is successful. However, 
the TPM specification allows vendor specific commands to access and modify shielded locations on a TPM 
under certain circumstances. If such vendor specific commands are considered for implementation, they have 
to be evaluated to determine whether they meet security requirements.
When an object is loaded into the TPM, the user will be given a handle to reference this object. The TCB has to 
securely manage the use of this handle and the authorisation value of the parent object to prevent misuse. 
The TPM has to rely on the TCB to log down the commands that access the data stored in the TPM. 
Repudiation (Threat #22) 
Threat: Attacker can access the computing system and edit the log file that records the interactions of the user 
app with the TPM. 
Mitigation: TPM does not store log files internally. It will rely on the TCB to keep logs. Therefore, the TCB has 
to protect the integrity of the log files and ensure that only authorised changes can be made. 
Information Disclosure (Threat #23) 
Threat: Malicious codes in computing system attempt to read the data stored in TPM RAM. 
Mitigation: TPM will have to reply on the security of the TCB to stop malicious codes from entering the 
computing system. The integrity measurement at system start up can protect against this type of threat but 
there is a risk of run time attacks.
Although data can be stored without encryption in TPM RAM, commands that access the data stored in the 
TPM RAM will require authorisation. The TCB has to ensure that the authorisation value is stored securely.
In addition, TPM RAM will lose the stored data after a restart.
Information Disclosure (Threat #70) 
Threat: Attacker makes use of physical means to read data stored in TPM RAM. 
Mitigation: The TPM is not designed to withstand physical attacks. However, this risk can be mitigated if the 
Data Stores
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computing system is secured physically.
Denial of Service (Threat #24) 
Threat: Attacker attempts to run the TPM RAM out of space. 
Mitigation: If there are no more space in TPM RAM, the response code will indicate to the user that there is 
not enough space to store the object. The TPM should not crash if it runs out of RAM space.
Certifications
No certifications have been made for this threat model.
External Dependencies
ID Name URL Origin Team Owner External Owner Notes
1 TPM device driver External TPM manufacturer
2 Trusted Software Stack External TCG
Implementation Assumptions
ID Date/Time Element 
Impacted
Assumption
1 04/08/2013 
2:59:12PM
All It is assumed that the TPM manufacturer will follow the TPM specification 
closely.
2 04/08/2013 
2:59:26PM
All It is assumed that the cryptographic standards used by the TPM are robust.
3 04/08/2013 
2:59:45PM
All It is assumed that the internal TPM program codes are secure.
External Security Notes
ID Notes
1 The Trusted Computing Base has to ensure that authorisation values used by user applications with TPM are managed 
securely.
2 There must be strong user authentication and authorisation.
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Appendix C
An Ontology of a Computing Device Secured
with Trusted Platform Module 2.0 in OWL
Format
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<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE rdf:RDF [
    <!ENTITY owl "http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#" >
    <!ENTITY xsd "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" >
    <!ENTITY rdfs "http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#" >
    <!ENTITY rdf "http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" >
    <!ENTITY tpm2.0 "http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#" >
]>
<rdf:RDF xmlns="http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#"
     xml:base="http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0"
     xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
     xmlns:owl="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#"
     xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#"
     xmlns:rdfs="http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#"
     xmlns:tpm2.0="http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#">
    <owl:Ontology rdf:about="http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0"/>
    
    <!--
    
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//////////////////////
    //
    // Object Properties
    //
    
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//////////////////////
     -->
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#backsSecurityAndTrustNotion -->
    <owl:ObjectProperty 
rdf:about="&tpm2.0;backsSecurityAndTrustNotion">
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;DeviceCapability"/>
        <rdfs:range 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;SecurityAndTrustNotion"/>
    </owl:ObjectProperty>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#enablesDeviceCapability -->
    <owl:ObjectProperty 
rdf:about="&tpm2.0;enablesDeviceCapability">
        <rdfs:range rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;DeviceCapability"/>
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;TPM2.0Capability"/>
    </owl:ObjectProperty>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#isBackedByDeviceCapability -->
    <owl:ObjectProperty 
rdf:about="&tpm2.0;isBackedByDeviceCapability">
        <rdfs:range rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;DeviceCapability"/>
        <rdfs:domain 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;SecurityAndTrustNotion"/>
        <owl:inverseOf 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;backsSecurityAndTrustNotion"/>
    </owl:ObjectProperty>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#isCounterMeasureTo -->
    <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="&tpm2.0;isCounterMeasureTo">
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;TPM2.0Capability"/>
    </owl:ObjectProperty>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#isEnabledByTPM2.0Capability -->
    <owl:ObjectProperty 
rdf:about="&tpm2.0;isEnabledByTPM2.0Capability">
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;DeviceCapability"/>
        <rdfs:range rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;TPM2.0Capability"/>
        <owl:inverseOf 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;enablesDeviceCapability"/>
    </owl:ObjectProperty>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#isSupportedByTPM2.0Capability -->
    <owl:ObjectProperty 
rdf:about="&tpm2.0;isSupportedByTPM2.0Capability">
        <rdfs:range rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;TPM2.0Capability"/>
        <rdfs:domain 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;SecurityAndTrustNotion"/>
        <owl:inverseOf 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;supportsSecurityAndTrustNotion"/>
    </owl:ObjectProperty>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#supportsTPM2.0Capability -->
    <owl:ObjectProperty 
rdf:about="&tpm2.0;supportsTPM2.0Capability">
        <rdfs:range rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;TPM2.0Capability"/>
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;TPM2.0SubSystem"/>
        <owl:inverseOf 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;usesTPM2.0SubSystem"/>
    </owl:ObjectProperty>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#supportsSecurityAndTrustNotion -->
    <owl:ObjectProperty 
rdf:about="&tpm2.0;supportsSecurityAndTrustNotion">
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;TPM2.0Capability"/>
        <rdfs:range 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;SecurityAndTrustNotion"/>
    </owl:ObjectProperty>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#usesTPM2.0SubSystem -->
    <owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="&tpm2.0;usesTPM2.0SubSystem">
        <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;TPM2.0Capability"/>
        <rdfs:range rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;TPM2.0SubSystem"/>
    </owl:ObjectProperty>
    
    <!--
    
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//////////////////////
    //
    // Classes
    //
    
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//////////////////////
     -->
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#AES -->
    <owl:Class rdf:about="&tpm2.0;AES">
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;SymmetricEngine"/>
    </owl:Class>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#AccessControl -->
    <owl:Class rdf:about="&tpm2.0;AccessControl">
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;DeviceCapability"/>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;backsSecurityAndTrustNotion"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;Integrity"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;backsSecurityAndTrustNotion"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;Accountability"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;backsSecurityAndTrustNotion"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;Availability"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;backsSecurityAndTrustNotion"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;Confidentiality"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;isEnabledByTPM2.0Capability"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;ProtectedLocation"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
    </owl:Class>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#Accountability -->
    <owl:Class rdf:about="&tpm2.0;Accountability">
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;SecurityAndTrustNotion"/>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;isBackedByDeviceCapability"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;IdentityManagement"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;isSupportedByTPM2.0Capability"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;IntegrityMeasurement"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;isBackedByDeviceCapability"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;AccessControl"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
    </owl:Class>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#Assurance -->
    <owl:Class rdf:about="&tpm2.0;Assurance">
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;SecurityAndTrustNotion"/>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;isSupportedByTPM2.0Capability"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;IntegrityMeasurement"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
    </owl:Class>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#AsymmetricEngine -->
    <owl:Class rdf:about="&tpm2.0;AsymmetricEngine">
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;TPM2.0SubSystem"/>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;supportsTPM2.0Capability"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;Certification"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;supportsTPM2.0Capability"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;Attestation"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
    </owl:Class>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#Attestation -->
    <owl:Class rdf:about="&tpm2.0;Attestation">
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;TPM2.0Capability"/>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;usesTPM2.0SubSystem"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;AsymmetricEngine"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;usesTPM2.0SubSystem"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;ExecutionEngine"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;supportsSecurityAndTrustNotion"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;Identity"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;usesTPM2.0SubSystem"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;NVMemory"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;supportsSecurityAndTrustNotion"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;ExpectedBehaviour"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;usesTPM2.0SubSystem"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;Authorization"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;supportsSecurityAndTrustNotion"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;Authenticity"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;usesTPM2.0SubSystem"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;VolatileMemory"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;usesTPM2.0SubSystem"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;KeyGeneration"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;enablesDeviceCapability"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;IdentityManagement"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
    </owl:Class>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#Authenticity -->
    <owl:Class rdf:about="&tpm2.0;Authenticity">
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;SecurityAndTrustNotion"/>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;isSupportedByTPM2.0Capability"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;Certification"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;isSupportedByTPM2.0Capability"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;Attestation"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;isBackedByDeviceCapability"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;IdentityManagement"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
    </owl:Class>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#Authorization -->
    <owl:Class rdf:about="&tpm2.0;Authorization">
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;TPM2.0SubSystem"/>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;supportsTPM2.0Capability"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;Certification"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;supportsTPM2.0Capability"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;IntegrityMeasurement"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;supportsTPM2.0Capability"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;Attestation"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;supportsTPM2.0Capability"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;ProtectedLocation"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
    </owl:Class>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#Availability -->
    <owl:Class rdf:about="&tpm2.0;Availability">
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;SecurityAndTrustNotion"/>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;isBackedByDeviceCapability"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;SecureDataBackup"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;isBackedByDeviceCapability"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;AccessControl"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
    </owl:Class>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#Certification -->
    <owl:Class rdf:about="&tpm2.0;Certification">
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;TPM2.0Capability"/>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;usesTPM2.0SubSystem"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;NVMemory"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;usesTPM2.0SubSystem"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;AsymmetricEngine"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;supportsSecurityAndTrustNotion"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;Identity"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;usesTPM2.0SubSystem"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;ExecutionEngine"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;supportsSecurityAndTrustNotion"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;Authenticity"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;usesTPM2.0SubSystem"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;Authorization"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
    </owl:Class>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#Confidentiality -->
    <owl:Class rdf:about="&tpm2.0;Confidentiality">
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;SecurityAndTrustNotion"/>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;isBackedByDeviceCapability"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;SecureDataBackup"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;isBackedByDeviceCapability"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;AccessControl"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;isSupportedByTPM2.0Capability"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;ProtectedLocation"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
    </owl:Class>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#DeviceCapability -->
    <owl:Class rdf:about="&tpm2.0;DeviceCapability"/>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#ECC -->
    <owl:Class rdf:about="&tpm2.0;ECC">
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;AsymmetricEngine"/>
    </owl:Class>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#ExecutionEngine -->
    <owl:Class rdf:about="&tpm2.0;ExecutionEngine">
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;TPM2.0SubSystem"/>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;supportsTPM2.0Capability"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;ProtectedLocation"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;supportsTPM2.0Capability"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;Attestation"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;supportsTPM2.0Capability"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;IntegrityMeasurement"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;supportsTPM2.0Capability"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;Certification"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
    </owl:Class>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#ExpectedBehaviour -->
    <owl:Class rdf:about="&tpm2.0;ExpectedBehaviour">
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;SecurityAndTrustNotion"/>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;isBackedByDeviceCapability"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;SecureDataBackup"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;isSupportedByTPM2.0Capability"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;Attestation"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;isSupportedByTPM2.0Capability"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;IntegrityMeasurement"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
    </owl:Class>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#HashEngine -->
    <owl:Class rdf:about="&tpm2.0;HashEngine">
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;TPM2.0SubSystem"/>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;supportsTPM2.0Capability"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;IntegrityMeasurement"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
    </owl:Class>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#Identity -->
    <owl:Class rdf:about="&tpm2.0;Identity">
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;SecurityAndTrustNotion"/>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;isBackedByDeviceCapability"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;IdentityManagement"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;isSupportedByTPM2.0Capability"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;Certification"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;isSupportedByTPM2.0Capability"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;Attestation"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
    </owl:Class>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#IdentityManagement -->
    <owl:Class rdf:about="&tpm2.0;IdentityManagement">
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;DeviceCapability"/>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;isEnabledByTPM2.0Capability"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;IntegrityMeasurement"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;isEnabledByTPM2.0Capability"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;Attestation"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;isEnabledByTPM2.0Capability"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;ProtectedLocation"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;backsSecurityAndTrustNotion"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;Identity"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;backsSecurityAndTrustNotion"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;Accountability"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;backsSecurityAndTrustNotion"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;Authenticity"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
    </owl:Class>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#Integrity -->
    <owl:Class rdf:about="&tpm2.0;Integrity">
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;SecurityAndTrustNotion"/>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;isSupportedByTPM2.0Capability"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;IntegrityMeasurement"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;isBackedByDeviceCapability"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;AccessControl"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
    </owl:Class>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#IntegrityMeasurement -->
    <owl:Class rdf:about="&tpm2.0;IntegrityMeasurement">
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;TPM2.0Capability"/>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;usesTPM2.0SubSystem"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;Authorization"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;supportsSecurityAndTrustNotion"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;Accountability"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;usesTPM2.0SubSystem"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;VolatileMemory"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;usesTPM2.0SubSystem"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;HashEngine"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;supportsSecurityAndTrustNotion"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;Integrity"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;enablesDeviceCapability"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;IdentityManagement"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;usesTPM2.0SubSystem"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;ExecutionEngine"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;supportsSecurityAndTrustNotion"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;ExpectedBehaviour"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
    </owl:Class>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#KeyGeneration -->
    <owl:Class rdf:about="&tpm2.0;KeyGeneration">
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;TPM2.0SubSystem"/>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;supportsTPM2.0Capability"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;ProtectedLocation"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;supportsTPM2.0Capability"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;Attestation"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
    </owl:Class>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#Management -->
    <owl:Class rdf:about="&tpm2.0;Management">
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;TPM2.0SubSystem"/>
    </owl:Class>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#NVMemory -->
    <owl:Class rdf:about="&tpm2.0;NVMemory">
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;TPM2.0SubSystem"/>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;supportsTPM2.0Capability"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;Attestation"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;supportsTPM2.0Capability"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;ProtectedLocation"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;supportsTPM2.0Capability"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;Certification"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
    </owl:Class>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#OneTimePadXOR -->
    <owl:Class rdf:about="&tpm2.0;OneTimePadXOR">
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;SymmetricEngine"/>
    </owl:Class>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#PowerDetection -->
    <owl:Class rdf:about="&tpm2.0;PowerDetection">
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;TPM2.0SubSystem"/>
    </owl:Class>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#ProtectedLocation -->
    <owl:Class rdf:about="&tpm2.0;ProtectedLocation">
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;TPM2.0Capability"/>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;enablesDeviceCapability"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;AccessControl"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;usesTPM2.0SubSystem"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;Authorization"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;supportsSecurityAndTrustNotion"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;Confidentiality"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;usesTPM2.0SubSystem"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;ExecutionEngine"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;usesTPM2.0SubSystem"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;RNG"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;enablesDeviceCapability"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;SecureDataBackup"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;usesTPM2.0SubSystem"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;KeyGeneration"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;enablesDeviceCapability"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;IdentityManagement"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;usesTPM2.0SubSystem"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;SymmetricEngine"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;usesTPM2.0SubSystem"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;NVMemory"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
    </owl:Class>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#RNG -->
    <owl:Class rdf:about="&tpm2.0;RNG">
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;TPM2.0SubSystem"/>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;supportsTPM2.0Capability"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;ProtectedLocation"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
    </owl:Class>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#RSA -->
    <owl:Class rdf:about="&tpm2.0;RSA">
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;AsymmetricEngine"/>
    </owl:Class>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#SHA-1 -->
    <owl:Class rdf:about="&tpm2.0;SHA-1">
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;HashEngine"/>
    </owl:Class>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#SHA-2 -->
    <owl:Class rdf:about="&tpm2.0;SHA-2">
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;HashEngine"/>
    </owl:Class>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#SM2 -->
    <owl:Class rdf:about="&tpm2.0;SM2">
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;AsymmetricEngine"/>
    </owl:Class>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#SM3 -->
    <owl:Class rdf:about="&tpm2.0;SM3">
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;HashEngine"/>
    </owl:Class>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#SM4 -->
    <owl:Class rdf:about="&tpm2.0;SM4">
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;SymmetricEngine"/>
    </owl:Class>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#SecureDataBackup -->
    <owl:Class rdf:about="&tpm2.0;SecureDataBackup">
        <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;DeviceCapability"/>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;isEnabledByTPM2.0Capability"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;ProtectedLocation"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;backsSecurityAndTrustNotion"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;Availability"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;backsSecurityAndTrustNotion"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;Confidentiality"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
    </owl:Class>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#SymmetricEngine -->
    <owl:Class rdf:about="&tpm2.0;SymmetricEngine">
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;TPM2.0SubSystem"/>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;supportsTPM2.0Capability"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;ProtectedLocation"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
    </owl:Class>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#TPM2.0Capability -->
    <owl:Class rdf:about="&tpm2.0;TPM2.0Capability"/>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#TPM2.0SubSystem -->
    <owl:Class rdf:about="&tpm2.0;TPM2.0SubSystem"/>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#SecurityAndTrustNotion -->
    <owl:Class rdf:about="&tpm2.0;SecurityAndTrustNotion"/>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#VolatileMemory -->
    <owl:Class rdf:about="&tpm2.0;VolatileMemory">
        <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;TPM2.0SubSystem"/>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;supportsTPM2.0Capability"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;Attestation"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
        <rdfs:subClassOf>
            <owl:Restriction>
                <owl:onProperty 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;supportsTPM2.0Capability"/>
                <owl:someValuesFrom 
rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;IntegrityMeasurement"/>
            </owl:Restriction>
        </rdfs:subClassOf>
    </owl:Class>
    
    <!--
    
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//////////////////////
    //
    // Individuals
    //
    
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//////////////////////
     -->
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#AES -->
    <owl:NamedIndividual rdf:about="&tpm2.0;AES">
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;SymmetricEngine"/>
    </owl:NamedIndividual>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#Accountability -->
    <owl:NamedIndividual rdf:about="&tpm2.0;Accountability"/>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#Authenticity -->
    <owl:NamedIndividual rdf:about="&tpm2.0;Authenticity"/>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#Availability -->
    <owl:NamedIndividual rdf:about="&tpm2.0;Availability"/>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#Confidentiality -->
    <owl:NamedIndividual rdf:about="&tpm2.0;Confidentiality"/>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#ECC -->
    <owl:NamedIndividual rdf:about="&tpm2.0;ECC"/>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#EndorsementSeed -->
    <owl:NamedIndividual rdf:about="&tpm2.0;EndorsementSeed">
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;NVMemory"/>
    </owl:NamedIndividual>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#ExpectedBehaviour -->
    <owl:NamedIndividual rdf:about="&tpm2.0;ExpectedBehaviour"/>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#Identity -->
    <owl:NamedIndividual rdf:about="&tpm2.0;Identity"/>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#Integrity -->
    <owl:NamedIndividual rdf:about="&tpm2.0;Integrity">
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;SecurityAndTrustNotion"/>
    </owl:NamedIndividual>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#OneTimePadXOR -->
    <owl:NamedIndividual rdf:about="&tpm2.0;OneTimePadXOR">
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;SymmetricEngine"/>
    </owl:NamedIndividual>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#PCR -->
    <owl:NamedIndividual rdf:about="&tpm2.0;PCR">
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;VolatileMemory"/>
    </owl:NamedIndividual>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#PlatformSeed -->
    <owl:NamedIndividual rdf:about="&tpm2.0;PlatformSeed">
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;NVMemory"/>
    </owl:NamedIndividual>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#RSA -->
    <owl:NamedIndividual rdf:about="&tpm2.0;RSA"/>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#SHA-1 -->
    <owl:NamedIndividual rdf:about="&tpm2.0;SHA-1">
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;HashEngine"/>
    </owl:NamedIndividual>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#SHA-256 -->
    <owl:NamedIndividual rdf:about="&tpm2.0;SHA-256">
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;HashEngine"/>
    </owl:NamedIndividual>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#SM2 -->
    <owl:NamedIndividual rdf:about="&tpm2.0;SM2"/>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#SM3 -->
    <owl:NamedIndividual rdf:about="&tpm2.0;SM3">
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;HashEngine"/>
    </owl:NamedIndividual>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#SM4 -->
    <owl:NamedIndividual rdf:about="&tpm2.0;SM4">
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;SymmetricEngine"/>
    </owl:NamedIndividual>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#StorageSeed -->
    <owl:NamedIndividual rdf:about="&tpm2.0;StorageSeed">
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;NVMemory"/>
    </owl:NamedIndividual>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#key_size_1024 -->
    <owl:NamedIndividual rdf:about="&tpm2.0;key_size_1024">
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;RSA"/>
    </owl:NamedIndividual>
    
    <!-- http://www.semanticweb.org/pxai0_
000/ontologies/2015/3/TPM2.0#key_size_2048 -->
    <owl:NamedIndividual rdf:about="&tpm2.0;key_size_2048">
        <rdf:type rdf:resource="&tpm2.0;RSA"/>
    </owl:NamedIndividual>
</rdf:RDF>
<!-- Generated by the OWL API (version 3.5.1) 
http://owlapi.sourceforge.net -->
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Threats against Provenance aware system
Spoofing (Threat #82) 
Threat: Attacker pretends to be a legitimate provenance aware system 
Mitigation: The trust evaluator does not limit the check to provenance record. It can check on other evidence 
to ascertain the identity of the provenance aware system.
Tampering (Threat #83) 
Threat: Attacker tamper with a legitimate provenance aware system. 
Mitigation: A trusted computing base secured with anti-virus software and intrusion detection system can help 
to mitigate this threat.
Repudiation (Threat #84) 
Threat: Provenance aware system denies it produces a particular provenance record. 
Mitigation: A provenance aware system can have an unique ID and this ID is tagged to the provenance record 
it produces.
Information Disclosure (Threat #85) 
Threat: Attacker reads provenance records produced by provenance aware system. 
Mitigation: Most modern operating systems offer memory protection to prevent a process from accessing a 
memory location not allocated to it.
Denial of Service (Threat #86) 
Threat: Attacker overloads a provenance aware system. 
Elements
Element Type Description
Data Flow Get
Data Flow Log
Data Flow Query
Data Flow Reply
Data Flow Rule
Data Flow Verify
Data Store Provenance record store
Data Store Rule store
Process Provenance aware system
Process Trust evaluator
TrustBoundary
TrustBoundary
Processes
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Mitigation: A firewall can block out access from unauthorised IP addresses.
Elevation of Privilege (Threat #87) 
Threat: Attacker gain access to high privilege level of provenance aware system. 
Mitigation: Most modern operating system requires authorisation before giving a user a higher privilege level. 
In addition, most modern operating systems offer memory protection to prevent a process from accessing a 
memory location not allocated to it.
Threats against Trust evaluator
Spoofing (Threat #31) 
Threat: Malicious application pretends to be evaluator and gives the result of a positive trust assessment of a 
provenance record. 
Mitigation: The result of the evaluation contains an unique key and it can be used with TPM 2.0 enhanced 
authorisation.
Tampering (Threat #32) 
Threat: The evaluator is modified so that it gives an unreliable assessment of provenance record. 
Mitigation: The evaluator should be part of the Trusted Computing Base and its integrity is checked during 
system boot up.
Repudiation (Threat #33) 
Threat: The evaluator denies it's ownership of the assessment of a provenance record. 
Mitigation: The evaluator is configured with an unique ID and this ID is stated in the assessment result it 
produces.
Information Disclosure (Threat #34) 
Threat: Attacker reads the input and output of the trust evaluator. 
Mitigation: Most modern operating systems offer memory protection to prevent a process from accessing a 
memory location not allocated to it.
Denial of Service (Threat #35) 
Threat: Attacker overloads the computing resource of the trust evaluator. 
Mitigation: A firewall can block access from unauthorised IP addresses.
Elevation of Privilege (Threat #36) 
Threat: Attacker gains access to higher privilege level of trust evaluator. 
Mitigation: Most modern operating system requires authorisation before giving a user a higher privilege level. 
In addition, most modern operating systems offer memory protection to prevent a process from accessing a 
memory location not allocated to it.
Data Flows
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Threats against Get
Tampering (Threat #47) 
Threat: Attacker alters the get rule request from the evaluator to the rule base 
Mitigation: Most modern operating systems offer memory protection to prevent a process from accessing a 
memory location not allocated to it.
Information Disclosure (Threat #48) 
Threat: Attacker reads the get rule request from the evaluator to the rule base 
Mitigation: Most modern operating systems offer memory protection to prevent a process from accessing a 
memory location not allocated to it.
Denial of Service (Threat #49) 
Threat: Attackers attempt to use up all the computing resource of the rule store by sending larger number of 
get rule request to the rule base. 
Mitigation: If the rule store is accessed over a network, a firewall can be used to block network access from 
unauthorised ip address.
Threats against Log
Tampering (Threat #9) 
Threat: Attacker insert malicious codes into the data path between the provenance aware application and 
provenance record store to hijack the session. 
Mitigation: The TPM will have to rely on the security of the TCB to prevent an attacker from inserting malicious 
codes between the user application and TPM. The integrity measurement of the TCB at system start up can 
offer protection against this type of attack but there is a risk of run time attack.
In addition, most modern operating systems offer memory protection to prevent a process from accessing a 
memory location not allocated to it.
Information Disclosure (Threat #10) 
Threat: Attacker reads the data path between the provenance aware application and provenance record store. 
Mitigation: The TPM will have to rely on the security of the TCB to prevent an attacker from inserting malicious 
codes between the user application and TPM. The integrity measurement of the TCB at system start up can 
offer protection against this type of attack but there is a risk of run time attack.
In addition, most modern operating systems offer memory protection to prevent a process from accessing a 
memory location not allocated to it.
Denial of Service (Threat #11) 
Threat: Attacker attempts to use up all computing resources by sending large number of logs to the 
provenance record store. 
Mitigation: A provenance aware application has to log in to the provenance record store before it can deposit 
its provenance record. The log in access control can prevent a provenance aware application from logging in 
after a number of unsuccessful attempts.
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Threats against Query
Tampering (Threat #37) 
Threat: Attacker alters the query from the evaluator to the provenance record store. 
Mitigation: Network protocol such as the TLS can be used to protect this information exchange. 
Information Disclosure (Threat #38) 
Threat: Attacker reads the information exchange between the provenance record store and evaluator. 
Mitigation: The provenance record is encrypted and the cryptographic key is stored in the source TPM. During 
the migration of the cryptographic key to the destination TPM, the cryptographic key is encrypted by the public 
key of the destination TPM.
Meanwhile, network protocol such as the TLS can be used to further protect this information exchange. 
Information Disclosure (Threat #75) 
Threat: Attacker pretends to be an evaluator and sends a query to the computing device. 
Mitigation: The evaluator provides its credentials to the computing device for verification. The credentials can 
be signed by its TPM.
Denial of Service (Threat #39) 
Threat: Attacker attempts to use up the computing resource of the provenance record store by sending large 
number of queries. 
Mitigation: If the provenance record store is accessed over a network, a firewall can be used to block network 
access from unauthorised ip address.
Threats against Reply
Tampering (Threat #40) 
Threat: Attacker alters the reply from the provenance record store to the evaluator. 
Mitigation: The provenance record is encrypted and the cryptographic key used is encrypted with the public 
key of the evaluator's TPM.
Information Disclosure (Threat #41) 
Threat: Attacker reads the reply from the provenance record store to the evaluator. 
Mitigation: The provenance record is encrypted and the cryptographic key used is encrypted with the public 
key of the evaluator's TPM.
Denial of Service (Threat #42) 
Threat: Attacker attempts to use up the computing resource of the evaluator by sending large number of 
replies. 
Mitigation: A firewall can be used to block network access from unauthorised ip address.
Threats against Rule
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Tampering (Threat #50) 
Threat: Attacker alters the rule provided by the rule base to the evaluator. 
Mitigation: Most modern operating systems offer memory protection to prevent a process from accessing a 
memory location not allocated to it.
Information Disclosure (Threat #51) 
Threat: Attacker reads the rule provided by the rule base to the evaluator. 
Mitigation: Most modern operating systems offer memory protection to prevent a process from accessing a 
memory location not allocated to it.
Denial of Service (Threat #52) 
Threat: Attackers attempt to use up all the computing resource of the trust evaluator by sending larger 
number of rule reply. 
Mitigation: A firewall can block network access from unauthorised ip address.
Threats against Verify
Tampering (Threat #88) 
Threat: Attacker insert malicious codes into the data path between the provenance aware application and 
provenance record store to hijack the session. 
Mitigation: The TPM will have to rely on the security of the TCB to prevent an attacker from inserting malicious 
codes between the user application and TPM. The integrity measurement of the TCB at system start up can 
offer protection against this type of attack but there is a risk of run time attack.
In addition, most modern operating systems offer memory protection to prevent a process from accessing a 
memory location not allocated to it.
Information Disclosure (Threat #89) 
Threat: Attacker reads the data path between the provenance aware application and provenance record store. 
Mitigation: The TPM will have to rely on the security of the TCB to prevent an attacker from inserting malicious 
codes between the user application and TPM. The integrity measurement of the TCB at system start up can 
offer protection against this type of attack but there is a risk of run time attack.
In addition, most modern operating systems offer memory protection to prevent a process from accessing a 
memory location not allocated to it.
Denial of Service (Threat #90) 
Threat: Attacker attempts to use up all computing resources by sending large number of replies to the 
provenance aware system. 
Mitigation: The session can be controlled by a log in process.
Threats against Provenance record store
Data Stores
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Tampering (Threat #21) 
Threat: Malicious entity access the provenance record store and alters the provenance records. 
Mitigation: A provenance record is encrypted and the cryptographic key is stored in the TPM. The 
cryptographic key can be migrated to the TPM of the evaluator and then subsequently used to decrpyt the 
provenance record for the purpose of trust assessment.
Repudiation (Threat #22) 
Threat: Provenance record store denies that it possess a provenance record. 
Mitigation: The provenance record store can be an unique ID and this ID is tagged to a provenance record 
when it is first stored.
Information Disclosure (Threat #23) 
Threat: The content of the provenance record store is accessed by an unauthorised party. 
Mitigation: A provenance record is encrypted and the cryptographic key is stored in the TPM. The 
cryptographic key can be migrated to the TPM of the evaluator and then subsequently used to decrpyt the 
provenance record for the purpose of trust assessment.
Denial of Service (Threat #24) 
Threat: Attacker attempts to run provenance record store out of space. 
Mitigation: The coding of the provenance record store has to include provision for the scenario of insufficient 
storage space. The provenance record store can prompt the computer user to remove selected provenance 
records. The provenance record store should not crash in this scenario.
Threats against Rule store
Tampering (Threat #43) 
Threat: Malicious entity access the rule base and alters the trust assessment rules. 
Mitigation: The rule base can be encrypted and the cryptographic key can be stored in the TPM. The evaluator 
will have to provide the correct authorisation value to obtain the cryptographic key from the TPM and then 
proceed to decrypt the rule base before it uses the rules for a trust assessment.
Repudiation (Threat #44) 
Threat: Rule store denies it's ownership of a rule. 
Mitigation: Rule store can have an unique ID and this ID is tagged to the rule when it is first stored.
Information Disclosure (Threat #45) 
Threat: The content of the rule base is accessed by an unauthorised party. 
Mitigation: The rule base can be encrypted and the cryptographic key can be stored in the TPM. The evaluator 
will have to provide the correct authorisation value to obtain the cryptographic key from the TPM and then 
proceed to decrypt the rule base before it uses the rules for a trust assessment.
Denial of Service (Threat #46) 
Threat: Attacker use up all the computing resource of the rule store by sending large number of access 
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request. 
Mitigation: A firewall can block network access from unauthorised IP address.
Certifications
No certifications have been made for this threat model.
External Dependencies
There are no external dependencies.
Implementation Assumptions
There are no implementation assumptions.
External Security Notes
There are no external security notes.
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